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Preface 
Once again it is a pleasure to acknowledge the financial support of Touche 
Ross Foundation that has made it possible to continue this series of biennial 
auditing symposia at the University of Kansas. The 1984 symposium was the 
seventh of the series, and once again about fifty invited practitioners and 
educators came together for two days to consider and discuss the eight papers 
that were presented. 
As the persons co-chairing the symposium, we selected the topics to be 
presented as well as the persons who prepared the papers or served as the 
designated discussants. The paper on the origins and development of mate­
riality as an auditing concept continues the historical coverage of auditing that 
has opened each of the symposia. The sole unifying theme or purpose of the 
additional papers was, as always, that the topic addressed or the research 
reported relate to current matters likely to be of interest and concern to the 
invited participants from both practice and academe. Following the pattern 
established with the first symposium, all papers, except for the traditional 
evening address on a more general topic, were distributed in advance, making 
it possible for the preparer to limit comments to summary remarks or 
observations about the paper, and more than an hour was available for the 
prepared response of the selected discussant and the ensuing open discussion. 
Although these discussions have invariably been one of the highlights of the 
symposia, it has not been feasible to attempt to capture and report these 
discussions for the benefit of the wider readership of the proceedings. For 
those who might like an opportunity to participate in the discussions at a future 
symposium, we would be pleased to receive an indication of your interest. 
The proceedings of each of the symposia except the first are still in print 
and may be purchased from 
KANSAS UNION BOOKSTORE 
UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS 
LAWRENCE, KANSAS 66045 
Proceedings are shipped only on a prepaid basis. The prepaid price covers 
mailing costs with the exception of orders outside of the United States and 
Canada, in which case an additional $2.00 should be included for surface 
transportation. The papers included in each of the available proceedings, the 
authors of those papers, and the prepaid price of each volume from the Kansas 
Union Bookstore are given below for the benefit of those who may wish to 
refer to a paper in one of the previous volumes. 
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An Added Note-
Auditing Symposium VII becomes the final offering of the symposia with 
which I will be directly involved, inasmuch as I retired from the faculty of the 
University of Kansas at the end of the 1984 spring semester after an 
association of 37 years. The response to the symposia has been most 
gratifying, especially in terms of the willingness of so many busy people to 
prepare the 56 papers that have been presented and of others to serve as 
discussants for those papers. Many persons have given their support to this 
series since it began in 1972, but I particularly want to recognize with thanks 
the assistance and encouragement of Jerry Jackson, previously of the Kansas 
City office of Touche Ross & Co. and now in the national office, and Bob Long 
of the Kansas City office of Arthur Andersen & Co. 
Plans have been made to assure the continuation of the symposia, thanks to 
Dean John Tollefson of the University of Kansas School of Business. To that 
end, Allen Ford agreed to take time from his involvement in the income tax 
area to be co-chairman on an interim basis, so as to be able to pass the reins to 
a successor with an auditing specialty when such a person is appointed to the 
faculty of the School of Business. 
I do, however, plan to lend my assistance to subsequent symposia and to 
participate in them if I can manage to be invited. I look forward to seeing some 
of the many persons with whom I have become acquainted through the 
symposia and in other ways, either at subsequent symposia or other profes­
sional gatherings. 
Howard Stettler 
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The Origins and Development of 
Materiality as an Auditing Concept 
David C. Selley 
Auditing Standards Director, 
The Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants 
Introduction 
"Unimportant, of course, I meant," the King hastily said, and went on to himself in an 
undertone, "important—unimportant—unimportant-important—" as if he were trying 
which word sounded best. 
—C.L. Dodgson, alias Lewis Carroll 
The accounting and auditing professions and users of financial statements 
are, of course, much more organized than the King. Or are they? Recently, 
accounting professions in a number of countries, including the United States, 
have issued authoritative pronouncements on the subject of materiality in 
accounting, and the United States has issued a pronouncement on materiality in 
an auditing context (AICPA Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 47, 
"Materiality and Audit Risk," referred to hereafter as SAS 47). However, no 
one pretends that all the problems have been resolved and, as will be outlined 
in this paper, further work is underway in a number of areas. 
Being asked to write a paper on materiality is rather like being asked to 
write a love poem. If one were to research all love poems previously written 
one would wonder how it was possible to come up with anything new or 
different. The materiality situation is similar. There is an immense quantity of 
material on the subject from standard-setting bodies and commissions, task 
forces and study groups commissioned by such bodies, practising firms, 
authors of text books and researchers in academe and elsewhere. This activity 
has not been confined to the United States. One approach to a paper on the 
history and development of the concept of materiality would be to write an 
accountant's equivalent to a Whole Earth Catalogue, but that would be most 
uninteresting for the writer and even more so for the reader. This paper 
therefore is highly selective in the material that it covers and the issues that it 
addresses. 
Until the last several years, little of the work carried out on the subject of 
materiality dealt specifically or at length with the auditor's use of this concept. 
Most of the emphasis, and probably rightly so, was on what was material in the 
context of annual financial statements and the users thereof. Nevertheless, 
there was always some recognition that the auditor was concerned in this 
process, even if only to indicate at the outset that the particular pronounce­
ment, study or paper did not deal with the auditor's concern on the question. 
The problem is that the auditor has to be concerned with understanding 
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how materiality is accounted for in the accounting sense and then has concerns 
over and above that in determining how he can construct an audit program to 
obtain reasonable assurance of detecting errors, if they exist, in financial 
statements accumulating to the materiality levels determined in an accounting 
context. It is this that has led to a supposed distinction between accounting 
materiality and auditing materiality, which is one of the issues addressed in this 
paper. 
In this paper, I will make no attempt at a catalogue. I am not in a position to 
do so. I will try to bring to the subject my experience which was until the early 
1970s, that of a practising auditor wresting with day-to-day problems of 
materiality and coping with materiality guidelines provided by the national office 
of my firm, one of the largest public accounting firms in Canada. Next, I spent 
several years in that same national office auditing standards department and 
was therefore part of the firm's process of developing the auditing materiality 
guidelines that then were wrestled with by those unfortunates in the field that I 
had abandoned. For the last three years I was Director of Auditing Standards 
for the firm. For the past seven months I have been Auditing Standards 
Director at The Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA), respon­
sible for staff support for the auditing standards-setting process in Canada. So I 
will try to bring to bear the views of a practitioner (very rusty), a trouble-
shooter and a standard-setter. 
I have no academic experience (except as a student) and I am not a 
researcher. In preparing this paper I have read, I think, most of the key 
authoritative pronouncements and studies, a selection of the research papers 
and articles referred to in those studies and some other material that caught my 
fancy. The background material referred to is heavily weighted towards North 
America. However, I have taken into account developments at the authorita­
tive level in other parts of the Anglo-Saxon accounting world. 
I am, therefore, not going to find a new discovery in the literature. I am 
treading well-trodden ground. Readers may think that all this sounds a little like 
a restricted scope paragraph, and they may very well be right. I ask that you 
wait for the conclusion before deciding whether such conclusion is an opinion, a 
qualified opinion or a disclaimer of opinion. 
I will make references in many cases in abbreviated form, which are then 
described in detail in Appendix 1. In some cases, I will also identify quotations 
taken second-hand from published material. Unless quotations are so identi­
fied, they have been taken from the original material. 
This paper is presented in the following sequence. 
Section A—History of the Concept of Materiality in an Audit-
ing Context 
A very brief summary in chronological sequence of the major developments 
since the 1950s and an even briefer summary of developments prior to that. 
Section B—Where We are Now? 
A very brief summary of where the profession is now with respect to 
authoritative and semi-authoritative material. 
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Section C—Key Issues 
Commentary on selected key issues that have been a feature of develop­
ments in this field since the 1950s. The following issues are covered: 
1. Definition of materiality 
2. Accounting versus auditing materiality 
3. Materiality and the audit model 
4. Quantitative versus qualitative materiality 
5. Practical considerations when unrealistic materiality levels are demanded. 
6. Professional judgment versus rules of thumb (by far the biggest issue, at 
least in terms of volume of paper) 
7. The user problem 
8. Informing the user 
9. Aggregation of individual materiality judgments 
Section D—Concluding Comments 
Appendices 
1. List of Short-Form References used in the Paper 
2. Apparent Status of Materiality Question with Authoritative Professional 
Bodies 
3. Definitions of Materiality. Elements of the Definition 
4. Bibliography 
A number of other issues have not been dealt with in this paper. These 
include considerations of soft numbers (client estimates), dividing materiality 
among locations, highly leveraged entities, materiality in low-profit or loss-
making entities, the carryover of immaterial unadjusted errors from one period 
to the next, materiality for compliance procedures and changing materiality 
from one year to the next. I have, however, attempted to identify the main 
themes in the debate. 
History of the Concept of Materiality in an Auditing Context 
It is probably fair to say that materiality has always been a consideration in 
presenting accounts and in auditing them. Even in 19th century Great Britain, 
when audits were more of an investigative exercise, it would not have been 
possible to work without some agreement between an auditor and his client 
(but probably not the user) as to what was material and what was not, although 
it is probable that the level was set very low at what we would now call a level 
of triviality. 
The best evidence of concerns in this area was a change in the form of the 
auditor's report in the U.K. in 1900 from use of the phrase "true and correct" 
to "true and fair." This appears to have taken longer to develop in the United 
States. Agitation to drop the term "certify" and the phrase "true and 
correct" occurred during the 1930s, as, of course, did the stock-market 
collapse and securities legislation. As a result, in 1940 a new form of report was 
developed which reads much like the current standard report and, in particular, 
the phrase "present fairly . . . in accordance with generally accepted account­
ing principles" appears. The reference to generally accepted auditing stand-
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ards came in 1941 after the McKesson & Robbins scandal and the wording 
used today was eventually adopted in 1949. Finally, with respect to events 
prior to 1950, it is important to know that generally accepted auditing standards 
were promulgated in October 1947, although they were not generally elabo­
rated upon at that time. 
The most important events subsequent to 1950 are outlined below. 
• In 1954 the AICPA's Committee on Auditing Procedure issued a booklet 
entitled Generally Accepted Auditing Standards, Their Significance and 
Scope. Contained in this material (page 25) is the following under the heading 
"Materiality": 
There should be stronger grounds to sustain the auditor's informed 
opinion in respect of those items which are relatively more important 
and in respect of those in which the possibilities of material error are 
greater. For example, in an enterprise with relatively few, but large, 
accounts receivable, the individual items themselves are more 
important, and the possibility of major error is also greater, than in 
another enterprise which has a vast number of small accounts 
aggregating the same total . . . Similarly, accounts receivable will 
receive more attention than prepaid insurance. However put in 
words, the principle of materiality is inherent in the work of the 
auditor. 
This paragraph was included in the 1963 codification of Statements on 
Auditing Procedure (No. 33) published by the AICPA and is now with minor 
amendment part of the AICPA's auditing standards, Section 150, "Gener­
ally Accepted Auditing Standards" (paragraph .04). However unsophisti­
cated this wording might seem in the light of all the subsequent research, it 
is interesting to note that materiality was raised as an auditing issue at the 
very inception of a codification of generally accepted auditing standards. 
• Apart from various worthwhile research papers and articles and the 
publication of a number of very specific materiality guidelines to cover 
particular situations by the SEC and by the AICPA, the next major event 
was the publication in 1965 by the CICA of what is known as an "Audit 
Technique Study" with the title Materiality in Auditing (referred to 
hereafter as the CICA Technique Study). While not an official auditing 
standard, such a study does have a reasonably high degree of authority.* 
Not only did this study address the entire issue of materiality from the 
auditor's point of view, but it provided specific materiality guidelines and 
rules of thumb based on varying percentages of gross profit. This study 
sparked interest in the United States and resulted in an article by Douglas R. 
Carmichael in the Journal of Accountancy in December 1969, which sug­
gested that the study be considered by the U.S. profession. 
• Then, in 1968, Accounting Statement V-10 was issued by the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales entitled "The Interpretation of 
'Material' in Relation to Accounts" (Statement V-10). This accounting 
* The relevant wording is, in part, "This study is part of a series prepared by the Study Group on 
Audit Techniques and published under the general authority of the Committee on Accounting and 
Auditing Research . . . (It) expresses the views of the Study Group and does not reflect the 
approval or endorsement of the Institute nor of the Committee." 
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pronouncement was highly significant because, while it emphasized profes­
sional judgment, it outlined the factors to be taken into account and 
suggested particular percentage guidelines: 
In some circumstances a difference of about 10% might be acceptable 
but in other circumstances a difference as low as 3% might be too 
much. While percentage comparisons can, properly used, constitute 
useful broad guides, it must be kept in mind that they are no more 
than rough rules of thumb, and should not be applied indiscriminately 
without regard to particular circumstances. 
• At about the same time the Bar Chris1 case was decided in the United 
States. In this case the judge made matters rather difficult for accountants by 
specifically outlining two situations in detail and concluding in one that the 
misstatement in question was not material and in the other that it was. This 
did not really solve any problems because this case, like most other legal 
cases, simply decides materiality on the basis of particular facts in a 
particular case. Nevertheless it did focus the attention of auditors on the 
issue of materiality. 
• In 1972, AICPA SAS 2, "Reports on Audited Financial Statements" was 
published and paragraph 16 provided some very general guidance to the 
auditor in how to decide what was, or what was not, material at the 
evaluation stage of the audit, when he was about to express his opinion. 
• In 1974 the Accountants International Study Group (AISG—consisting of 
representatives of the U.S., U.K. and Canadian professions) published a 
study entitled Materiality in Accounting which described practices in the 
three countries concerned. In addition to noting that materiality is essentially 
a matter of professional judgment (this is a mandatory statement for anyone 
to make dealing with the subject) this group suggested that: 
'Quantitative guidelines within broad parameters are usually used in 
practice and we believe they could be developed by the authoritative 
bodies in the three nations' (paragraph 30). 
In the same year, a Statement of Accounting Standards on "Materiality in 
Financial Statements" was issued jointly by the two authoritative accounting 
bodies in Australia. A similar standard was issued in New Zealand in 1977. 
These statements provided guidance on determining materiality and specific 
rules of thumb in more detail and with more encouragement than the earlier 
British pronouncement (Statement V-10). 
• We now come to 1975 and things were really warming up. The AICPA 
issued SAS No. 5 "The Meaning of 'Present Fairly in Conformity with 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles' in the Independent Auditor's 
Report" which suggested that auditors should use their judgment as to 
whether: 
. . . the financial statements reflect the underlying assets and 
transactions in a manner that presents the financial position . . . 
stated within a range of acceptable limits, that is, limits that are 
reasonable and practicable to attain in financial statements. (emphasis 
added) 
However, by far the most important event in 1975, and arguably the most 
important event to date in the whole question of materiality from an 
5 
accounting (and therefore also from an auditing) point of view, was the 
publication in March of the Financial Accounting Standards Board Discussion 
Memorandum, "An Analysis of Issues Related to Criteria for Determining 
Materiality." Henceforth, in this paper this will be referred to as 
" F A S B . D M , " followed by a page reference. This synthesized an enormous 
amount of the preceding work on materiality, including all of the items 
previously mentioned* and many papers prepared on the subject by 
practitioners and academics. It was, and is, a mammoth work. The 
discussion memorandum generated much comment and public hearings were 
held. To skip just a little in the chronology at this point, it should be noted 
that, during the 1970s the FASB was unable to come to grips with the 
concept of materiality, which ended up forming part of one of the conceptual 
framework projects, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2 
(SFAC No. 2), "Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting Information," 
published in 1980. It is interesting to note that the 246 pages in the 
discussion memorandum (including bibliographies, etc.) was boiled down to 
an exposure draft with 18 paragraphs and to only 10 paragraphs in the final 
pronouncement. 
• In 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court2 provided a judicial definition of mate­
riality, the key elements of which are noted in Appendix 3. 
• In 1980, the year that SFAC No. 2 was issued as described above, two 
research studies were published by the CICA. One, entitled "Financial 
Reporting For Non-Profit Organizations" recommended specific rules of 
thumb materiality guidelines for auditors of non-profit organizations, and the 
second study, "Extent of Audit Testing," while it does not set specific 
guidelines, assumes that a materiality level has been decided upon and 
quantified and concludes that the materiality level used by the auditor at the 
planning stage must be the same as that used by the preparers of financial 
statements. 
• The early 1980s saw considerable efforts on the part of the AICPA Auditing 
Standards Executive Committee (AudSEC) to deal with the question of 
materiality as part of a project entitled "Materiality and Audit Risk." The 
urgency for this became greater after June 1981 with the publication of SAS 
39, "Audit Sampling," which required the auditor to come to a decision on 
what was material when devising a sample. 
• Eventually, in September 1983, the AICPA published SAS 47, which deals 
squarely with the issue of materiality, although at the conceptual level. SAS 
47 does not provide any rule of thumb guidelines, nor does it even require 
the auditor to express his preliminary consideration of materiality in 
quantified terms. SAS 47 also recognizes that certain qualitative aspects of 
materiality decisions at the evaluation stage of the audit, might not be able to 
be taken account of at the planning stage (this matter is discussed later in 
this paper). 
• Although SAS 47 contained no rule of thumb guidelines, the subject had been 
considered by the committee during the process of developing the pro­
nouncements.3 At present a Research Monograph is in the course of 
preparation that will publish the information accumulated by the Task Force 
formed to develop the material for SAS 47. 
* For example, relevant portions describing the quantitative guidelines in the Canadian CICA 
Technique Study, the British Statement V-10 and the Australian Statement are quoted in full. 
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• The next event of significance, in my view, will be the probable publication 
during 1984 of a research study by the CICA entitled Materiality—The 
Concept and its Application to Auditing (referred to hereafter as The Leslie 
Study). This study is authored by Donald A. Leslie, FCA, who has written 
several papers on this subject and who is heavily involved in the subject of 
statistical sampling. He was also a member of the SAS 47 Task Force 
referred to above and of the Study Group which produced the CICA 
Research Study Extent of Audit Testing. I have reviewed a draft version of 
this research study and with the kind permission of the author have quoted 
extracts (which may, of course, change). This study as presently drafted 
deals with all the issues raised in this paper and a host of others as well. It 
will be by far the most comprehensive study to date and is prepared from the 
auditor's point of view. 
While the above history takes into account only important authoritative 
pronouncements, it should be remembered that throughout the period at least 
from the 1950s, a considerable amount of empirical research was being carried 
out, a number of legal decisions were made, and a few specific guidelines were 
set out for specific situations by the SEC and by the AICPA. Much of this is 
captured in the bibliography attached to the FASB Discussion Memorandum, 
and the specific guidelines are described in pages 25 to 33 and 38 to 43. There 
is also a more up-to-date list of relevant legal decisions in paragraphs 163 to 
165 of SFAC No. 2 and of specific accounting and SEC rules in paragraph 166, 
including Table 1. 
Where Are We Now? 
Before proceeding further, it would be well to summarize where the profes­
sions, at least in the Anglo-Saxon world, are in April 1984 on the question of 
materiality in terms of setting standards. 
UNITED STATES 
Accounting 
• SFAC No. 2 "Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting Information" para­
graphs 123 to 132 (an authoritative, conceptual pronouncement providing 
general criteria for determining materiality but no rules of thumb or detailed 
practical guidance). 
• A few specific guidelines in quantitative form in pronouncements of the 
AICPA's Accounting Principles Board and one by the FASB in respect to 
segmented information. 
Auditing 
• Various references to materiality considerations in SAS's, together with 
SAS 47 "Audit-Risk and Materiality in Conducting an Audit" (Authoritative, 
conceptual and specific guidance but no rules of thumb and no requirement to 
quantify at all). 
• An AICPA Research Monograph underway which may illustrate rules of 
thumb. 
• SAS 39 "Audit Sampling," which provides guidance for the application of 
materiality decisions in audit sampling. 
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CANADA 
Accounting and Auditing 
• The CICA Handbook contains only a definition and a statement that the 
content of the Handbook applies only to material items. 
• The Research Study, Financial Reporting for Non-Profit Organizations 
(1980) provides general and quantitative guidelines. 
Auditing 
• An Audit Technique Study (1965) provides general guidance and rules of 
thumb based on gross profit (these latter rules have probably not been 
widely used in practice). 
• The Research Study, Extent of Audit Testing, provides guidance on the 
application of materiality decisions. 
• A Research Study is in the final stages that will deal comprehensively with 
the materiality issue from the viewpoint of the auditor. 
UNITED KINGDOM 
Accounting 
• Statement V-10, published in 1970, "The Interpretation of 'Material' in 
relation to accounts" provides extensive criteria and general guidance, 
including a brief reference to rule of thumb percentages. 
Auditing 
• The Auditing Practices Committee has identified materiality as a topic but 
has not commenced a project.4 
AUSTRALIA 
Accounting 
• The Australian profession (National Council of the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in Australia and General Council of the Australian Society of 
Accountants) has published Statement DS7: "Materiality in Financial Ac­
counts," an authoritative statement providing general and detailed guidance, 
including rules of thumb. 
Auditing 
• The Australian auditing profession relies heavily on the International Audit­
ing Guidelines (IAGs) published by the International Auditing Practices 
Committee (IAPC) in setting its own auditing guidelines. The IAPC has 
commenced a project on "Materiality and Audit Risk" which Australia may 
adopt. 
NEW ZEALAND 
Accounting 
• A Statement of Standard Accounting Practice No. 6 was published in 1977 by 
the New Zealand Society of Accountants entitled "Materiality in Financial 
Statements." It contains general and specific guidance, including rules of 
thumb. 
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INTERNATIONAL 
Accounting (IASC) 
• No guidance 
Accounting (AISG) 
• A study of Materiality in Accounting, published in 1974, recommended 
specific guidance with quantitative parameters (i.e., rules of thumb). 
Auditing (IAPC) 
• Proposed IAG "Materiality and Audit Risk" in process. 
A comparative summary of where the various standard-setting bodies stand 
is contained in Appendix 2. It is interesting to note that, in the auditing field, 
the US profession was first past the post with an authoritative pronouncement, 
yet has hesitated to go as far with respect to the quantification and rules of 
thumb as other professional bodies have in their accounting pronouncements or 
less-than-authoritative material. 
Key Issues 
1. Definition of Materiality 
In the dictionary, the word "material" is generally regarded as being 
synonymous with "significant," and that is the end of it. The best short 
definition I have found is: "in essence, 'materiality' means this: if it doesn't 
really matter, don't bother with it." (Ernest L. Hicks, "Materiality," 
Journal of Accounting Research (Autumn 1964), page 158.) However, these 
definitions won't really do as practical guidance. Accordingly, various and 
sundry authors, authoritative and semi-authoritative bodies, and lexicogra­
phers particularly interested in accounting have tried their hand at a definition. 
To be fair, all of these definitions are not necessarily trying to achieve exactly 
the same purpose and there are, or course, other definitions that I have not 
considered. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this paper, 13 definitions were 
examined from the U.S., Canada and the U.K. and the following general 
conclusions can be drawn (see Appendix 3 for more detail): 
• In 11 of the 13 definitions specific reference is made to the users of the 
information and in the other two cases it is implied, although not stated. 
• In 9 of the 13 definitions the user is required to be "intelligent," 
"reasonable" or "prudent." In one of the remaining cases (a particular 
court case) prudence was not particularly relevant. 
• The degree of certainty that the preparer or transmitter of the information 
should have that the user will be affected varies, but he would generally 
require a relatively high degree of certainty. For example, none of the 
definitions seen suggested that it was sufficient that the reader "might" be 
affected. The conditions range from "reasonably likely" to "would" or 
"should." 
There is therefore a high degree of agreement that these three elements 
should be included in any definition, and they are indeed the key three elements 
in the definition contained in SFAC No. 2, issued by the AICPA in 1980 and at 
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this time the most authoritative U.S. definition. In the draft CICA research 
study, Leslie basically picks up the SFAC No. 2 definition and adds the element 
of aggregation. (As seen in Appendix 3, his and that of the FASB.DM are the 
only definitions to do this.) Leslie suggests that the aggregate of omissions or 
mis-statements could cause a reasonable person to mistakenly rely. 
In my view, this is the best definition I have seen and accordingly is quoted 
as follows from the draft: 
Materiality—The magnitude of an omission or mis-statement or the 
aggregate thereof that, in the light of surrounding circumstances, 
makes it probable that the judgment of a reasonable person relying on 
the financial statements would have been changed or influenced by such 
omission or mis-statement or the aggregate thereof. 
For wider application (e.g., to other than financial statements), this 
definition could easily be amended. No doubt different users will require 
somewhat different difinitions but, for the purposes of the auditor, I believe 
that the above definition is appropriate and properly encompasses the key 
elements required. 
2. Accounting versus Auditing Materiality 
One of the problems (or non-problems) that seems to have continually 
plagued researchers and standard-setters in this area is what is held to be a 
distinction between accounting and auditing materiality. Perhaps this distinc­
tion arose because it was the accountants who set the rules and created 
problems for auditors in applying them. However, since accountants have not 
in fact set very many detailed rules in this area (at least in the U.S. and 
Canada), and the auditors have had quite a hand in preparing the ones that have 
been set, this is difficult to understand. 
The FASB DM on page 7 states, 
The Board's consideration focuses on materiality in financial accounting 
and reporting. However, the results of this project may be useful in any 
consideration of materiality in auditing. 
That comment has to be one of the understatements of all time. It is 
impossible to imagine how auditors could conceivably not take into considera­
tion any decision that the FASB might have reached. However, as we know, 
the FASB did not reach any specific decisions as a result of this project. 
The materiality problem does not exist only within the profession. Causey, 
in his work on legal liability for public accountants (Duties and Liabilities of 
Public Accountants) deals with the question of materiality and quotes a number 
of cases. He starts out with the following statement (page 187-1982 edition): 
No little confusion has surrounded the use of the word "material'' and 
"materiality" in the accounting profession. The reason for this confu­
sion is that authors use the words in various contexts with various 
meanings without making careful distinctions for the different uses. 
Materiality in the context of applying audit procedures is quite different 
from materiality in the context of financial reporting. 
Nor do professional accountants from several countries when they get 
together necessarily fail to fall into the same trap— 
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This study deals with materiality as it relates to accounting matters . . . 
and sets forth some criteria used in making materiality decisions. It 
does not consider the concept of materiality in relation to its effect on 
auditing procedures that would normally be employed as the basis of an 
auditor's opinion on the financial statements. (AISG Study, Materiality 
in Accounting, 1974). 
However, on the other hand, some authorities and researchers, while 
recognizing that materiality is first of all an accounting concept, and that 
auditors have to use the accounting concept, believe that the materiality 
concept itself is the same in both cases. For example, D.R. Carmichael in 
"The Cumulative Aspects of Materiality," (Journal of Accountancy, December 
1969), says 
The auditor uses materiality in essentially two ways: (1) evaluating the 
fairness of presentation and reporting (materiality in accounting) and (2) 
in deciding questions involving the development and execution of the 
audit program (materiality in auditing). However, materiality in auditing 
is dependent upon materiality in accounting. An item would be material 
for auditing purposes if failure to detect mis-statement or misrepresen­
tation of the item would influence decisions based upon the factual 
statements. 
The CICA Research Study on non-profit organizations (1980) starts out 
with a distinction: 
The Study Group believes that accounting materiality is one of the most 
important governing factors in determining what should be disclosed in 
any financial statement . . . Materiality in auditing is discussed in 
chapter 14. 
but goes on to say in chapter 14 (page 107): 
If accounting materiality is set at a certain level, the auditor must 
execute sufficient tests to obtain a reasonable degree of assurance that 
if there are aggregate errors of that magnitude, they will be disclosed 
during the course of the audit. 
(This particular statement on the objective of auditing procedures will be 
referred to again later.) 
In the end, it seems that researchers and standard-setters acknowledge 
that, while accountants set the materiality level, auditors have to use it. Some 
researchers and authors go on to point out that the auditor uses the materiality 
level at two stages, first devising the extent of procedures necessary to detect 
material errors if they exist and then at the evaluation stage of the audit to 
assess whether errors found are material. Most researchers to date have 
suggested that the same materiality number is applicable both at the planning 
and evaluation stages. However, this leads us right into the next issue in this 
paper: materiality and the audit model. 
In conclusion, therefore, there is widespread agreement that materiality 
from the auditor's point of view at the final evaluation stage of the audit is the 
same as it is from the point of view of the preparers of the financial statements 
(so-called "accounting materiality"). However, SAS 47 has stated that the 
auditor for cost/benefit reasons may not in fact plan his procedures to detect 
some errors that would be qualitatively material. If this view prevails (as it is 
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almost bound to do in the U.S.) we are again back to two materialities: 
"planning materiality" and "evaluation materiality." Future developments will 
clarify this situation or further confuse it. 
3. Materiality and the Audit Model 
The objective of an audit is properly stated, in my view, in International 
Auditing Guideline 1, "Objective and Scope of the Audit of Financial State­
ments." 
The objective of an audit of financial statements, prepared within a 
framework of recognized accounting principles, is to enable an auditor 
to express an opinion on such financial statements. (IAG 1, paragraph 2) 
Paragraph 10 refines this objective further by stating 
In forming his opinion on the financial statements, the auditor carries 
out procedures designed to obtain reasonable assurance that the 
financial statements are properly stated in all material respects. 
The CICA Handbook, in Section 5000.04, "Audit of Financial Statements— 
An Introduction'' states 
In performing his examination, the auditor seeks reasonable assurance 
that the financial statements taken as a whole are not materially mis­
stated. 
These objectives are similar to objectives contained in the audit evidence 
standards (e.g., the third field work standard in the United States and the third 
examination standard in Canada). 
The principle to be noted here is that there is assumed to be a direct link 
between material errors in the financial statements, if they exist, and the 
auditor's procedures. Although the concepts of reasonable assurance and cost 
effectiveness are mentioned by writers in this area, the fact remains that it 
appears under this model to be inconceivable that an auditor could deliberately 
not devise procedures which might leave open a substantial risk that material 
errors would occur in the financial statements. This is an issue which underlies 
the literature up to the issuance of SAS 47, although it was generally not 
highlighted. 
SAS 47 has changed all that by specifically inserting the word "quan­
titatively" into the definition in paragraph 13 and following it with a statement 
that there are some kinds of things that an auditor would consider material if he 
found them, but he will not go looking for them. Paragraph 13 states: 
The auditor generally plans the audit primarily to detect errors that he 
believes could be large enough, individually or in the aggregate, to be 
quantitatively material to the financial statements. Although the auditor 
should be alert for errors that could be qualitatively material, it is 
ordinarily impractical to design procedures to detect them. SAS No. 31, 
"Evidential Matter," states that "an auditor typically works within 
economic limits; his opinion, to be economically useful, must be framed 
within a reasonable length of time and at a reasonable cost.'' (emphasis 
added) 
What this change means is that the auditor is now, in effect, in the position of 
giving an opinion on the financial statements but in fact only expressing 
negative assurance on some aspects thereof. This issue needs to be specifically 
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addressed and further justified. Perhaps it is not the first time that such 
negative assurance is implied in the auditor's report. Certainly, an argument 
might be made that it has already been done in SAS 16, "The Independent 
Auditor's Responsibility for the Detection of Errors or Irregularities" and SAS 
17 "Illegal Acts by Clients."* Indeed, in the Berliner 1983 Article, the author, 
who was Chairman of the Materiality and Audit Risk Task Force which led to 
SAS 47, says that it is not the intent of the (SAS 47) exposure draft (as it then 
was) to: 
. . . establish a higher standard of responsibility for the detection of 
errors or responsibilities than is recognized in SAS 16 . . . (p. 14). 
Berliner discusses this issue at some length under the heading "The 
Preliminary Estimate." Yet he acknowledges that "He who does not seek is 
unlikely to find"—which is indeed the fundamental issue. 
I believe that, based on this article and the other material I have reviewed, 
this issue has yet to be developed. The only justification for acknowledging that 
planning and evaluation materiality may be different would appear to be the 
"cost/benefit" one. If this is the case, clarification and justification is going to 
be required as to the situations in which the "qualitatively material option" 
may be taken by the auditor at the planning stage. 
4. Quantitative versus Qualitative Materiality 
The literature of the 1960s through the 1980s makes reference to a 
distinction between qualitative and quantitative materiality considerations, 
although they are not necessarily called such. The FASB DM, page 56, quotes 
from SAS 1 a passage which originated with the 1954 special report on auditing 
procedures, "GAAS—Their Significance and Scope," as follows: 
These (material) matters relate to the form, arrangement, and content 
of the financial statements with their appended notes; the terminology 
used; the amount of detail given; the classification of items in the 
statements; the basis of amounts set forth, for example, with respect to 
such assets as inventories . . . and the existence of affiliated or 
controlling interests . . . 
Some of these concepts are clearly not directly quantifiable. 
The CICA Research Study on non-profit organizations comments (page 108): 
The qualitative aspects of materiality refer to judgment by the auditor 
on: 
• important non-financial information that should be reported, but is not 
disclosed adequately; 
• quantified amounts and other pertinent information the auditor 
identified as irregularities but which are below the quantitative 
materiality threshhold. 
* In my experience a similar situation has arisen in practice in Canada where auditors have tacitly 
recognized (as has the CICA in a non-authoritative Auditing Guideline, "Related Party 
Transactions and Economic Dependence" contained in the CICA Handbook) that, apart from 
enquiring of management, there are no effective techniques for identifying all related parties as 
determined under Canadian GAAP (CICA Handbook Section 3840, "Related Party Transac-
tions—Disclosure Considerations"). Auditors, in remaining alert for such disclosure, in effect 
provide a form of negative assurance that disclosures are complete. 
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On the other hand SFAC No. 2, in paragraph 123, states "Materiality 
judgments are primarily quantitative in nature." Perhaps all materiality 
considerations are ultimately quantifiable, presumably because anything that 
does not eventually affect future cash flows cannot be material, provided that 
we assume that users have only financial goals (or, if they have social goals, 
that the auditor need not worry about them). Paragraph 7 of SAS 47 also 
appears to be thinking along those lines when it says, 
. . . errors of relatively small amounts detected by the auditor could 
have a material effect on the financial statements. For example, an 
illegal payment of an otherwise immaterial amount could be material if 
there is a reasonable possibility that it could lead to a material 
contingent liability or a material loss of revenue. 
This, too, seems to be suggesting that all qualitative considerations are 
ultimately quantifiable and would be consistent with the view of the CICA group 
(second bullet). 
However, SAS 47, as noted above, does, in paragraph 13, make a clear 
distinction between quantitatively and qualitatively material items, a distinction 
that is very important in terms of the auditor's responsibilities. 
In conclusion, the end result at the authoritative level in the United States 
seems to be on the one hand that everything is quantifiable, and on the other, 
that qualitative considerations are important. Perhaps it is not necessary to 
make the distinction in these terms for a satisfactory resolution to be achieved. 
As long as materiality decisions are related ultimately to future cash flows, they 
are ultimately quantifiable. Nevertheless, for the auditor in a particular 
circumstance, something that is quantitatively small may have characteristics 
that lead him to be concerned because such characteristics may be material to 
the user. That is the important point, rather than a question of semantics. 
5. Practical Considerations When Unrealistic Materiality Levels Are 
Demanded 
"It has been long an axiom of mine that the little things are infinitely the 
most important.'' (Sherlock Holmes in A Case of Identity, Sir Arthur 
Conan Doyle.) 
One of the problems that has bedevilled auditors throughout the entire 
discussion of materiality is that those with great concern for users of financial 
statements have from time to time suggested certain criteria that would set a 
very precise level of materiality because of specific situations. For example, 
under the heading "investors' view of materiality'' at the top of page 126 in the 
FASB DM we find: 
. . . some have stated that any item, transaction, or situation which has 
or could have an effect on the year-to-year increase or decrease in an 
enterprise's earnings of 5% or more should be disclosed on the basis 
that it is material, even though it might affect total income by 1% or 
less. 
Statement V-10, under the heading "Disproportionate Significance" 
states: 
An item of small amount may nevertheless be of material significance in 
the context of a company's particular circumstances . . . 
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The recently issued (December 30, 1983) exposure draft of the FASB, 
"Proposed Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts: Recognition and 
Measurement in Financial Statements of Business Enterprises" states, in 
paragraph 20, that 
The individual items, sub-totals, or other parts of a financial statement 
may be more useful than the aggregate to those who make investment, 
credit and similar decisions. 
An auditor cannot always live up to such expectations, particularly at the 
planning stage of an audit because it may not be possible to devise procedures 
at reasonable cost to detect such errors. Even if such considerations were to 
fall under SAS 47's definition of qualitative characteristics, an auditor may be 
unable to deal with such tiny items at the evaluation stage because it may be 
impossible to prepare financial statements to that degree of precision. Such 
rules, particularly when they relate to special situations and changes in trends, 
would require materiality levels to jump around from year to year, a situation 
that would be highly unproductive from the point of view of users as well as 
preparers and auditors. Examples of unrealistic criteria that pervade the 
literature include: 
• criteria relating to swings or changes in trends of earnings; and 
• small amounts which would push a working capital or similar ratio into 
a "breach" situation with respect to trustee or regulatory require­
ments. 
While advance knowledge of such considerations can indeed affect the 
scope of the auditor's work and necessitate more alertness for certain matters 
or a concentration of audit effort differently than otherwise would be the case, 
nevertheless it will still be unrealistic for an auditor to devise procedures and, 
in some instances, evaluate the results, in terms of such precise materiality. 
How, for example, can a company and its auditor cope with the situation where 
users are worried about a 0.5% net income decrease because it would change a 
trend when, for example, the maximum precision that could be attained in 
computing the warranty provision is 1% to 2% of net income? 
Auditors and preparers of financial statements should take some comfort 
from SFAC No. 2 which (paragraphs 81 to 89) establishes "verifiability"* as a 
qualitative characteristic, that is a sub-category of "reliability." The degree of 
comfort will depend on the way that characteristic is applied in practice. 
Verifiability should at least rule out the most unrealistic of user expecta­
tions. In the same vein, in paragraph 130, SFAC No. 2 states that the degree of 
precision that is attainable in estimating a judgment item is a factor in 
materiality judgment. 
My conclusion is, therefore, that it is impossible to meet users' expecta­
tions in all circumstances and, if it is impossible, presumably someone should 
be informing the user of that fact. User issues are discussed in issues 7 and 8 
below. 
* Previous studies, papers and texts had also identified verifiability as an important concept. 
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6. Professional Judgment versus Rules of Thumb 
Of all the issues that have been discussed with respect to materiality, in 
both an accounting and an auditing context, by far the most visible is the 
question of whether professional bodies should, or should not, provide detailed 
guidance in quantitative terms concerning materiality decisions. Such guidance 
is sometimes referred to as a "rule of thumb," which I will refer to in this 
section as "ROT" (some would say a highly appropriate acronym!). Such 
guidance is frequently regarded by commentators as a restriction on profes­
sional judgment and therefore, by some, a bad thing automatically. Of the three 
basic and six implementation issues identified in the FASB DM, one (and part 
of another) basic issue and at least four implementation issues relate to this 
question. 
First of all, it should be noted that no professional body, practicing firm or 
commentator on this issue has suggested that a ROT can do the whole job; 
merely that it could be used as a point of departure. All state that there will be 
circumstances in which the ROT will need to be overriden and many provide 
examples: 
• the CICA Technique Study, after setting up a table of quantitative 
guidelines (these are illustrated on page 34 of the FASB DM) lists 
seven conditions under the heading "Circumstances Causing Devia­
tion from the Normal Guidelines." 
• The AISG Study states (paragraph 30) "The quantitative guidelines 
set forth in the preceding paragraph, combined with a further 
provision for much lower quantitative limits in respect of certain 
transactions such as those with directors and officers would . . . 
represent a reasonable (approach)..." Paragraph 30 also notes that 
"An amount is not material solely by its size" and sets out nine 
conditions to be considered in addition to size. 
Accordingly, the fact that ROTs cannot do the whole job is not in 
contention. There is an argument as to whether they represent an adequate 
starting point and, in the words of Australian statement DS7, will "help to 
reduce the possibility of widely divergent judgments when decisions on 
materiality are made" (pagagraph 2). 
There is no room in this paper to repeat the arguments pro and con ROTs. 
All have been made many times by different people and bodies and in varying 
degrees. 
The Berliner 1983 Article captures the arguments in explaining the views of 
the author's Task Force: 
Citing research studies that show the application by practitioners of a 
wide variety of views in making materiality judgments, they (some 
members) agreed that rule-of-thumb guidelines were needed. Other 
members believed that a decision whether a certain item is material is a 
matter of judgment for which rule-of-thumb should not be substituted. 
They argued that materiality judgments are necessarily complex and 
involve too many subjective factors to be reduced to simplistic guide­
lines that are not likely to be appropriate in all situations" (pp. 11 & 12). 
The question of restriction in professional judgment has brought strong 
reaction from commentators as, for example, an early comment of Bernstein in 
"The Concept of Materiality," The Accounting Review (1967) page 90: "An 
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undefined and all-embracing process described as 'judgment' does not inspire 
the confidence of thinking men." An even stronger criticism of delays in 
adopting "decision aids" in the auditing process to reduce professional 
judgment comes from Robert K. Elliott of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., New 
York, and this view is, in my opinion, so important and so rarely expressed that 
it is reproduced below at some length: 
. . . the inevitable presence of judgment in the audit process does not in 
any way indicate that it is to be celebrated or to be defended as the most 
valuable element in the audit. That position is inconsistent with the 
recent history of the profession. 
Consider the following passage from IFAC's International Auditing 
Guideline 1. 
"Judgment permeates the auditor's work; for example, in deciding the 
extent of audit procedures and in assessing the reasonableness of the 
judgments and estimates made by management in preparing the 
financial statements. Furthermore, much of the evidence available to 
auditors is persuasive rather than conclusive in nature. Because of the 
above factors, absolute certainty in auditing is rarely obtainable." (par. 
09) 
I believe this is an accurate passage. It cites the pervasiveness of 
judgment, but it does not celebrate its use. It suggests that the 
pervasiveness of judgment is a source of uncertainty in auditing. Yet the 
value of the audit is, and has been, the credibility it lends to financial 
statements. We do not add credibility by adding uncertainty to our 
opinions. The credibility derives from the fact that users of auditors' 
opinions believe there is a common body of procedures, based on 
professional knowledge, that leads different auditors to similar decisions 
when presented with the same audit problem. An audit opinion can 
never provide absolute certainty about the fairness of the financial 
statements, but it is designed to reduce that uncertainty. It seems 
reasonable to conclude that if decision aids and models can reduce 
uncertainty in the audit process, it is sensible to develop them even if they 
reduce auditor judgment." (Robert K. Elliott, "The Research Path to 
Audit Efficiency," Technical Papers, World Accounting Congress, 
Mexico City (October 1982) (emphasis added).) 
The opposite view, reflecting the advantages of unfettered professional 
judgment is strongly expressed by Carman Blough in a response to an enquiry 
addressed to the AICPA's Technical Service Department in 1950. It reflects 
and elaborates upon the views of the AICPA's Committee on Accounting 
Procedure, stating that materiality is "an elusive matter" and that general 
criteria are "not feasible." He goes on to elaborate on several specific 
instances where "judgment" would have to be used.* 
This is still the view of the profession. SFAC No. 2, in paragraph 131 
states: 
Some hold the view that the Board should promulgate a set of 
quantitative materiality guides or criteria covering a wide variety of 
situations that preparers could look to for authoritative support. That 
appears to be a minority view, however, on the basis of representations 
* Blough's comments are quoted in part in prevously mentioned articles by Hicks and Bernstein. 
17 
made to the Board in response to the discussion memorandum . . . . 
The predominant view is that materiality judgments can properly be 
made only by those who have all the facts. 
Nevertheless, this paragraph goes on to say that the Board might in the 
future review its conclusion not to provide quantitative guidance if circum­
stances require it. 
In terms of uniformity of practice, a recent comparison of auditing 
methodologies of large U.S. accounting firms5 in reviewing compliance with 
AICPA Au. Section 311.03 ("Planning and Supervision—preliminary determi­
nation of materiality") concludes, 
Of all the steps in the GAAS model, there is the greatest degree of non­
conformity with this requirement. 
Nevertheless, the FASB DM, on page 68, had concluded: 
. . . some preparers and auditors believe that, absent unusual circum­
stances, an item generally should be considered material if it affects net 
income by 10 percent or more and not material if it affects net income 
by 5 percent or less. They believe that the materiality of matters whose 
effect on net income falls between 5 and 10 percent should be 
determined through a careful analysis of the nature of the matter and 
the surrounding circumstances. 
A study by Woolsey, reported in the September 1973 Journal of Account-
ancy, surveyed CPA's (national, local and regional), controllers, financial 
analysts and academics. As a result he concluded that a range of 4.5% to 5.5% 
of normal pre-tax income was appropriate (subject to amendment in particular 
cases). This study is interesting because it is one of the few that deal with a 
typical auditing situation (the auditor had uncovered an error which the client 
did not wish to adjust). 
My own, limited, research bears this out from the point of view of auditors. 
For the purposes of this paper, I conducted a telephone survey of 16 large 
public accounting firms in Canada (including all the "big nine"). My survey 
revealed that 11 of the 16 provide quantitative guidelines to their auditing 
professional staff for determining what is material and that all 11 of them use as 
the primary or as one among several presumptive guidelines 5% to 10% of 
normal pre-tax net income for most profit-oriented clients. Two more firms 
have guidance material in process. 
What, then, can we conclude from all that has happened to date with 
respect to ROT's or detailed guidelines? I think at least the following: 
• Many (perhaps most) accounting firms and practitioners use ROTs 
and find them helpful. 
• Common sense would suggest that in the absence of ROTs mate­
riality decisions will vary in like circumstances much more than if 
there are such guidelines. 
• Professional judgment, even with ROTs, still has a major role to play 
(everybody agrees on that, although one or two regret it). 
• With the exception of the US profession (FASB and AICPA), study 
groups and standard-setting bodies in several important Anglo-
Saxon-dominated professions have recommended and/or adopted 
ROTs in some form. 
• In spite of strong arguments from some practitioners and academics, 
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the FASB and AICPA have resisted ROTs but have provided 
guidance at a more conceptual or general level. The results of a 
survey conducted during the preparation of SAS 47, including 
material on ROTs, are expected to be published as a Research 
Monograph. 
• When ROTs have been developed, they have generally tended to 
coalesce around 5% to 10% of normal pre-tax income (The 5-10% 
Rule)* as a starting point, with a suggestion, in some cases, for 
alternatives. Two Canadian studies (the 1965 Audit Technique Study 
which used varying percentages of gross profit as a base and the 1980 
non-profit Research Study which recommended a ROT of 1/2% of 
normal revenue) were, in fact, quite consistent with the above even 
though not expressed in terms of normal net income. 
• Specific guidelines set in specific cases for specific legal or regulatory 
purpose, or by the AICPA are, with a few exceptions, not greatly 
inconsistent with a 5%-10% Rule. 
• Researchers and article writers, with a few exceptions** (e.g., 
Hicks goes up to 20%6), based on this author's reading, would not 
strongly disagree with the 5-10% Rule as a starting point, unless, of 
course, they are opposed to any ROT at all. 
With all this, then, one has to wonder why at least the "5-10% Rule" 
guideline has not been authoritatively adopted with all its warts and recognizing 
that it only does part (a quarter? a half? most?) of the job of improving 
consistency among auditors. It may also present some potentially useful 
opportunity for better user understanding. In my view, unless persuasive 
evidence can be presented that serious harm would result to preparers, 
auditors and users, this should be done. Finally, to assist the process, we 
ought to decide that ROT is rot and replace the term "rules of thumb'' or even 
"quantitative guidelines" with "decision aids" (Elliott's term) which has the 
sound of assisting the professional judgment process rather than being 
antithetical to it or "substituted" for it, as some members of Berliner's Task 
Force would say. 
7. The User Problem 
As noted previously, all definitions of materiality are importantly related to 
user requirements, usually the requirements of a reasonable investor, prudent 
investor or intelligent reader. Just who this reasonable investor is may not be 
entirely clear. It is important that we know this because, as the FASB DM says 
in its Foreword (page 3), 
There is a general belief that preparers, auditors, and users of financial 
statements have dissimilar views of materiality. 
Dissimilar views are an aspect of the conclusions of the Cohen Commission 
Report in the United States issued in 1978 and a report issued in Canada (also 
* A frequently used, more precise, guideline would suggest that matters affecting (in aggregate) 
normal pre-tax income by less than 5% are presumed immaterial and, by more than 10%, 
material. Between 5% and 10%, judgment is used. Frequently, the size of the entity is an 
important factor within this range. 
** Leslie, for example, in his forthcoming CICA Research Study, devotes some space to the 
hypothesis "Net Income is Not a Problem-Free base." 
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in 1978) with approximately the same objectives, The Adams Report. Both 
reports identified as a major concern what "seems to be a gap between what 
the public expects and what auditors are doing" (Adams Committee Report, B3) 
and "evidence abounds that communication between the auditor and users of 
his work—especially through the auditor's standard report—is unsatisfac­
tory." (Cohen Commission Report, p. xxiv). A number of solutions are 
suggested in both reports, being a mixture of steps that the profession should 
take in the technical area and, most importantly, making efforts to explain to 
users what assurance an audit can, and cannot, provide. Presumably, an 
explanation concerning unrealistic materiality considerations, explained above, 
would be one part of this education process. 
Before educating, we have to know who to educate. In his 1964 article on 
materiality, Hicks6 (p. 159) attempts to identify the average prudent investor 
or reasonable person that the auditor should be concerned about. It is 
interesting to note that he classifies users into three broad types; those who 
are truly ignorant and uncaring at one end, and sophisticated securities 
analysts, bank trust officers and managers of investment portfolios at the 
other. He, however, excludes both these groups, the former for obvious 
reasons and the latter because it has additional information at its disposal and 
uses highly specialized "professional analytical techniques" for its purposes. 
Hicks plumps for a middle group consisting of "knowledgeable individuals with 
(at least) a rudimentary understanding of financial statements; they are willing 
to and able to weigh financial information carefully." He equates this group 
with the average prudent investor. 
This is interesting because some of the literature, including material in 
Chapter 5 of FASB DM (starting on page 89) clearly includes financial analysts 
and advisors, stock exchanges, etc. within the concept of users that the auditor 
worries about, and perhaps it is unrealistic to exclude them. Nevertheless, 
Hicks' view received some support from the Trueblood Study Group in its 
report "Objectives of Financial Statements." 
Page 62 of this report is quoted in the FASB DM: 
"An objective of financial statements is to serve primarily those users 
who have limited authority, ability, or resources to obtain information and 
who rely on financial statements as their principal source of information 
about an enterprise's economic activities." (emphasis added) 
The report goes on to say that "the user envisioned by this objective has 
been called a 'user without clout'." 
Some commentators have expressed skepticism about the whole concept 
of aiming guidelines at users. For example, O'Connor and Collins in a 
December 1974 Journal of Accountancy article included as Appendix D to the 
FASB DM say on page 178: 
In theory, most agree that materiality guidelines ought to be aimed at 
providing the "average prudent investor" with information necessary 
to make an informed investment decision. The question remains, 
however, whether that objective is attainable without knowledge of the 
characteristics of the average investor or the decision model that he 
uses. 
I might add that the objective may not be attainable even with such 
knowledge! 
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Finally, the Financial Executives Institutes in both Canada and the United 
States have cooperated with their respective accounting professions to try to 
solve the communication problem through the inclusion in the annual report of a 
"management report" to explain the relative roles of the auditor and client, 
and a number of examples of such reports are quoted in those studies. In 1979 
the AICPA published a report entitled Conclusions and Recommendations of the 
Special Advisory Committee on Reports by Management. 
While these various studies do suggest that management explain the role of 
judgments and estimates, and the consequent lack of precision in financial 
statements, they do not specifically raise the question of materiality and the 
examples presented do not include specific mention of materiality. 
Another reaction to the Cohen Commission and Adams Reports was an 
increased emphasis on audit committees, and a CICA research study on audit 
committees was published in 1981. This, too, did not suggest that auditors 
discuss materiality levels with an audit committee, although I am aware that 
this is sometimes done. 
Those professions which have adopted specific quantitative guidelines have 
made a decision on what they are going to do and have done it. The users can 
read the standard and, presumably, if they do not like it, exert pressure and get 
it changed. Leslie has previously expressed the view, repeated in the 
forthcoming CICA study, that perhaps a better way of achieving this is to 
disclose the materiality level right in each auditor's report. Either method is a 
help. What is unsatisfactory, is evidence that users have expectations that 
auditors, and in some cases preparers of financial statements, cannot meet. 
In conclusion then, despite all the research done and despite a general 
acknowledgement that the user is a vital element—perhaps the most vital 
element—in the materiality discussion, there does not appear to be much 
meeting of the minds between the two groups.* Perhaps this is impossible. 
The user may be king, but that does not mean that he is God. 
8. Informing the User 
Much of the commentary on the question of whether or not accounting and 
auditing standards should contain a quantification of materiality has centered on 
the need for users to know the materiality levels used. Of course, to the extent 
that any standard guidelines are deviated from in a particular case (which is 
likely to happen frequently because of the still broad scope for the exercise of 
professional judgment), users would still not know what materiality level had 
actually been used. Nevertheless, they would at least know the starting point 
for materiality decisions by preparers and by auditors. If they were aware of 
the professional pronouncement, they would know that, if their expectation for 
precision was in a range significantly less than 5% of net income, such 
expectation would likely be unrealistic. 
The Trueblood Report, starting on page 39, suggests that users might be 
better informed if preparers communicated in ranges. 
* The draft Leslie Study recommends that auditors and a representative group of users get 
together to thrash out the question of materiality so that a solution that can be effectively audited 
can be arrived at. 
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Many economic decision makers would prefer simple, not complex, 
answers, but simple answers may not serve them as well as complex 
ones. Single numbers supplemented by ranges and investments 
grouped by relative risk may be more complex, but they may also 
communicate more accurately the imprecision involved in making 
judgments. 
This is one way of providing (indirectly) some disclosure to the user of the 
materiality levels used in the preparation of the financial statements. 
A similar view was expressed by Edward Stamp in an endowed lecture in 
1979 to The Australian Society of Accountants (the University of Sydney, 
Accounting Research Centre) entitled "Accounting and Auditing Standards; an 
International Point of View." Stamp had proposed that margins of error should 
be disclosed in financial statements and observed that this proposal was 
unpopular in professional circles and had always been rewarded with peals of 
incredulous laughter. 
Nevertheless I am quite serious in my suggestion, and one has only to 
look at practices in an associated profession (engineering), or indeed 
throughout the whole realm of experimental science, to realize that 
intelligent people are not deceived by uncertainty masquerading as 
precision, and are only prepared to regard measurements useful if the 
measurement error is disclosed. 
Perhaps then, the Trueblood Committee and Edward Stamp would agree 
with the proposals of Don Leslie that consideration be given to disclosing in an 
auditor's report the materiality level used. Leslie made such proposals in 1977 
at a symposium on auditing research at the University of Illinois at Urbana 
Champaign in a paper entitled "Materiality in Auditing (Some of the Issues)" 
and referred to it again in 1979 in Dollar-Unit Sampling, A Practical Guide for 
Auditors, co-authored with Teitlebaum and Anderson (Toronto: Copp, Clark, 
Pittman, 1979), page 6 and finally in the draft CICA research study. In this 
draft study Leslie presents detailed arguments and examples of the manner in 
which materiality could be disclosed in the auditor's report, in notes to the 
financial statements or, possibly, in a "management report." In my experi­
ence, the only instances of reporting specific materiality levels by auditors have 
been, in rare cases, in the audit engagement letter for a normal audit and, 
somewhat more frequently, in engagement letters and reports in special 
purpose engagements (the only examples of reporting to third party users) 
such as "purchase investigations." In oral and written presentations to audit 
committees, materiality levels are sometimes noted and discussed. 
Certainly some form of communication to users is necessary, especially if 
we decide that many of their expectations are unrealistic. Other forms of 
communication include education and some efforts have been made in this 
regard (e.g. both the AICPA and CICA have published laypersons' guides as to 
what an auditor's report means)7. All these suggestions and proposals will have 
to be considered in reaching the final solution, if there is one. It is, in my view, 
far from resolution at this point and is a very important issue.* 
* What is not needed, though, at this time, is more studies of what users say they need. 
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9. Aggregation of Individual Materiality Judgments 
Through the 1960s and 1970s, another issue that surfaced from time to 
time was the question of whether materiality decisions could be made on an 
individual item-by-item basis, or whether such decisions should be aggregated 
into one overall decision. Professional pronouncements appear to have re­
solved this question in favour of aggregation: 
• In the United Kingdom (1968) in Statement V-10, paragraph 9(e). 
• In Canada (CICA Handbook, Section 5400.13), which covers it more 
obliquely by saying "the auditor must exercise his professional 
judgment as to the appropriateness of the selection and application of 
(accounting) principles to the particular circumstances of an enter­
prise and as to the overall effect on the financial statements of 
separate decisions made in their preparation." 
• In the USA, the AICPA, in SAS 47, makes it abundantly clear 
throughout the document, but particuarly in paragraph 18, when it 
states that the auditor should design procedures to detect errors that 
" . . . could be material, when aggregated with errors in other balances 
or classes, to the financial statements taken as a whole." (emphasis 
added) 
In fact, one has to wonder why this was ever an issue. AICPA Accounting 
Research Bulletin No. 43 stated, as far back as 1953: 
. . . freedom to deal expediently with immaterial items should not 
extend to a group of items whose cumulative effect in any one financial 
statement may be material and significant (quoted in Hicks, "Mate­
riality: A Useful Audit Tool," Journal of Accountancy (July 1962), p. 
63). 
Other issues concerning aggregation have been raised from time to time (e.g. 
the extent to which offsetting errors may be offset). However, in recent years, 
at the authoritative level, no one has suggested that errors should not be 
aggregated and their combined effect taken account of. Other issues related to 
aggregation (particularly techniques as to how it is accomplished) may remain 
to be resolved. 
Concluding Comments 
My remarks have to this point provided a very brief historical overview and 
identification and discussion of nine important issues that have been raised in 
selected authoritative and non-authoritative material, primarily in the 1960s 
through to the early 1980s. The following points stand out: 
• The FASB DM presented a comprehensive and well-thought-out 
explanation of the issues from the point of view of preparers of 
financial statements and their users, and the responses to the 
discussion memorandum added further to the knowledge base. 
• No material of comprehensive scope, authority, and thoroughness 
has yet been published with respect to materiality viewed from the 
auditor's point of view. However, I believe that the forthcoming 
CICA research study will fill that gap.* 
* I should declare at this point that I am not entirely free from the appearance of bias in 
this judgment because Leslie, the author of the study, has been my partner in Clarkson 
Gordon for approximately 10 years and my present position with the CICA associates 
me with the Study itself. 
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• The American profession, at the authoritative level, has been more 
reluctant than other professions to "go public" with detailed quan­
titative materiality guidelines. On the other hand, important guidance 
in the form of more general criteria is set out on the accounting side 
in SFAC No. 2, "Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting Informa­
tion" and, on the auditing side, in SAS 47. The auditing pronounce­
ment is an exceptionally thorough conceptual statement which is 
unparalleled in the world, at least to this writer's knowledge. 
• Of the nine auditing issues highlighted in this paper, the ones that I 
believe to be farthest from acceptable solution in the United States 
and Canada are: 
1. Expectations of users: how to meet the ones that can be met, 
identify those that can't, and discuss the latter in public so that 
users know they are not met. 
2. The need for practical quantitative "decision aids" at an au­
thoritative level to reduce variations in practice and thereby 
lessen uncertainty and increase utility for users, whether they 
are aware of it or not. Attention should be paid to experience 
gained with authoritative prounouncements in those countries 
which have published decision aids. 
3. How, in the light of SAS 47, to preserve the link between 
materiality levels used in planning audit procedures and those 
used at the reporting stage (A solution to item 1 above should be 
of considerable help in this regard). 
4. Communication with, and education of, users generally on 
materiality issues as part of a program to close the expectation 
gap identified by the Cohen Commission and in the Adams 
Report. 
In Canada, issues 1, 2 and 4 are important and 3 has not yet been 
specifically identified as an issue. In addition, Canada (in my own 
personal view—I cannot speak for the CICA) needs an equivalent 
(not necessarily identical) pronouncement to SAS 47. 
In the world as a whole, perhaps the IAPC will be able to take a lead in their 
"Materiality and Audit Risk" project, presently in the early stages. We have 
come a long way; we have enough information, let's keep on moving.* 
* One last note: many research papers I have read conclude that further research is needed in "x'' 
areas. In this case, at least for the purposes of standard-setting and guidance at the professional 
practice level, my own feeling is that little more will be required, especially after the publication 
of the Leslie Study. However, research should continue, in my view, in the area of trying to 
quantify materiality and risk criteria in a usable way. Also, more descriptive research is needed 
on what auditors actually do and how long they spend doing it. For example, a study which would 
review audits after they are completed in order to assess the impact of materiality decisions on 
audit effort would be very useful. 
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Discussant's Response to 
The Origins and Development of Materiality 
as an Auditing Concept 
Lauren Kelly 
University of Washington 
David Selley does an excellent job tracing the institutional history and 
setting of materiality. Particularly useful are his appendices where he contrasts 
the development of materiality in different countries, compares the status of 
materiality in both the accounting and auditing contexts, and examines the 
elements of materiality definitions found in professional pronouncements. 
Discussing such an extensive and complete review is a difficult task. Thus I 
would like to elaborate on two aspects of the materiality topic that Selley 
addresses but does not extensively discuss. 
First, I would like to consider what research has told us about the various 
observations Mr. Selley makes. (For a complete review of empirical research 
on materiality see Holstrum and Messier, 1982.) In this connection, I will 
remain cognizant of Selley's opinion as stated in footnote 20 which says, 
"many research papers I have read conclude that further research is needed in 
'X ' areas. In this case, at least for the purposes of standard setting and 
guidance at the professional practice level, my own feeling is that little more 
will be required. . . . " Being an academician, I do not necessarily agree, and 
thus would also like to consider where future research might be helpful. 
Second, I would like to elaborate on the integration of accounting and auditing 
materiality. In my opinion, this is a more difficult and perhaps more important 
topic. 
The Materiality Concept 
Most authors, researchers, and authoritative bodies agree that the mate­
riality of the accounting treatment or disclosure of an item depends upon its 
importance to the financial statement user. In this regard, the user is assumed 
to be sophisticated (intelligent and knowledgeable), and significance occurs 
when the accounting treatment or disclosure would affect the user's decision. 
Most would also agree that materiality is an accounting concept with important 
implications to the audit process. 
Initial research focused on determining the factors or characteristics of an 
information item that make it significant to the user. Attributes commonly cited 
include the item's impact on net income, absolute size, cumulative amount, 
impact on trends, the nature of the item, uncertainty regarding the issue, firm-
specific characteristics, and environmental condition. 
Early studies were ex-post descriptive, attempting to infer from financial 
statements the quantitative thresholds used by preparers and auditors in 
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resolving disclosure issues (Bernstein, 1967; Copeland and Fredericks, 1968; 
Neumann, 1970; Frishkoff, 1970). In general these studies were unable to 
consistently identify a quantitative measure of materiality. Other researchers 
have suggested materiality issues can be assessed by reference to the 
aggregate stock market (O'Connor and Collins, 1974; Abdel-Khalik, 1977; 
Burgstahler and Kinney, 1984). Changes in stock market prices are observed 
to infer investors' assessments of the materiality of specific disclosures. 
Researchers have also inquired whether the same factors are considered 
by financial statement users and preparers in resolving materiality issues. 
Questionnaire case studies applied to both groups have largely found differ­
ences in the factors, their relative importance, and the ultimate materiality 
decision (Woolsey, 1954a, 1954b, 1973; Dyer, 1975; Pattillo, 1976). Subse­
quently the focus turned to modeling the decision process apparently followed 
by users and preparers in materiality situations. Focusing solely on users, 
Rose, Beaver, Becker, and Sorter (1970) used the concept of significant 
differences in stimuli to identify materiality thresholds. Two of the studies 
compared the decision approach used by users and preparers. Using a policy-
capturing model, Boatsman and Robertson (1974) found the two groups had 
consistent judgment processes and materiality criteria. However, Firth (1979) 
found significant differences in materiality judgments made in thirty hypotheti­
cal cases by users, management and auditors. 
What does all this research tell us about Mr. Selley's observations entitled 
"The User Problem"? One can only conclude that (1) materiality decisions are 
multi-factor, situation-specific decisions, and (2) users and preparers may 
consider different factors in assessing the significance of information. In 
Selley's words, "despite all the research done and despite a general acknowl­
edgement that the user is a vital element . . . in the materiality discussion, 
there does not appear to be much meeting of the minds between the two 
groups." However, I am not sure I agree with his conclusion: "The user may 
be king, but that does not mean that he is God." This follows his suggestion 
that to close the gap between preparers, auditors, and users, the former 
should disclose the materiality guidelines used (preferably as sanctioned by 
authoritative bodies), and the users should be allowed to reject them. That 
approach renders the preparer God. We then have compromised on the 
original intent of materiality. 
Instead, I am more inclined to agree with the observation made by 
Holstrum and Messier (1982, p. 48): "With limited knowledge of how financial 
statements are integrated into users' decision models, and with limited 
knowledge of the extent of consensus among these groups because of their 
different perspectives on materiality, we have little information on how 
materiality judgments made by preparers and auditors will affect the users' 
decision making." Mr. Selley questions whether we could attain the objective 
of materiality guidelines even with knowledge about the characteristics of users 
and their decision models. I tend to disagree. Instead, I think additional 
research regarding the user would be helpful. 
Implications of Materiality in Accounting to the Auditor 
To the auditor, the important question is how the audit is affected by 
materiality. This issue necessitates integrating materiality in accounting with 
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materiality in auditing, and in my opinion this issue must be addressed before 
rules of thumb can be developed. As stated earlier, most people agree that 
materiality is first an accounting concept, but with implications for auditing in 
terms of the scope of the audit and the auditor's opinion. Berliner (1983, p. 10) 
identifies this problem in tracing the background to SAS No. 47: "It was 
concern about how the concept of materiality, given its elusiveness in 
accounting, might affect the nature, timing, and extent of audit procedures that 
prompted the Auditing Standards Board (ASB) to appoint a special task force in 
1979." 
Selley gives a very thorough treatment of the history of the materiality 
concept in both the accounting and auditing contexts. I especially found 
Appendix 3 useful, where he compared the elements of the various definitions 
as they are found in the authoritative literature in several countries. I would 
have liked some discussion of these comparisons, with perhaps some specula­
tion as to why they differ. For example, what characterizes the accounting and 
auditing environments in Canada, England, and the U.S. such that we find rules 
of thumb for accounting materiality at least suggested by 1965 in Canada, 1968 
in England, but not at all in the U.S.? Yet why has the U.S. been the only 
country in which we find the authoritative pronouncements issuing guidelines 
and guidance for auditing materiality? Additionally, a more direct comparison of 
the pronouncements we do have on audit materiality would have been helpful; 
for example, AICPA SAS No 39 "Audit Sampling" and Canada's research 
study Extent of Audit Testing. 
Returning to the problem as stated by Causey (and cited in Selley's paper): 
"Materiality in the context of applying audit procedures is quite different from 
materiality in the context of financial reporting.'' To further explore materiality 
in auditing, most observers distinguish between the planning and evaluation 
phases of an audit. Planning the audit involves setting the scope and extent of 
audit procedures. SAS 47 gives only conceptual guidance to this process, 
stating that the auditor should use " . . . his preliminary judgment about 
materiality levels in a manner that can be expected to provide him, within the 
inherent limitations of the auditing process, with sufficient evidential matter to 
make a reasonable evaluation whether the financial statements are materially 
misstated" (paragraph 12). This is the very heart of materiality in auditing, yet 
it seems to have been ignored by both researchers and standard setters. 
In the evaluation stage, the auditor considers whether the errors dis­
covered are material. This is materiality in accounting and, as Mr. Selley points 
out, this is where the authoritative guidance has focused. In fact, SAS 47 
recognizes that qualitative aspects of materiality may be present in the 
evaluation stage that were not considered in the planning stage of the audit. 
This problem further exasperates the necessary link between materiality in 
auditing and accounting. In the section "Materiality and the Audit Model," 
Selley states: "There is assumed to be a direct link between material errors in 
the financial statements (if they exist) and the auditor's procedures." I would 
have liked to have seen him discuss this link more fully. Perhaps the reason we 
find SAS 47 explicitly allowing only for quantitative materiality factors in 
planning the audit is because auditors do not know how to explicitly allow 
qualitative considerations to affect the audit scope. 
The effect of materiality on audit planning was first addressed analytically in 
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designing sampling plans (Elliott and Rogers, 1972; Kinney, 1975; Teitlebaum 
and Robinson, 1975; Heimann and Chesley, 1977). More recently, Zuber, 
Elliott, Kinney, and Leisenring (1983) present an example of a practical 
approach that could be used to allocate the preliminary estimate of materiality 
to components of the financial statements, and thus design appropriate audit 
procedures. 
Unfortunately, empirical research on the auditor's decision process has 
largely focused on the evaluation stage of the audit. Several researchers have 
proposed various decision models and structural forms to study the relative 
importance of decision-related factors in materiality judgments (Boatsman and 
Robertson, 1974; Ward, 1976; Moriarity and Barron, 1976; Hofstedt and 
Hughes, 1977; Newton, 1977; Schultz and Reckers, 1981). Only two studies 
have considered the relationship between auditing and materiality. Moriarity 
and Barron (1979) used conjoint analysis to study the relative importance of 
five factors in setting pre-audit materiality levels for planning audit tests. Their 
research was unable to identify a consensus regarding the materiality judg­
ments or factors. Cushing, Searfoss and Randall (1979) applied the Elliott and 
Rogers (1972) approach for allocating overall materiality to the separate 
accounts to be audited. Field tests of the model on four audits indicated it was 
feasible to incorporate the materiality allocation concept into audit planning and 
evidence evaluation. 
In my opinion, joining materiality in accounting and auditing represents one 
of the most challenging and fruitful areas for future research. Holstrum and 
Messier (1983, p. 60) mention three aspects: (1) the impact of materiality on 
audit planning and evaluation throughout all phases of the audit, (2) the 
relationship between materiality and audit risk in determining the scope of the 
engagement, and (3) the magnitude and/or importance of errors on audit 
planning and evaluation. 
Auditors are currently making these kinds of decisions and may very well 
have in-house guidelines for setting materiality in planning the audit. Descrip­
tive research would help in understanding the nature of such decisions or 
guidelines, and how they relate to disclosure considerations. Judgmental 
research could also be used to study how different disclosure situations (i.e., 
accounting materiality problems) affect the way the auditor plans the audit. The 
previous two research studies have looked at the effect on audit sample sizes. 
Nonquantitative factors need to be taken into account, and audit decisions in 
addition to sample size need to be considered. 
Rules of Thumb 
Mr. Selley views the most visible issue in auditing as the discussion of 
whether professional bodies should provide detailed guidelines in quantitative 
terms for making materiality decisions. In his opinion, such a "decision aid" 
should be authoritatively adopted. I have severe reservations as to whether 
the auditing profession would benefit from such a standard. 
First, I agree with Selley's observation that all materiality considerations 
are ultimately quantitative, since to be material the issue must eventually affect 
the future cash flows of the firm. This necessitates a long-run view of the item. 
More realistically, most materiality decisions are made with more focus on the 
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immediate aspects of the item. This renders qualitative considerations more 
important. Indeed, SAS 47 makes this point in paragraph 7: "As a result of the 
interaction of quantitative and qualitative considerations in materiality judg­
ments, errors of relatively small amounts detected could have a material effect 
on the financial statements. For example, an illegal payment of an otherwise 
immaterial amount could be material if there is a reasonable possibility that it 
could lead to a material contingent liability or a material loss of revenue." 
Quantitative guidelines might work if the accountant's decision horizon is long 
enough. Otherwise, potentially material items may be overlooked. 
Second, Selley seems to view some users' expectations of materiality 
levels as unrealistic. I agree that computation of net income can not be done as 
precisely as some would like, and the user should be informed of the error that 
potentially exists in financial statements. However, I am fearful that establish­
ing quantitative criteria for materiality issues will just add to the delusion of 
precision. This would lead precisely to the difficulties Mr. Selley discusses in 
terms of planning the audit and devising procedures to ensure such precise 
materiality standards are met. Yet these "unrealistic" expectations held by 
users cannot be ignored in setting materiality guidelines, since in the final 
analysis materiality is determined by the user. Instead, I think the accountant's 
judgment remains predominant. Indeed, this was the conclusion of the FASB in 
SFAC No. 2, where it was stated: "No general standards of materiality (can) 
be formulated to take into account all the considerations that enter into an 
experienced human judgment" (as quoted by Landsittel and Serlin, 1982, p. 
293). 
Admittedly, Selley states rules of thumb are merely a starting point, aimed 
at reducing the possibility of "widely divergent judgments" and "improving 
consistency among auditors." One might question whether we really want to 
reduce the auditor's judgment. But more importantly, I am not convinced rules 
of thumb will improve consistency. I am afraid there would be so many 
exceptional circumstances that judgment would still predominate. 
Selley's suggestion does lead to some interesting research questions. His 
survey reveals only the U.S. does not have materiality guidelines. One might 
inquire into why this is true. A cross-cultural study might be done (using one 
international auditing firm in two or more countries) to study the effect of the 
existence or nonexistence of materiality guidelines on (1) auditing—scope, 
procedures, planning, evidence; (2) evaluation—disclosure decisions, opinion 
formulation; and, perhaps (3) court cases—the ultimate determinant of mate­
riality. The effect of rules of thumb could also be studied by using field 
experiments and judgment models to study how audit planning and evaluation 
are affected by guidelines. Also, the user aspect might be studied by 
researching the impact of stated materiality thresholds on decisions and 
perceptions of financial statements. 
Basically, though, I question whether we are ready for rules of thumb. I do 
not think we know where to begin to establish materiality guidelines that will 
help the auditing profession until we have a better understanding of the link 
between materiality in auditing and accounting. What good are disclosure 
criteria if this link does not exist? 
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Conclusion 
Finally, I would like to consider Mr. Selley's recommendations and 
concluding comments in light of where I believe we should be focusing our 
attention in materiality in auditing. Selley cites several auditing issues that are 
"furthest from solution." First are the expectations of users about materiality 
levels and decisions, and the need for communication and education to close 
this expectations gap. Selley states that what we do not need are more studies 
of what information users say they need. Instead, he recommends practical 
quantitative rules of thumb (or decision aids) at the authoritative level. Again, I 
wonder how these guidelines can appropriately be established without thor­
ough knowledge of what is significant to the financial statement user. And I 
question reliance on a quantitative standard when qualitative aspects of the 
issue may be more germane. Selley views such a guideline as a starting point 
for preparers and auditors, deviated from when judgment indicates. I am afraid 
the deviations would be so frequent that, in fact, the existence of a materiality 
criterion would be misleading. In any case, I think it would be enlightening to 
research the impact on users of communicating materiality guidelines in several 
forms: official pronouncements from the FASB or AICPA, a statement of the 
auditing firm's policy, the materiality level used stated in the auditor's or 
management's report, educational programs as through AICPA layperson 
guides, and communicating income probabilistically or in ranges. 
Second, Mr. Selley states that preserving the link between materiality 
levels used in planning audit procedures and those used at the reporting stage 
is a major issue. I seriously question whether at this stage there is a link which 
can be preserved. And this is where I believe the bulk of our efforts should be 
concentrated. Understanding or establishing this link is critical before mate­
riality guidelines which really relate to reporting issues can be devised. Mr. 
Selley himself acknowledges this in a footnote: "Also, more research is needed 
on what auditors actually do and how long they spend doing it. For example, a 
study which would review audits after they are completed in order to assess 
the impact of materiality decisions on audit effort would be very useful." Selley 
himself could have added evidence on this in his paper. In his introduction he 
states that part of his career was spent in the auditing standards department of 
a CPA firm where he " . . . was part of the process of developing the auditing 
materiality guidelines that then were wrestled with by those unfortunates in 
the field. . . . " I would like to have known more about how he developed the 
guidelines, and in what sense were they wrestled with. 
In any case, it is interesting to speculate as to why we have had so little 
research, conceptual debate, or practical guidelines on materiality in auditing. 
Either the topic is not a problem and thus a nonissue (which is doubtful), or it is 
very difficult to understand and truly judgmental. In the latter case, I think 
materiality in auditing represents a very challenging and fruitful area for the 
future. 
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2 
Auditor Reviews of 
Changing Prices Disclosures* 
K. Fred Skousen 
W. Steve Albrecht 
Brigham Young University 
Research Purpose and Methodology 
This research project was sponsored jointly by the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. 
The objectives of the research and the steps followed in conducting the project 
are described in this introductory section of the report. 
Background 
In September 1979, the FASB issued Statement of Finanical Accounting 
Standard No. 33, Financial Reporting and Changing Prices.1 This statement is 
an experimental standard on accounting for the effects of changing prices. It 
requires selected public companies to report changing prices disclosures as 
supplemental information to their financial statements. Although this supple­
mental information is unaudited, auditing standards2 require auditors to 
consider this information and, in certain circumstances, to report on it. 
Because of the experimental nature of SFAS 33, the FASB has encouraged 
research to assess costs and benefits of changing prices disclosure require­
ments. This project is one of fifteen research studies being monitored by the 
FASB in assessing the SFAS 33 experiment. It represents the only FASB-
sponsored project that is focused specifically at audit issues and that provides 
for auditor input. 
The American Institute of CPAs, through its Auditing Standards Division, 
also has encouraged research directed toward improving standards and 
procedures for auditors who must deal with changing prices disclosures. 
In assessing the SFAS 33 experiment, it is important to recognize the 
views of all interested groups: users, preparers, and auditors. The results of 
this study—the data and insight from an auditor's perspective—should be 
considered in light of other related research concerning the usefulness of 
changing prices disclosures. 
* This paper was prepared initially for the AICPA and the FASB. © American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants, 1984, and reproduced herein by permission of the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants. 
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Objectives 
Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) 27 and SAS 28 provide general 
standards for auditors in meeting their responsibilities with respect to a client's 
changing prices disclosures. However, these auditing standards do not specify 
detailed procedures to be used in reviewing the disclosures, nor do they 
address special problems that may arise during the review process. Because of 
the experimental nature of SFAS 33 and the general nature of SAS 27 and SAS 
28, little is known about the actual review techniques used by CPAs. The 
overall objective of this research was to examine the actual experience of CPAs 
in conducting such reviews.* Thus, this is a descriptive study dealing with 
auditors' perceptions, responsibilities, and experience in reviewing SFAS 33 
disclosures. 
More specifically, this research was designed to accomplish five objectives. 
1. Determine the extent and impact of SFAS 33 changing prices dis­
closures. 
2. Identify the costs involved in the review process. 
3. Identify the techniques and procedures currently used by CPAs in 
conducting reviews. 
4. Analyze special problems encountered in conducting reviews. 
5. Identify auditor perceptions concerning the usefulness and auditability of 
SFAS 33 disclosures. 
The results of this study may assist the FASB in developing reporting 
requirements that will provide more useful information. Such reporting 
requirements might help to simplify auditor reviews and, thereby, lower the 
costs of disclosure. In addition, this research may provide useful data for the 
Auditing Standards Board in considering amendments to, or interpretations of, 
SAS 27 and SAS 28. 
Methodology 
The first step in conducting the research was to review guidance Materials 
developed by CPA firms for SAS 27 and SAS 28 reviews. Materials from seven 
accounting firms were examined. In addition, FASB statements, statements on 
auditing standards, articles, position papers, company annual reports, and 
other publications dealing with financial reporting and changing prices were 
studied. 
A second step was to conduct in-depth interviews with national office 
partners and personnel of three major CPA firms. These interviews, held in 
New York City, were with individuals who are heavily involved with the 
research topic. Prior to conducting the in-depth interviews, the researchers 
prepared a detailed checklist of questions based primarily on CPA firm 
guidance materials. These interviews proved extremely useful in clarifying key 
issues and in identifying additional questions, which were then used in the 
development of a questionnaire. 
* The term review is used in this report in the context of the normal English language and not in the 
technical sense of, for example, "compilation and review" as defined in Statements On Standards 
For Accounting and Review Services No. 1, "Compilation and Review of Financial Statements" 
(Accounting and Review Services Committee, December 1978). 
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The third step in the research process was to develop a comprehensive 
questionnaire designed to elicit responses from a representative sample of 
audit practitioners with clients that currently disclose SFAS 33 data. Once the 
questionnaire was developed, it was sent to each of the partners interviewed, 
to representatives of the FASB and AICPA, and to academic colleagues for 
review. 
The fourth step was to conduct a pilot test of the questionnaire. Again, 
interviews were conducted with key personnel of two different CPA firms, this 
time in Salt Lake City offices. Based on these pilot tests, additional minor 
modifications were made to the questionnaire. 
Questionnaires were distributed to 172 potential respondents.* Of these, 
126 were returned, a 73 percent response rate. Because of missing pages, 
seven questionnaires were not usable. The data and comments received, along 
with information obtained during interviews, provide the basis for the conclu­
sions of this report, which are described in the next section. 
Results of Research 
The results of the research are grouped into five categories: perceived 
client interest and involvement with SFAS 33 disclosures; nature, extent, and 
impact of CPA involvement with changing prices disclosures; specific tech­
niques used by CPA firms in performing SAS 27 and SAS 28 reviews; special 
problems encountered by auditors; and auditor perceptions concerning the 
usefulness and auditability of changing prices data. 
Perceived Client Interest and 
Involvement with SFAS 33 Disclosures 
Although 98 percent of the audit clients in the sample met the SFAS 33 size 
criterion and disclosed changing prices data in all four years (1979-82) covered 
by the study, auditors perceived that their clients have little interest in SFAS 
33 disclosures. Specifically, only six clients reported changing prices data on a 
comprehensive basis. Other clients essentially provided the minimum required 
disclosures specified by Statement 33. Of the 118 auditors responding to the 
question concerning client interest in the disclosures, 104 clients were 
evaluated by their auditors as complying only because of the disclosure 
requirement, 12 were evaluated as having moderate interest in the changing 
prices disclosures, and only two were evaluated as having sufficient interest to 
frequently base managerial decisions on inflation-adjusted data. 
Given the low level of interest in SFAS 33 disclosures, it is not surprising 
that most companies comply with the minimum disclosure requirements, using 
easily applied measurement methods that have a low relative cost. For 
example, indexing is the most common method used by companies to compute 
the current cost of property, plant, and equipment (PPE). In computing the 
current cost of PPE, 59 percent of the companies used specific price indices, 3 
* A representative sample of companies reporting under SFAS 33 was drawn from the FASB data 
base and the CPA firms that audit these companies were identified. Nine major CPA firms were 
involved. A cover letter and several questionnaires were sent to a partner in the national office of 
each of the nine firms who in turn forwarded the questionnaires to engagement partners or 
managers directly involved with the particular client companies in the sample. 
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percent used direct price quotes, 12 percent used general indices such as the 
CPI, 11 percent used annual appraisals, 7 percent used appraisals in the first 
year with indices in subsequent years, and 4 percent used internally-developed 
indices. The principal types of specific price indices used were U.S. Producer 
Price Index (38 percent), Handy-Whitman Index (17 percent), and the CPI-U 
(17 percent).* 
With respect to inventory, current costs were most often estimated using 
FIFO inventory costing (53 percent); standard costs were used in 17 percent 
of the companies; and published indices were used by another 11 percent of the 
companies. 
In summary, it can be concluded that although large companies do comply 
with SFAS 33, most are perceived by their auditors as having little interest in 
the data and report the data only because of the FASB requirement. In general, 
companies do not appear to use changing prices data for internal managerial 
purposes, provide only the minimum required disclosures, and use simplified 
methods to estimate current costs of PPE and inventory (i.e., indices for PPE 
and FIFO for inventory). 
Nature, Extent, Costs, and Impact of CPA Involvement 
with Changing Prices Disclosures 
SAS 27 and SAS 28 require that auditors be involved with their clients' 
changing prices disclosures. Because SAS 27 and SAS 28 offer only general 
guidance to auditors, this research gathered evidence on the extent of CPA 
involvement, the costs incurred, and the impact of auditors' efforts. 
As expected, in the first year of compliance, auditors were involved 
extensively in assisting their clients in preparing the changing prices dis­
closures; in subsequent years, auditor involvement was limited generally to 
reviewing the data. Specifically, the percentage of auditors who assisted their 
clients in preparing changing prices disclosures decreased from 54 percent in 
1979 to 23 percent in 1982. As a result of this reduced involvement, auditor 
time decreased each year. Average chargeable hours involved in helping clients 
prepare changing prices disclosures and in conducting SAS 27 and SAS 28 
reviews were 104 hours in 1979, 84 hours in 1980, 71 hours in 1981, and 68 
hours in 1982. For 90 percent of the reviews, the procedures represented less 
than 2 percent of "total audit time." 
In respect to the hours charged to the reviews of changing prices 
disclosures, senior staff accounted for 43 percent, supervisors/managers 27 
percent, junior staff worked 23 percent, and partners accounted for only 7 
percent. Using the average chargeable hours mentioned above and constant 
billing rates of $45 per hour for junior staff, $65 for senior staff, $100 for 
supervisor/manager, and $150 for partners, the average cost to clients of 
auditor involvement with the changing prices data was $7,883 in 1979, $6,367 
in 1980, $5,381 in 1981, and $5,154 in 1982. 
* The Consumer Price Index-Urban suggests a national price level by calculating the average price 
of a "market basket" of many commodities commonly purchased by urban and suburban 
households. The U.S. Producer Price Index measures price changes on approximately 2,800 
goods sold in large quantities by primary producers to wholesalers and distributors. The Handy-
Whitman Index is a property valuation index that is used in the public utility industry to estimate 
construction costs. 
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Measuring the impact of auditor association with changing prices dis­
closures was more difficult than measuring costs. Impact (effectiveness) can be 
measured accurately only if quality, extent of the disclosures, and degree of 
compliance can be assessed both with and without auditor involvement. 
Because involvement is required, the surrogate measurement used was 
whether auditors initiated adjustments to the companies' changing prices 
disclosures or modified their own reports because of material departures from 
SFAS 33 guidelines. 
With respect to adjustments, the performance of SAS 27 and 28 procedures 
resulted in modified disclosures in 55 percent of the companies for one or more 
years. Most of these adjustments involved correcting clerical errors and 
problems with the translation of data from foreign subsidiaries. As a result of 
the adjustments, some reported current cost number was changed for 34 
percent of the clients, some constant dollar number was changed for 21 
percent of the clients, a narrative disclosure was changed for 14 percent of the 
clients, a reported holding gain and/or loss was changed for 15 percent of the 
clients, a reported monetary gain or loss was changed for 12 percent of the 
clients, reported income from continuing operations was changed for 9 percent 
of the clients, and a reported "lower recoverable amount"* was changed for 4 
percent of the clients. 
In no case were auditor reports modified (i.e., a third paragraph added) to 
call attention to omissions, material departures from SFAS 33 guidelines, or 
because of the inability to perform SAS 27 and 28 procedures. Most auditors 
agreed, because of the general nature of the standards and the subjective 
nature of the changing prices data, that departures, errors, or omissions would 
have to be extremely significant before a modification of the audit report would 
be considered. Auditors suggested that materiality guidelines for changing 
prices data are not nearly as strict as those for data contained in the primary 
financial statements. 
Based on these results, it is apparent that the cost of auditor involvement 
with changing prices disclosures is comparatively low and represents only a 
small percentage of total "audit" cost. Involvement does result in some 
general adjustments, although mostly clerical, to the supplemental disclosures. 
In no case were there omissions or departures from SFAS 33 guidelines that 
were considered material enough to justify modification of the auditor report. 
Specific Techniques Used by CPAs 
in Performing SAS 27 and SAS 28 Reviews 
As indicated earlier, SAS 27 and SAS 28 provide only general guidelines as 
to how auditors are to meet their responsibilities with respect to clients' 
changing prices disclosures. As a result, one of the major purposes of the 
research was to determine what specific procedures are being used and 
whether or not these procedures are consistent across CPA firms. 
To determine existing procedures, CPA firms that have SFAS 33 clients 
were contacted and asked to send copies of the programs they use in meeting 
* SFAS No. 33 states that "If the recoverable amount for a group of assets is judged to be 
materially and permanently lower than historical cost in constant dollar or current cost, the 
recoverable amount shall be used as a measure of the assets." 
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SAS 27 and SAS 28 responsibilities. Seven of the nine CPA firms with 12 or 
more SFAS 33 clients sent programs; one replied they did not have a specific 
program; and one firm did not respond. Once received, these programs were 
analyzed and compared for consistency. Most programs were general, merely 
rephrasing the overview procedures outlined in SAS 27 and SAS 28. On the 
basis of these documents and interviews with audit partners, it was determined 
that auditors use the following six procedures in meeting their responsibilities: 
1. Inquiring of management and other client personnel. 
2. Checking mathematical accuracy of the current cost and constant dollar 
computations. 
3. Performing reasonableness tests. 
4. Comparing SFAS 33 disclosures with those in the audited financial 
statements. 
5. Reading narrative explanations. 
6. Cross-checking data to source documents. 
Of these procedures, numbers 1, 4, and 5 are specifically required by SAS 
27 and SAS 28. It is not surprising, therefore, that inquiries of management and 
other client personnel were deemed by auditors to be most important. On 
average, 23 percent of total chargeable hours were spent in this activity. Most 
inquiries were made of the client's senior accounting staff and controllers; 
there is little interaction with nonaccounting personnel. Specifically, less than 5 
percent of the respondents stated that they ever questioned engineers or 
appraisers whereas over 64 percent indicated that inquiries were made of 
senior accounting staff and controllers. 
While the programs of most CPA firms did not specify types of inquiries 
made, one program did enumerate specific areas for inquiry. Based on that 
program and on initial interviews, the researchers identified several potential 
topics covered in discussions with client personnel. On a scale of 1 (no 
emphasis) to 5 (very strong emphasis), respondents ranked specific inquiries 
as follows: 
Nature of Inquiry 
1. Are changing prices disclosures 
consistent from year to year? 
2. Do current cost and constant 
dollar computations comply with SFAS 
33 guidelines? 
3. Are preparer(s) and reviewer(s) 
knowledgeable about changing prices 
disclosures? 
4. 
5. 
6. Are client's computations internally 
reviewed and rechecked? 
Average Score 
4.262 
4.227 
4.050 
3.983 
3.806 
3.704 
What significant assumptions are 
made by clients in preparing 
changing prices disclosures? 
Are assumptions made by the company 
in preparing the data consistent 
with the nature of the business? 
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7. Are the sources of the current 
cost data appropriate? 3.655 
8. What methods are used in computing 
current cost amounts? 3.649 
9. What methods are used in providing 
constant dollar amounts? 3.550 
10. How does the client treat disposals of 
business segments? 3.487 
11. Who prepares the disclosures? 3.413 
12. How are monetary assets and liabilities 
classified? 3.303 
13. What assumptions are made about inventory 
turnover? 3.056 
14. What shortcut techniques, if any, are 
used in computing changing prices 
disclosures? 3.047 
15. How are the "lower recoverable amounts" of 
assets calculated? 2.947 
16. What considerations are given to the 
homogeneity of assets? 2.857 
Checking the mathematical accuracy of client's computations was the 
second most time-consuming procedure used by auditors. Over 97 percent of 
the respondents indicated that they test-checked mathematical accuracy, 
spending, on average, 21 percent of chargeable hours in this activity. Most 
checking involved recalculating adjustments made through using the CPI-U and 
other more specific indices. 
Eighty-seven percent of all respondents indicated they performed rea­
sonableness tests in complying with SAS 27 and SAS 28. On average, rea­
sonableness tests consumed 19 percent of total chargeable hours. Specific 
reasonableness tests included the following: 
1. Comparing the disclosed monetary gain or loss with the net monetary 
position times the average rate of inflation. 
2. Comparing constant dollar depreciation with the percentage increase in 
restatement of fixed assets times historical cost. 
3. Comparing the percentage change from historical costs to current cost 
for fixed assets with the average yearly rate of increase in the value of 
fixed assets times the assets' lives. 
4. Comparing the percentage changes in the constant dollar and current 
cost amounts with the general inflation rate. 
5. Comparing the relationship between historical cost, constant dollar, and 
current cost amounts in prior years to that of the current year. 
6. Performing analytical reviews of significant fluctuations. 
Although 87 percent of responding auditors indicated that they performed 
one or more of the above tests, all indicated that less emphasis was placed on 
these tests than on the other procedures. 
Even though the average percentage of total chargeable hours consumed in 
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comparing SFAS 33 disclosures to audited financial statements for consistency 
was only 16 percent, because it is required, all respondents indicated that this 
was a procedure they always performed. 
The specific comparisons made, with their respective scores, were: 
Nature of Comparison Average Score 
1. Examining the consistency between the 
basic data in the primary financial 
statements with that used in the 
changing prices disclosures. 4.274 
2. Examining the consistency of methods, 
indices, and assumptions used from 
year to year. 4.188 
3. Examining the consistency of the service 
lives of property, plant, and equipment 
with those assumed in the changing prices 
disclosures. 3.404 
4. Examining the consistency of the inventory 
turnover assumptions used in changing prices 
disclosures with those in the primary 
financial statements. 3.229 
5. Examining the consistency between the use 
of "lower of cost or market" in the 
primary financial statements and adjustments 
to "lower recoverable amounts" in the 
changing prices disclosures. 3.045 
The remaining two procedures used by auditors were reviewing narrative 
explanations and test-checking the data to source documents. On average, 
reviewing narrations consumed 11 percent of the total chargeable hours. To 
assess what auditors look for when reading narrative disclosures, they were 
asked to indicate the emphasis placed on the completeness of various aspects 
of the disclosures. The following are average scores with respect to evaluating 
management's narrative explanations: 
Nature of Reading Average Score 
1. Making sure there are no material 
misstatements of fact. 4.483 
2. Making sure there are no material 
omissions. 4.235 
3. Making sure there are no material 
inconsistencies between changing prices 
disclosures and data presented in the 
audited financial statements or elsewhere 
in the annual report. 4.139 
4. Making sure all explanations are 
logical. 4.000 
5. Making sure all significant and unusual 
relationships are explained. 3.586 
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6. Making sure all major assumptions are 
fully described. 3.456 
The scores indicate that, although reading narrative explanations is not 
very time consuming, it is an extremely important step that must be 
completed. These average scores, ranging from a low of 3.456 to 4.483, are as 
high as those for any other procedure. 
The final procedure, test-checking of data to source documents,* was 
deemed to be the least important of any procedures performed by auditors. 
However, 75 percent of the respondents indicated that they performed test-
checks. Those using this technique indicated that, on average, the tests 
consumed only 9 percent of total chargeable hours. Neither SAS 27 not SAS 28 
suggest the examining of source documents, and many accountants would 
consider this to be an "audit" procedure rather than a review technique. 
To summarize, auditors use six specific procedures in complying with the 
requirements of SAS 27 and SAS 28. These procedures, together with their 
relative costs, are presented below: 
Percentage of 
Review 
Time 
Inquiring of Management and 
Other Client Personnel 
Checking Mathematical 
Accuracy of Computations 
Performing Reasonableness 
Tests 
Comparing SFAS 33 
Disclosures with Audited 
Financial Statements 
Reviewing Narrative 
Explanation 
Testing Checking Data to 
Source Documents 
23 
21 
19 
16 
11 
9 
Approximate 
Costs* 
$1,185 
1,082 
979 
825 
567 
464 
Totals 100 $5,154 
* These costs are estimated using the average 1982 costs as specified earlier in this report. The 
costs assume a homogeneity of tasks that likely will not exist because junior staff will spend more 
time on test-checking procedures while managers likely will make any inquiries. 
Special Problems Encountered in Performing 
SAS 27 and SAS 28 Reviews 
One of the major objectives of the research was to assist the auditing 
standard setting process by identifying SAS 27 and SAS 28 implementation 
problems. Auditors identified three major problems in complying with SAS 27 
* Examples of such test checking would be to examine the documention for the property schedules 
that are used to support the fixed asset amounts. 
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and SAS 28. The most common problem was that SAS 27 and SAS 28 are too 
general to provide much guidance. As a result, it is difficult to know when the 
data have been analyzed sufficiently. Typical comments were: 
"It is difficult to know when to stop reviewing and yet be comfortable that 
no embarrassment will result to the client or my CPA firm from amounts 
disclosed." 
"It is difficult to determine the extent of 'review' procedures and to 
ascertain the propriety and reasonableness of indices used." 
A second problem identified was that the changing prices data are so 
subjective that no matter what procedures are performed, auditors can never 
feel comfortable with the data. Typical comments included: 
"Determination of current cost of property and inventory are difficult to 
become comfortable with." 
"Objectively reviewing the assumptions and judgments is difficult consid­
ering the broad nature of assumptions and their limitations on companies 
with world-wide operations." 
The final major problem encountered was that, because changing prices 
disclosures are only supplementary to the primary financial statements and 
because they are unaudited, the disclosures are assigned a low priority by 
clients. As a result, the information is not available early enough to allow for 
meaningful evaluation. Typical responses were: 
"Information necessary to generate data for SFAS 33 disclosures 
generally is not available early enough to allow for adequate time to 
generate meaningful data and allow adequate time to evaluate reasonable­
ness." 
"The client has relatively little interest in the information and prepares it 
only to comply with GAAP. As a result, there is not a great deal of 
attention paid to the preparation of the information or the significance of 
the assumptions used." 
Auditor Perceptions Concerning Usefulness and 
Auditability of Changing Prices Data 
The final objective of the research was to assess whether auditors perceive 
changing prices data to be useful to investors and creditors and whether or not 
disclosures should be audited. When asked whether or not they perceived the 
data to be useful, most auditors replied with an emphatic "no." Typical of the 
responses received were the following: 
"Changing prices information should not be required. They presume that 
inflation has an impact of similar latitude in each company's financial 
statements. Business decisions are never based on these amounts to any 
great extent. Investors would have a very difficult time using this 
information to reliably predict earnings trends." 
"The confusion brought about by SFAS 33 is enough to warrant 
elimination of the disclosures." 
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"SFAS 33 disclosures should be discontinued due to lack of tangible 
usefulness to investors and to other interested parties. It is an over­
simplified means of presenting the implications of a very complex set of 
economic variables and events and, as a result, does not represent cost-
beneficial information. The basic framework is not readily understand­
able." 
Particularly strong in their objection to the requirements were auditors of 
public utilities. Nearly all such auditors commented that, for public utilities, at 
least, the requirements are a waste of time. Several respondents indicated 
that, because public utilities are limited to recovering only historical costs 
through the rate-making process, the "lower recoverable amount" require­
ment causes PPE and inventory to be written up to current value and then 
written back down to historical cost. 
The auditors responding to the questionnaire generally concurred, how­
ever, that if changing prices disclosures are to be mandated, then the 
accounting requirements should be more specific so that comparability among 
companies would be enhanced. Generally, auditors believe that SFAS 33 allows 
too many alternatives that result in inconsistent disclosures. These inconsis­
tencies significantly reduce the usefulness of the information. Typical com­
ments supporting this position were: 
"SFAS 33 guidelines should have been specific in nature in order to allow 
for comparability of financial statements." 
"The FASB should reduce the number of acceptable accounting methods 
to avoid confusion and provide better consistency of the information." 
Although responding auditors were generally not supportive of any chang­
ing prices data, they did favor current cost disclosures over constant dollar 
disclosures. When asked which method they believed preferable for reporting 
to investors and creditors, nearly three times as many auditors responded that 
current cost disclosures are preferred. Although unsolicited, some re­
spondents expressed their views with the following kinds of comments: 
"The dual approach (constant dollar and current cost) should be elimi­
nated in favor of current cost. A dual approach is confusing, and current 
cost is more appropriate." 
"The FASB should drop constant dollar reporting or allow companies to 
compute data based on indices representative of their business commit­
ment." 
"The assumption of applying constant dollar indexes to complex multina­
tional companies is so illogical that no one should base any judgments on 
the information." 
The final group of questions in the survey asked auditors their perceptions 
about the "auditability" of current cost and constant dollar disclosures and 
whether auditing the disclosures would make them more reliable to external 
users. Generally, auditors believed that data could be audited but that auditing 
would take considerably more time and would not make the data any more 
reliable to external users. 
With respect to constant dollar disclosures and assuming the same 
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requirements of SFAS 33, 78 percent believe that, by conducting additional 
verifications and reviews of the indices and by checking more source docu­
ments and mathematical calculations, they could audit and render an opinion on 
financial statements that included such disclosures as a footnote. On average, 
auditors believe it would take 2.25 times as many chargeable hours to obtain 
the sufficient competent evidential matter necessary to audit such data. 
However, 88 percent feel that audited constant dollar disclosures would not be 
much more reliable to external users than the present unaudited supplemen­
tary disclosures. Those respondents who believe that the constant dollar 
disclosures could not be audited cited as their reasons the lack of specific 
GAAP, the complications of international operations, the use of too many 
assumptions and estimates, and the subjectivity of the data. 
A much smaller percentage, 44 percent, believe that, given the same 
requirements as SFAS 33, it would be possible to audit and render an opinion 
on financial statements that included current cost disclosures as a footnote. 
Respondents who believe it would be possible to audit current cost data 
estimate that such procedures would take three times as long as current 
procedures and would require more detailed reviews of indices, more tracing 
to source documents, more checking of mathematical calculations, more 
analytical reviews, and more detailed testing of computer programs used to 
generate the data. Respondents who believe that current cost numbers could 
not be audited cited the use of too many assumptions and estimates and the 
subjectivity of the data as their primary reasons. 
Both those who thought they could audit the data and those who believe it 
would be impossible agreed on one proposition—the audited data would not be 
much more useful to external users than unaudited disclosures. In fact, some 
respondents indicated that, by leading financial statement users to believe the 
information is more accurate than it really is, auditing might make the data even 
more confusing. 
In summary, most auditors stated that the present constant dollar and 
current cost disclosures are confusing, subjective, and not very useful. They 
indicated that current cost disclosures are more meaningful than constant dollar 
disclosures but do not want to see expanded standards, such as a requirement 
that the data be audited. 
Conclusions 
Based on an analysis of the accumulated data, the following conclusions 
have been reached: 
• There is little perceived client interest in changing prices disclosures. 
Auditors do not perceive such disclosures to be used by internal management; 
rather, the disclosures are provided only to meet the minimum FASB 
disclosure requirements. 
Of those auditors surveyed, 87 percent indicated that their clients have 
little interest in changing prices disclosures. Many comments were received 
indicating that, because of confusion about their meaning, changing prices data 
are not considered when making decisions. 
Seventy-three percent of the auditors indicated that their clients provided 
the disclosures only to meet the requirements set forth in SFAS 33. In meeting 
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these minimum disclosures requirements, most companies use the easiest 
method available for calculating the current costs of property, plant, equip­
ment, and inventories. Published indices are used by 59 percent of the 
responding companies in valuing PPE while 53 percent indicate that they base 
the current cost of inventories on FIFO. 
• The average review of changing prices disclosures requires a small 
percentage of engagement time and results in minor adjustments to the 
disclosures. Departures from SFAS 33 guidelines ordinarily are not material 
enough to justify modifying auditor reports. 
In 90 percent of the cases, the auditors' review of changing prices 
disclosures consumed less than two percent of total engagement time. This 
amounted to less than $5,200 per client based on assumed costs in 1982. 
Senior staff members were most often involved; partners had relatively little 
involvement in reviewing the disclosures. 
As a result of these reviews, several minor adjustments were made to the 
changing prices disclosures. These adjustments usually involved correcting 
clerical errors. None of the respondents reported having to modify audit 
reports because of material omissions or material departures from SFAS 33 
guidelines. 
• Although few formal audit-type programs exist for reviewing changing 
prices disclosures, CPAs use the following specific procedures in fulfilling their 
responsibilities: inquiring of management, checking mathematical accuracy, 
performing reasonableness tests, comparing SFAS 33 disclosures with audited 
financial statements, reviewing narrative explanations, and test-checking data 
to source documents. 
Inquiring of management is considered the most important step in review­
ing changing prices disclosures. This procedure consumes almost one quarter 
of all chargeable hours related to reviews of SFAS 33 disclosures. When 
conducting these inquiries, the senior accounting staff and controllers of clients 
are most often contacted. 
Almost all auditors perform mathematical checks of computations and 
spend 21 percent of chargeable hours on this activity. 
Various resonableness tests relating to changing prices data have been 
developed by CPA firms. These tests are applied by 87 percent of auditors and 
are responsible for almost one fifth of chargeable hours relating to SAS 27 and 
SAS 28 reviews. 
Another procedure always performed by auditors, comparing changing 
prices disclosures with audited financial statements, accounted for 16 percent 
of chargeable hours. 
Although reviewing narrative explanations does not consume as much time 
as other procedures, it is considered by most auditors to be one of the most 
important. Management's narrative explanations are reviewed mainly for 
material misstatements, omissions, and inconsistencies. 
Test-checking data to source documents was the least important procedure 
performed by the auditors. 
• Several problems associated with reviewing changing prices disclosures 
were identified by auditors. The problems mentioned most often were: SAS 27 
and SAS 28 standards are too general, changing prices data are too subjective, 
and complying with the requirements is assigned low priority by client 
companies. 
The procedures suggested in SAS 27 and SAS 28 provide few specific 
details for auditors to follow in conducting their reviews. Consequently, 
auditors feel uncomfortable with the review process. 
The second problem, subjectivity of changing prices data, is a result of the 
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flexible guidelines of SFAS 33. This statement allows changing prices data to 
be computed using a variety of methods and assumptions. Many auditors 
commented that, if changing prices disclosures are to be effective, more 
specific reporting guidelines must be provided. 
Because of the low interest expressed to the respondents by clients 
concerning the changing prices data, the disclosures are seldom prepared in a 
timely manner. Clients apparently generate the data as a compliance pro­
cedure, not for use by management. 
• Auditors responded that the present reporting guidelines, requiring 
disclosures based on both constant dollars and current costs, are confusing, 
subjective, and not very useful. They stated that current costs are more 
meaningful than constant dollar disclosures. However, auditors indicated that 
requiring changing prices data to be audited would not necessarily result in 
more useful information for external users. 
Many comments were received suggesting that requiring information based 
on both constant dollars and current costs results in compromising the 
usefulness of both sets of data. Because each method includes different 
assumptions, the disclosures are confusing when reported with primary 
financial statements, which use yet another set of assumptions. 
Of those auditors expressing a preference, over 70 percent prefer current 
cost to constant dollar disclosures. Although auditors feel that neither method 
should be subject to an audit requirement, they indicated that the current cost 
method results in information that is more relevant to financial statement 
users. 
Endnotes 
1. Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 33, "Financial Reporting and Changing 
Prices" (Stamford: Financial Accounting Standards Board, September 1979). SFAS No. 33 
requires most large companies to provide supplemental financial data reflecting price changes. Two 
methods are used to disclose this information. The first deals with changes in the general price 
level for all commodities and services. This method is known as constant dollar accounting. The 
second kind of price change relates to changes in prices of particular items. This second method is 
referred to as current cost accounting. 
2. Statement on Auditing Standards No. 27, "Supplementary Information Required by the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board," AICPA Professional Standards, 1979 and Statement on 
Auditing Standards No. 28, "Supplementary Information on The Effects of Changing Prices," 
AICPA Professional Standards, 1980. SAS No. 27 requires auditors to apply certain procedures to 
supplementary information required by the FASB. Those procedures include inquiring of 
management regarding methods of preparing information, comparing the information for consis-
tency with audited statements and management's response to inquiries, and applying additional 
procedures required by other FASB statements. SAS No. 28 requires that the procedures in SAS 
No. 27 be specificially applied to a company's changing prices disclosures. 
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Discussant's Response to 
Auditor Reviews of Changing Prices Disclosures 
Robert W. Berliner 
Arthur Young & Company 
Before addressing the specifics of the Skousen/Albrecht research, I should 
disclose my involvement in the subject area because of the influence it may 
have on my evaluation of their findings. 
I am the partner in my firm with lead responsibility for the subject area of 
accounting for changing prices and have been closely involved for the past ten 
years with the efforts of the Financial Accounting Standards Board, Securities 
and Exchange Commission, and accounting bodies in certain other countries in 
this area. This involvement led to my being named chairman of the Auditing 
Standards Board's task force on Auditor Involvement with Required Supple­
mentary Information. The activities of this task force resulted in the issuance of 
SAS 27, Supplementary Information Required by the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board and SAS 28, Supplementary Information on the Effects of 
Changing Prices. Further, I am the principal author of the Arthur Young 
research paper on the use of changing prices information by financial analysts, 
and I reported on this research at the FASB research conference in January 
1983. What all this background means is that I believe that changing prices 
information has merit. In fact, I have helped to shape the related auditing 
standards and have conducted research that overlaps the subject research in 
the area of usefulness of FAS 33 data. 
I was, as well, one of the five members of the ASB's Planning Subcommit­
tee that evaluated and recommended AICPA participation in the funding of the 
subject research. And, further yet, I was one of the national office partners of 
major CPA firms to be interviewed by the researchers for purposes of 
providing input to the used in the development of their questionnaire. 
These prefatory remarks should constitute full disclosure of the reasons 
why I may be considered a nonindependent discussant of this research paper. I 
can assure you, however, that I have not accepted any money or other 
treasures from either Professor Skousen or Professor Albrecht and have 
endeavored to maintain objectivity in reviewing their research paper. 
Turning, then, to the paper itself, let me begin by focusing on the research 
objectives. As set forth in the second paragraph on the report's first page, they 
were: 
• To determine the nature and extent of procedures used by auditors, 
• To identify the costs and special problems related to the reviews, and 
• To seek input from auditors concerning the perceived usefulness and 
auditability of FAS 33 data. 
Did the researchers accomplish their stated objectives? I'd answer that 
with a qualified "yes"—something like "more or less." 
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Achievement of Stated Objectives 
As to the nature and extent of procedures—I think the researchers 
have obtained a good handle on the nature of procedures followed by auditors in 
reviewing the FAS 33 information. Their findings as to the nature of auditors' 
inquiries, reasonableness tests, and comparisons of the disclosures to the 
audited financial statements are particularly informative. I have only one slight 
reservation. The information about auditors' procedures was obtained pri­
marily from a review of SAS 27 and 28 and the guidance material of some 
accounting firms. These procedures were then listed in the questionnaire, and 
the respondents were asked to make certain comments about them. I wonder 
whether the researchers might have learned anything further had the question­
naire asked the respondents to list their own procedures. 
In terms of the extent of procedures, my reservations are somewhat 
stronger. The researchers obtained excellent input on four of the six pro­
cedures listed, but the questionnaire did not seek similar details as to the other 
two: checking the mathematical accuracy of computations and test-checking to 
source documents. These two verification procedures, which consumed 30 
percent of the respondents' review time, are not required by SAS 27 and 28. 
I'd be interested in learning more about them, particularly why they were 
performed at all, given the limited assurance objectives of SASs 27 and 28. 
As to the costs of the reviews—I think the researchers succeeded in 
obtaining as much information as could reasonably be expected from a 
questionnaire approach, namely a rough indication of total hours expended, the 
relationship of these hours to total audit time, a percentage allocation of the 
total hours to each of the basic procedures, and a percentage breakdown of the 
hours by level of personnel involved. As I will explain later, my only 
reservation here is how far one can go in interpreting this rough data. 
As to the perceived usefulness of FAS 33 data—Let me begin by 
saying that I would assign only a low priority to this objective. Information 
concerning the usefulness of the data is best obtained from users and, to some 
extent, from preparers—not from auditors. I believe this fact constitutes the 
reason the researchers refer to the perceived usefulness of the data. The use of 
that word suggests, and rightly so, that the research findings in this regard are 
only secondhand. 
While I happen to agree with the researchers' finding that auditors perceive 
little client interest in the disclosures, I do quibble with the basis for their 
finding, principally the responses to the question: "How much interest does 
your client have in using changing prices data?" Respondents were asked to 
choose one of the following three possible answers to the question: "little 
interest," "moderate interest," or "high interest." A client with moderate 
interest is defined in the questionnaire as one who "uses selected changing 
prices data occasionally for managerial decisions;" a client with high interest is 
one who "frequently bases managerial decisions on inflation adjusted data." 
Given the choices, I would expect, as was the case, that the great prepon­
derance of auditors would describe their clients as having little interest, defined 
as a client who "complies with FAS 33 only because it is a requirement." 
But is it appropriate to base perceptions of usefulness solely on the extent 
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of use in managerial decision-making? Isn't it possible for a client to be 
interested in the disclosures from the standpoint of external communication 
with users of financial information but not from the standpoint of use by internal 
management? And, regardless of perceived usefulness, how many clients 
voluntarily provide financial information that is not required by GAAP, some 
regulatory body, or the like? 
The researchers also supported their finding of auditor perception of little 
client interest based on the fact that only six respondents reported a client 
providing the changing prices data on a comprehensive basis. Is the fact that a 
company provides only the acceptable minimum necessarily demonstrative of 
little interest in the information? 
I also question the intimation that clients have little interest because they 
commonly use the indexing method to compute current costs of property, 
plant, and equipment. Irrespective of the degree of interest a company may 
have in the information, wouldn't it be only logical for it to use the most cost/ 
efficient method which produces reliable results? Contrary to the exposure 
draft, FAS 33 raised indexing to a level of acceptability equal to any other 
acceptable method of computing current cost. Further, when a relevant index 
of new asset price change is applied appropriately to the historical cost of an 
asset, I believe there is no basis for any implication that there is something 
suspect or second rate about the result. Moreover, many companies believe 
that indexing is not only the most cost-effective method of determining current 
cost, but is often the only practical method. 
I also find it significant that the researchers have reported that 71 percent 
of the respondents made use of external indexes in computing current cost of 
property, plant, and equipment. But the significance I find is not necessarily 
what one would think it to be; I find that percentage surprisingly low. After all, 
FAS 33 itself suggested the use of simplified methods. In these circumstances, 
were I the decision-maker at a reporting company, I wouldn't hesitate to make 
extensive use of external indexes. 
Furthermore, I never would have expected to find that appraisals were 
used by as many as 11 percent of the respondents or that appraisals were used 
in the first year and updated by means of indexes in subsequent years by 
another 7 percent of the respondents. Appraisals are by far the most expensive 
method of computing current cost. Their use by nearly one company in five 
points to more than little interest in the information. 
My reservations about the researchers' findings as to the perceived level of 
client interest are not intended to suggest, by any means, that clients have 
other than little interest in FAS 33 information. As I said earlier, my own 
experience suggests that most companies, in fact, do have little interest in the 
information. My comments were intended only to challenge the research as a 
basis for supporting that conclusion. 
Evaluation of the Research Findings 
The nature and extent of auditor procedures—The researchers 
report that "the average review takes less than two percent of total 
engagement time and results in minor adjustments to the disclosures. Depar­
tures from FAS 33 guidelines ordinarily are not material enough to justify 
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modifying auditor reports." The fact that the average review takes less than 
two percent of total engagement time is informative but very difficult to 
evaluate. Given that the information is supplementary and unaudited, one 
would not expect that it would require a significant portion of the total audit 
time. In evaluating the amount of time spent, one needs also to consider that 
the time reported is incremental time—time in addition to the time already 
spent in conducting the audit. As part of the audit, the auditor spends time 
obtaining information about the company's industry, business, accounting 
system, accounting controls, etc., which reduces the amount of time he would 
otherwise have to spend in reviewing the FAS 33 information. Put another 
way, if the reviewer had not done an audit, he would need to spend a lot more 
time on changing prices information than that indicated by the questionnaire 
responses. Also, the fact that auditors are applying more than the minimum 
procedures called for by SAS 27 and SAS 28 supports the belief that auditors 
are spending all the time that is necessary to fulfill their professional 
responsibilities. 
The researchers also state that the auditor review results in minor 
adjustments to the disclosures. Like a cup of coffee that is either half full or half 
empty, the research findings can be interpreted in two ways. The question­
naire revealed that the review procedures resulted in modified disclosures in 
55 percent of the companies for one or more years. A 55 percent adjustment 
rate strikes me as being very high, possibly even higher than the rate of 
adjustment resulting from audits of the primary financial statements for these 
large, public companies. Also, the fact that the adjustments were made at all 
could suggest that they were more than insignificant, else they would have 
been waived as immaterial. 
The last finding in this area is that there were no ommissions or departures 
from FAS 33 guidelines that were considered material enough to justify 
modification of the auditors' reports. My only comment regarding this finding is 
the need to bear in mind that no qualifications should be expected in light of the 
materiality considerations involved, the subjective judgments involved in 
preparing current cost information, the explicit flexibility provided by FAS 33 
itself, and its experimental nature. Because of these factors, it is very unlikely 
that an auditor could assert that the changing prices information departs 
materially from the FAS 33 guidelines. 
Special problems encountered in performing the reviews—The 
researchers observe that the most frequently mentioned problem is that the 
requirements of SASs 27 and 28 and FAS 33 are too general to provide much 
guidance. As a result, they report, it is difficult to know when the data have 
been analyzed sufficiently. 
This finding doesn't surprise me as much as it disturbs me. 1 disagree that 
the lack of specificity in these auditing standards is, or at least should be, a 
problem to auditors. Of course, my previous involvement with SAS 27 and SAS 
28 makes this issue the hardest for me to remain objective about. When 
developing standards, standard setters can either adopt a broad, conceptual 
approach or a narrow, so-called "cook-book" approach. The Auditing Stand­
ards Board usually leans to the conceptual approach because of a reluctance to 
impose a rigid structure that might unduly restrict a practitioner's exercise of 
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professional judgment. Another reason is the fact that there is more than one 
way to obtain audit satisfaction. Also, a cook-book approach to SAS 28 would 
have been incompatible with the experimental nature of FAS 33 and the wide 
latitude it permits preparers. 
The question of when an auditor obtains sufficient comfort, when that magic 
moment arrives when he can lay down his pencil and eye shade, is an age-old 
question, and more specific procedures in the authoritative auditing literature 
will not provide an answer. It simply must remain a matter of professional 
judgment in the circumstances, and I am disappointed to learn that there are 
practitioners who object to this condition. 
On the other hand, I do agree that FAS 33 needs more specificity, 
particularly in the area of current cost measurement. This is a problem which I 
believe should be corrected now. That correction, though, must of necessity 
recognize the inherent subjectivity of current cost information. 
Another special problem noted by the researchers is that "the information 
is not available early enough to allow for meaningful evaluation.'' This response 
is a puzzling finding because it seems to imply that auditors were unable to 
review the information in accordance with SAS 27 and SAS 28, which would be 
inconsistent with the researchers' conclusion that auditors are performing 
meaningful review procedures. I really don't know what to make of this 
finding—I wish the researchers had pursued it. 
Usefulness of data—Finally, the researchers find that requiring changing 
prices data to be audited (as opposed to undergoing the SASs 27 and 28 
review) would not necessarily increase the utility of the information to financial 
statement users. As I commented previously, I believe that information 
concerning the usefulness of the changing prices disclosures is best obtained 
from users and preparers, not from auditors. More importantly, though, I 
don't know how to interpret this finding. It is based on responses to questions 
asking how much more reliable to external users the constant dollar and the 
current cost disclosures would be if they were audited rather than included as 
unaudited supplementary disclosures. The respondents had a choice of "not 
much better,'' "somewhat better," or "significantly better.'' Based solely on 
the responses to these questions, it would seem that conclusions can be drawn 
only as to the reliability of the information. 
Information utility is, however, a function of two qualitative characteristics: 
relevance and reliability. If one is held constant and the other increased, the 
result should be greater usefulness. Obviously, the degree of auditor involve­
ment with the information affects only its reliability—in a positive way, we 
hope. So the greater auditor involvement represented by an audit should, all 
else remaining equal, increase reliability and usefulness. 
I can think of two reasons to explain the contradictory finding. First, it 
might mean that the information is perceived as so inherently imprecise that no 
degree of auditor involvement could possibly add to its reliability. Personally, I 
wouldn't agree with that, but it could be one interpretation of the finding. 
Alternatively, the finding might mean that respondents perceived the 
relevance of the information to be not only low, but close to nonexistent. For 
example, assume a company decides to disclose in its annual report to 
shareholders that the chief executive officer wears 9½-size shoes. I doubt if 
anyone would find the usefulness of this information increased if the auditors 
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verified and reported on the size of the CEO's shoes. Even if his shoe size 
were reported with 100 percent reliability, the information would still be 
without any utility whatsoever. 
I don't know which of these interpretations—or others I have not thought 
of—were behind the research findings. I wish they could be clarified. 
Despite the reservations noted, the researchers' overall conclusions about 
the perceived usefulness of FAS 33 information are consistent with other 
research findings and may have the most significant effect on the outcome of 
the FAS 33 experiment. Their finding that auditors think that the requirement 
to disclose changing prices information on both a constant dollar and current 
cost basis contributes to confusion on the part of users is supported by other 
research and is also particularly important. So is the finding that auditors 
perceive that their clients believe that current cost disclosures are more 
meaningful than constant dollar disclosures. These findings not only highlight 
some of the major problems with FAS 33 but also shed light on possible 
solutions. 
Concluding Remarks 
The FASB must soon decide what to do about FAS 33. It is currently in the 
process of evaluating the more than 300 comment letters received in response 
to its Invitation to Comment, Supplementary Disclosures about the Effects of 
Changing Prices. The comments, which were due by April 25, 1984, were 
directed to four issues. 
• Are the FAS 33 disclosures a generally useful supplement to financial 
statements? If yes, why? If no, why not, and what information would 
achieve the objectives of changing prices disclosures? 
• What should the FASB do about changing prices disclosures? 
Continue present or revised disclosures on an experimental or 
permanent basis, or discontinue altogether? 
• What FAS 33 disclosures should be continued—both current cost and 
constant dollar, current cost only, or constant dollar only? And which 
specific disclosure items should be continued and what additional 
disclosures should be required? And, should a more standardized 
format be required? 
• What changes should be made to improve the relevance and reliability 
of current cost measures? 
It will not be easy to resolve these issues. Many respondents have urged 
the FASB to discontinue the disclosure, primarily because of the limited use 
made of the information by financial analysts and other external users. 
Focusing on the issues in those terms, however, masks the need to overcome 
the distortion of financial information caused by changing prices. That need is 
now being addressed, albeit experimentally, by FAS 33. Withdrawing FAS 33 
without substituting another way of meeting the need would abandon the 
problem unsolved. 
Clearly, the problem is not behind us. Inflation is in no danger of extinction. 
Indeed, continuing record deficits in federal spending threaten its resumption 
at punishing levels. In other areas of the world, it has never let up. 
Nor does the distortion of financial information depend on continued 
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inflation at extraordinarily high rates. Many assets acquired before and during 
the most recent inflationary binge are still on the books, their carrying values 
irrelevant to current decision making, and, over time, the cumulative effects of 
even low rates of inflation seriously distort asset values and income measures. 
Nevertheless, the great indifference of users to FAS 33 information, 
indicated once again by the Skousen/Albrecht research, remains one of the 
principal findings of the FASB's experiment. It will undoubtedly be a significant 
consideration in the FASB's ultimate decision. So will some of the other 
Skousen/Albrecht findings, such as the unusual flexibility in computation 
provided by FAS 33, the resulting need for added specificity should the 
disclosure requirement be continued, the confusion to users resulting from the 
requirement to present the information on two competing bases, and the 
preference for current cost information over constant dollar information. 
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3 
The Case for the 
Unstructured Audit Approach 
Jerry D. Sullivan 
Coopers & Lybrand 
In their recently completed study of the audit methodologies of 12 large 
accounting firms—the Big Eight plus four of the next six largest firms—Cushing 
and Loebbecke analyzed the firms in terms of the amount of structure in their 
audit approaches and then classified the firms as "highly structured," "semi-
structured," "partially structured," or "unstructured."1 Based on the 
characteristics of a structured approach, as that term is defined in the study 
and discussed below, I hope that Coopers & Lybrand falls into the "partially 
structured" category, which could also be called the "mostly unstructured" 
category. It's interesting to note that when C&L revised its audit approach in 
1969, to what was the forerunner of our present approach, we called it the 
Uniform Audit Approach, thinking at the time that it was one of the most 
structured approaches in the profession. Today, those same initials—UAA— 
might be used to identify the "Unstructured Audit Approach." 
Cushing and Loebbecke define a structured audit methodology as "a 
systematic approach to auditing characterized by a prescribed, logical sequence 
of procedures, decisions, and documentation steps, and by a comprehensive 
and integrated set of audit policies and tools designed to assist the auditor in 
conducting the audit." Using that definition, it's hard to be against a structured 
audit approach; to favor an unstructured approach seems almost subversive. I 
would like to suggest, however, that merely calling the two polar positions by 
other names would go a long way toward removing what some symposium 
participants probably view as the stigma of an unstructured approach. For 
example, in addressing what are essentially the same issues, Dirsmith and 
McAllister2 use the terms "mechanistic" and "organic" instead of "struc­
tured" and "unstructured." I would much rather be associated with an 
approach that is viewed as organic than one that is referred to as unstructured. 
On the other hand, I am sure that many auditors who take pride in their firms' 
structured approaches would resent those approaches being referred to as 
mechanistic. 
There is a range of audit approaches between the two polar positions of 
"structured" and "unstructured." I have already indicated that we thought 
our approach was fairly structured when we first developed it. When I read the 
Cushing-Loebbecke definition of a structured audit approach, I again thought 
that our approach fit that definition. We always have believed that our approach 
is systematic, comprehensive, and integrated—as those terms are typically 
used. It's only when I see how far some firms have carried the notions of 
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systematic, comprehensive, and integrated that I jump off the structure 
bandwagon. 
Classifying Firms' Policies 
The Cushing-Loebbecke draft constructed a set of questions in an attempt 
to identify a CPA firm's "potential policies for each audit process step" that 
they identified in the study.3 They provided three alternative answers for each 
question "which relate to the possible degree of structure a firm may feel is 
appropriate." The set of answers that placed heavy emphasis on a structured 
approach included the following possible policies (emphasis added): 
1. All potential new clients would be investigated to the same extent. 
2. All audit areas would be audited at a certain standard level of effort. 
3. A totally substantive approach to an audit or to one audit area would 
not be possible, and some detailed compliance tests would always be 
required. 
4. If the auditor wished to rely on internal control for one audit 
objective for one type of transaction, internal control would have to 
be relied on to meet all audit objectives for all types of transactions 
and related accounts. 
5. Statistical sampling would be used for all detailed tests. 
6. Materiality would be allocated to various audit areas using a 
statistical algorithm that totally ignored qualitative considerations. 
7. Inherent risk would not enter into the determination of the scope of 
audit procedures at all—that is, inherent risk would be set at 100 
percent—presumably because the evaluation and assessment of 
inherent risk are not susceptible to quantitative determination. 
Those potential policies that underlie a structured audit approach seem to 
suggest that the issue really isn't that of a structured approach versus an 
unstructured approach, but rather that of structure versus judgment. The two 
camps can also be divided into those auditors who believe that auditor judgment 
should be replaced by structured, quantitative algorithms and those who 
believe that the audit decision-making process cannot be reduced to a 
quantitative model but will always require the exercise of considerable 
judgment. Virtually every applied discipline faces this same issue of structure 
versus judgment; only the words used to describe the debate vary. For 
example, in the 1950s, the debate over the Federal Reserve's monetary policy 
with regard to regulating the relationship between the money supply and the 
level of economic activity was expressed in terms of "rules" versus "au­
thorities," rules being the equivalent of structure and authorities being the 
equivalent of the exercise of judgment on a continual basis by the Federal 
Reserve Board and the Open Market Committee. 
The Argument for Judgment 
I don't believe that any audits are conducted based on the policies 
suggested above as underlying a structured approach, nor do I believe that any 
auditing firm has a set of policies, or even individual policies, that contain the 
conclusions suggested by Cushing-Loebbecke as placing heavy emphasis on a 
structured approach. I do not see that as the issue, however. The issue, as I 
see it, is not where are we today? Rather, it is where are we going? Where will 
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we be 10 years from now if we continue to strive to remove judgment from the 
audit process, which seems to be a goal that some auditors support? Coopers 
& Lybrand, and I'm sure this is true for all firms, seeks an audit approach that 
helps the auditor perform an effective audit in the most efficient manner. We do 
not characterize our approach as being either structured or unstructured; in 
fact, we don't characterize it at all other than as the Coopers & Lybrand Audit 
Approach, which I believe is far more advisable than having to defend or adhere 
to one of the polar positions of structured or unstructured. 
As part of our thinking about how to serve audit clients most efficiently, 
C&L has classified its clients into a few market segments and has developed 
different audit strategies for each of those segments—audit strategies that can 
be changed as client conditions warrant. For example, our guidance for an audit 
of a Fortune 500 client presumes that the control environment would support 
auditor testing and reliance on controls; our guidance for audits of smaller 
clients presumes that audit efficiency will be enhanced by using a purely 
substantive test mode. In both cases, however, the methodology is sufficiently 
flexible—that is, unstructured—to allow the engagement partner to follow an 
alternative strategy if it is deemed to be the most efficient way of performing an 
effective audit. 
Audit Effectiveness 
On the issue of audit effectiveness, my great fear is that a structured audit 
approach that is based completely on quantitative algorithms is likely to 
produce substandard audits, for a very simple reason—the incompleteness of 
the linkage between the results of compliance tests and the nature, timing, and 
extent of substantive tests. I do not believe that the technology currently 
exists to enable auditors to determine with any reasonable level of assurance 
what specific substantive tests should be performed and how much detailed 
substantive testing should be done based on specified results of specific 
compliance tests of internal controls. Even if inherent risk were set at 100 
percent and even if no reliance were placed on the results of analytical reviews 
in the substantive test phase of the audit—so that audit risk would be reduced 
to an acceptable level solely through the application of compliance and detailed 
substantive tests—I do not believe that an algorithm exists to permit a precise 
and unarguable specification of the nature and amount of substantive testing 
that should be performed, given the results of compliance test procedures in a 
particular transaction cycle. Short of an arbitrary rule, no way exists of 
determining, even on a statistical or probability basis, what the precise level of 
a particular substantive test should be. 
For example, if I concluded after applying statistical sampling to all key 
controls over sales and cash receipts that I was 95 percent confident that the 
true deviation rate for each control did not exceed 8 percent, what would that 
tell me about the size of the sample for confirming accounts receivable? How 
would that sample size change if sampling risk dropped to 1 percent? If the 
upper deviation limit dropped to 6 percent? I don't think it can be done. 
Auditors have neither the theory nor the technology to link the rate at which 
control deviations occur and sampling risk in compliance testing with the 
desired level of reliability in substantive testing. As a result, we cannot be 
confident that an audit structured completely on quantitative algorithms will 
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generate a sample size large enough to give us the level of reliability necessary 
to comply with generally accepted auditing standards. 
There is another extremely important aspect of the audit decision-making 
process to which a structured approach will not contribute: the judgments the 
auditor has to make, after the evidence has been obtained, about the 
appropriate application of generally accepted accounting principles in the 
client's particular circumstances. Decisions about whether the client has 
properly accounted for sales with the right of return, potential inventory 
obsolescence, and collectibility of receivables—to name just a few—are critical 
to an effective audit but are not subject to a structured methodology or a 
quantitative model. 
Audit Efficiency 
On the question of audit efficiency, the level of competition in the 
profession today mandates that we not overaudit. If we do too much, either the 
client pays for it and we risk losing the client to another firm, or we have to 
absorb the unbillable hours. Neither prospect is attractive. Accordingly, 
C&L—and I'm sure every other accounting firm—is extremely concerned 
about performing audits as efficiently as possible, which means expending the 
fewest possible hours to achieve the desired level of assurance. Let me 
suggest that there are four ways in which an overly structured audit 
methodology can lead to inefficiencies. 
First, as I indicated earlier, a highly structured methodology largely 
disregards the qualitative aspects of audit evidence that can and should have an 
impact on audit judgments. Most auditors who espouse structure are heavily 
quantitative and tend to ignore anything that can not be quantified. Among the 
factors that are ignored are levels of inherent risk that are below 100 percent 
and qualitative aspects of materiality that could serve to either increase or 
decrease the audit effort in specific areas. Also ignored is knowledge about the 
operation of controls that is obtained from nonsampling applications such as 
observation and inquiry, and tests of controls over completeness (for example, 
year-end reconciliations that are performed on a cumulative basis). I am not 
suggesting that statistical sampling applications are necessarily inappropriate; 
however, I am suggesting that sampling, and especially statistical sampling, is 
not appropriate for much evidence of considerable audit significance. I simply 
do not believe that an efficient audit can be performed if evidence of a 
qualitative nature is ignored. 
Second, the absence of linkage between substantive and compliance tests, 
which I mentioned earlier, can lead to inefficient as well as ineffective audits. In 
the absence of specific, quantitative guidance linking the nature and extent of 
substantive tests to compliance test findings, we are as likely to audit too much 
as to audit too little, and overauditing in one area doesn't offset the effects of 
underauditing in another area. The problems caused by the lack of precise 
linkage exist in both the structured and unstructured approaches and are not 
solved by increasing the level of structure in an audit. An unstructured 
approach at least allows the auditor to consider information obtained about a 
management assertion from tests other than the particular one under consid­
eration. After all, accounts and tests of those accounts are interrelated; audit 
evidence about any one assertion comes from multiple sources. 
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Third, I do not believe that any of the structured methodologies take into 
account, or can take into account, the audit efficiencies that ensue from what 
C&L refers to as the "leveraging" of evidence obtained through compliance 
tests. There are several ways to leverage evidence that C&L believes provide 
the auditor with a means of obtaining, from sources other than compliance 
tests, the necessary level of assurance about the continued and proper 
operation of controls. 
Leveraging Techniques 
By way of incorporating the leveraging technique, the C&L approach 
specifies that, to the extent possible and appropriate, some reperformance of 
control procedures is a necessary aspect of compliance testing. For example, 
assume an accounting control that consists of client personnel matching three 
documents, following up on unmatched documents, and initialing the docu­
ments. In testing that control the auditor should not only look for the initials but 
also reperform the matching. Similarly, the auditor should recalculate some 
extensions and footings if that is the control being compliance tested. 
Otherwise, the auditor has no assurance that the initials mean anything other 
than that the employee knows how to write his or her initials. Having 
reperformed the procedures and determined that the control operated on the 
items selected, the auditor can then obtain a higher level of assurance about the 
operation of the control by observing the operation of the procedure on 
numerous occasions and by examining evidence, namely the employee's 
initials, that the procedure was performed. In other words, once it has been 
established that the employee's initials do mean something, then compliance 
testing of those initials is appropriate, and that is a far less costly auditing 
procedure than reperforming calculations or matching documents. 
Similarly, C&L believes that the ability to rely on internal controls is 
enhanced if those controls are exercised in an environment that includes 
adequate supervisory review of their operation. We distinguish two different 
groups of controls: basic controls, which have to do with the control objectives 
of accuracy, validity, completeness, maintenance of account balances, and 
physical security, and disciplinary controls, which monitor the basic control 
procedures. Among the disciplinary controls is supervision. We believe that 
conclusions about the effectiveness of controls that are reached from com­
pliance tests performed before year-end can be extended throughout the year 
if supervisory controls exist and can be tested to determine if they operated 
during the untested period. Testing supervisory controls is relatively inexpen­
sive; it usually involves observation and reviewing error reports, such as 
computer printouts of rejected documents, that a supervisor may create and 
file. Recognizing a hierarchy of controls—which I do not think is included in any 
quantitative algorithm and probably can not be because there are so many 
variables involved—permits C&L to conduct a more efficient audit by eliminat­
ing some (but not all) of the compliance tests involving reperformance that, I 
believe, would otherwise be required for an audit in accordance with generally 
accepted auditing standards. 
Perhaps an illustration will be useful. The primary objective of any audit 
strategy is to provide the desired degree of protection against audit risk as 
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efficiently as possible. Assume that the audit objective at hand is to be able to 
conclude that recorded accounts receivable exist. A structured approach to 
examining a client's accounts receivable to achieve audit satisfaction regarding 
their existence is likely to center around the confirmation process, particularly 
deciding the appropriate sample size and how to evaluate the sample results, as 
a primary source of audit evidence. An unstructured approach would recognize 
that in reality, and depending on the circumstances of the particular client and 
its customers, the auditor may derive less comfort from the confirmation 
process than is commonly thought. The Commission on Auditors' Responsibili­
ties addressed this issue in its Report, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
(page 40): 
The Commission's review of significant cases involving auditors dis­
closed several instances in which certain traditional audit steps did not 
produce the assurances they were intended to provide. For example, 
direct confirmation with parties outside the company is an important 
method of substantiation of both financial statement amounts and other 
management representations. However, in several cases, outsiders 
either ignored incorrect information that was clearly shown in confirma­
tions or actively cooperated with management in giving incorrect 
confirmation. Constant attention should be given by both auditors and 
the AICPA to the effectiveness of conventional auditing techniques and 
to the development of new ones. 
Accordingly, the auditor would be well advised to look to other sources of 
evidence about the existence of the receivables. For example, the auditor 
could look to secondary sources of evidence by testing the functioning of the 
control system over shipping and billing, by determining by inquiry and 
observation that there is proper segregation of duties and adequate and 
continuing supervision over the basic controls in the revenue cycle, and by 
determining through analytical reviews that there are no unexplainable varia­
tions in the pattern of recorded sales and receivables. The auditor might also 
look to other primary sources of evidence for assessing the existence of an 
account receivable, such as examining subsequent cash receipts. All of these 
factors together may provide the necessary level of comfort for an auditor who 
uses an unstructured approach; not all of them are likely to be encompassed by 
the quantitative algorithm that is an integral part of a structured approach. 
Stated simply, deciding whether the appropriate sample size for confirmation 
should be 50 or 100 isn't nearly as important as the way the auditor integrates 
the knowledge obtained from all the other audit procedures that are likely to be 
performed. 
The Role of Compliance Tests 
Lastly, I noted earlier the Cushing-Loebbecke view that a compliance test 
audit strategy is usually part of a highly structured audit methodology. C&L's 
experience has been that, for many of our clients, an audit strategy of relying 
on controls is often inefficient. With the exception of the largest industrial and 
commercial companies and large- and medium-sized financial institutions, a 
substantive test strategy, supplemented by little more than the minimum level 
of understanding of the system that is required by the professional literature, is 
likely to produce a more efficient audit. Our methodology is not locked in on 
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this point, and we have not abandoned our long-standing attention to the 
client's control system. Each situation, however, should be looked at individu­
ally, and the partner should determine whether a completely substantive test 
approach would be more efficient for a particular client or a particular audit 
area. C&L also believes that, in considering the costs and benefits of a 
compliance test mode, the auditor must include cost and benefit factors that are 
not related to the specific engagement, such as staff hiring, availability, 
training, and retention. Even so, in many cases a strictly substantive test 
approach is more economical. An audit methodology that biases the auditor 
against reaching that conclusion is inappropriate, whether it's structured or 
unstructured. 
Decision Aids 
The apparently heavy emphasis on quantitative algorithms that is part of a 
highly structured approach seems to suggest that firms with structured 
approaches provide more "decision aids" to staff auditors than do firms with 
unstructured approaches. For example, one firm believes that the judgment-
making process is enhanced by providing its auditors with a formula for 
determining materiality. At C&L, we also provide decision aids to our staff—in 
fact, we believe that Montgomery's Auditing is the profession's best decision 
aid, and we have others as well—but we do so with great care, great restraint, 
much training, and many caveats. Decision aids can enhance audit judgment but 
can never replace it. Also, a decision aid should not be considered reliable 
solely because it has been formulated based on past practices. A decision aid 
that attempts to quantify a consensus without first ascertaining what the 
correct judgment should have been may well give the auditor who applies it 
what some have referred to as "the delusion of precision." 
Conclusion 
In summary, the research on error detection by Hylas and Ashton indicated 
that in many instances the auditor's first knowledge of a financial statement 
error came not through detailed tests that produced so-called hard audit 
evidence, but rather through such relatively soft procedures as discussions 
with the client, analytical reviews, and observation—hardly procedures that 
lend themselves to a great deal of structuring or to quantitative algorithms.4 
That study suggests that the auditor's decision-making process is much more 
complex than any quantitative model would suggest. 
In their study on audit methodologies, Cushing and Loebbecke suggest that 
many of the larger CPA firms have revised their audit methodologies in recent 
years and that the changes have generally been toward more structured 
approaches. They cite three motives for those changes: "(1) a need to 
implement a consistent approach across a large practice; (2) a need to control 
audit risk and audit costs more effectively; and (3) a desire to achieve a 
distinguishable image in the market place." I think a strong case can be made 
that those objectives can be achieved through an audit methodology that allows 
the auditor, based on an understanding of the client and industry, to exercise 
judgment in deciding what audit evidence is appropriate in the circumstances, 
whether to compliance test or not, and whether to consider more nonquantifia-
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ble evidence than a highly structured methodology would accommodate. The 
judgments the auditor must make in auditing under an unstructured approach 
are no different from those, particularly valuation judgments, that the auditor 
must ultimately make in assessing the overall fairness of financial statement 
presentation in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles 
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Discussant's Response to 
The Case for the Unstructured Audit Approach 
Carl S. Warren 
University of Georgia, Athens 
I would like to begin by making a few general comments concerning Jerry's 
paper. I found the paper somewhat unstructured, which supports the use of the 
title, and I found no new quantitative evidence in the paper supporting the 
unstructured approach, although the paper does cite support from the Hylas-
Ashton study. Interestingly, however, this study was based upon the practice 
of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., a firm which most would classify as highly 
structured. 
I plan to structure the remainder of my comments in three main areas: (1) 
areas of agreement, (2) points of concern, and (3) questions in need of further 
elaboration. 
Areas of Agreement 
Jerry makes several statements in the paper which I would defy anyone to 
disagree with. For example, no one could possibly argue with the following 
points: 
Audit firms should perform effective, efficient audits. 
Auditors need to integrate knowledge obtained throughout the audit 
process. 
However, such statements add little to either the academic or practitioner 
literature and provide no new insights. 
Points of Concern 
My primary point of concern is that Jerry has set up a straw man (or straw 
person if you wish) which he easily attacks and dismisses as an inappropriate 
audit approach. This straw man is, of course, the structured audit approach. 
For example, Jerry suggests that a structured approach is likely to involve a 
series of seven policies*. However, few practitioners or academicians would 
endorse any of these policies. Consequently, it is not surprising that Jerry 
arrives at the conclusion that the structured approach is an inappropriate audit 
approach. To illustrate, I have briefly analyzed each of these policies below: 
1. All potential new clients would be investigated to the same extent. 
* Jerry indicates that the seven policies used to define a structured audit approach were adapted 
from the Cushing and Loebbecke study on audit methodologies. The final version of this study was 
unavailable as of the symposium date. Irrespective of their source, the point remains that the 
seven policies are so restrictive as to be meaningless in comparing a structured approach with an 
unstructured approach. 
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I know of no firms which would endorse such a policy. As clients 
differ in business risk and audit risk so too would the extent of 
pre-audit investigations. Perhaps Jerry had in mind that all new 
clients would be investigated to some minimum extent. Most 
academicians and practitioners would agree with such a state­
ment. 
2. All audit areas would be audited at a certain standard level of effort. 
Again, I know of no firms which would endorse such a policy. As 
audit areas differ by risk levels, so would the extent of work. In 
addition, the optimal level of auditing for any given area would 
also depend upon the cost of auditing the area. For example, 
cash is often audited to a relatively low level of tolerable error 
simply because the cost is not high. Perhaps Jerry had in mind 
some minimum level of auditing for each area. 
3. A totally substantive approach to an audit or to one audit area would 
not be possible, and some detailed compliance tests would always be 
required 
Again, I know of no firms which would endorse such a policy. 
Compliance tests are frequently not conducted in many areas of 
the audit. 
4. If the auditor wished to rely on internal control for one audit 
objective for one type of transaction, internal control would have to 
be relied on to meet all audit objectives for all types of transactions 
and related accounts. 
This statement is so extreme so as to be nonsense. 
5. Statistical sampling would be used for all detailed tests. 
Again, this statement is simply nonsense. 
6. Materiality would be allocated to various audit areas using a 
statistical algorithm that totally ignored qualitative considerations. 
This statement has some merit. Materiality should be allocated 
across audit areas consistent with the philosophy of SAS 47; 
however, depending upon how one defines qualitative considera­
tions, such factors could be considered. In addition, one should 
also recognize that how the auditor considers materiality alloca­
tion depends upon the auditor's sampling approach. For exam­
ple, dollar unit samplers can be said to consider materiality 
allocation in a broad sense when they establish the tolerable 
error for their samples. 
7. Inherent risk would not enter into the determination of the scope of 
audit procedures at all—that is, inherent risk would be set at 100 
percent—presumably because the evaluation and assessment of 
inherent risk are not susceptible to quantitative determination. 
I personally believe that it is in the best interests of the 
profession if auditors would adhere to this policy. However, SAS 
47 clearly recognizes that inherent risk may be relied upon and 
set at less than 100 percent. Given the competitive environment 
of public accounting, I seriously doubt if any firm, structured or 
unstructured, would adopt this policy. 
The above analysis suggests that 6 out of the 7 policies which Jerry 
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attributes to a structured approach are at best unrealistic and at worst 
misleading. 
Early in the paper Jerry complains about the use of the terms "structured'' 
and "unstructured" and suggests that the term unstructured carries a 
negative stigma, whereas the structured approach does not allow or minimizes 
auditor judgment. Clearly, regardless of what audit approach is followed, the 
nature of auditing requires professional judgment. Jerry has apparently missed 
the essence of a structured approach. Specifically, firms employing structured 
approaches attempt to develop heuristics (or rules of thumb) to enhance the 
auditor's judgment process—not to reduce or eliminate the role of judgment. 
Jerry also takes pains to point out that the structured approach would lead 
to inefficient auditing. However, this analysis is in many ways irrelevant 
because it is based upon the straw man that was set up early in the paper. For 
example, an audit approach that requires compliance testing in all areas will 
clearly be inefficient. In addition, the difficulty of relating internal accounting 
controls to substantive testing is a concern of both the structured and 
unstructured approaches. Finally, if structured firms were as inefficient as 
Jerry suggests, then there should be a shift in the market share away from the 
less efficient structured firms to the unstructured firms, if for no other reason 
than because the unstructured firms could offer their audits at a lower cost. 
However, examination of recent changes in auditors among public companies 
indicate that structured firms seem to be doing as well as unstructured firms in 
obtaining new clients. 
Questions in Need of Elaboration 
In general I found the information content of Jerry's paper small. I would 
have liked to have seen Jerry expand upon some of the unique aspects of what 
he believes is the Coopers & Lybrand audit approach. For example, the 
reperformance of control procedures is a standard practice for many firms. As 
a matter of fact, this is a policy of many structured firms. In addition, the 
distinction between disciplinary and basic controls and how C&L uses this 
distinction in their audit approach was not clear. Jerry's example of accounts 
receivable confirmations was confusing to me. If the audit objective is 
existence of the account, I don't understand how the auditor could be satisfied 
through reliance on supervisory controls and the functioning of the shipping and 
billing functions. 
Concluding Remarks 
Perhaps the real issue that this paper brings to light is: "What is an 
effective, efficient audit?" Conceptually, we can address this question (see 
SAS 47), but on a practical basis we have no way of measuring the product of 
the audit process. This product can be conceptually stated as the likelihood that 
material errors exist in the financial statements reported upon. Thus, we have 
the debate about a structured versus unstructured approach, the usefulness of 
compliance testing, etc. Until we devise a measure of audit quality, little real 
progress will be made on determining the properties of a normative audit. 
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4 
The Case for the Structured Audit 
John Mullarkey 
Touche Ross & Co. 
This paper provides: 1) a definition and illustration of a structured audit; 2) 
a comparison to other types of audit approaches; 3) some analysis of the audit 
environment including a segmentation of the different levels of audit activity; 
and 4) comparisons of the different types of audit approaches within the broad 
categories of audit activity. 
What is a Structured Audit? 
As this term is not common, it may be useful to see how it was derived. A 
dictionary definition of "structure" provides the following elements: 
• A meaningful frame of reference 
• An established relationship between components 
• A set of rules or an agenda to be followed 
• An arrangement in a definite pattern of organization. 
Therefore, a structured audit would be one with a meaningful frame of 
reference, with different areas of the audit clearly related to one another, with 
a predetermined way of proceeding, and with a definite pattern of organization. 
An Example of the Structured Approach 
The Touche Ross Audit Process is an example of a structured audit 
approach in that it is based on a conceptual framework that is used to design a 
program for each specific audit engagement. Our process enables us to focus 
our audit effort—and get results—where audit risks and significance are 
greatest. It is based on two major assumptions, namely: 
• No two audits are so similar that major differences will not have to be 
dealt with 
• Risk assessment and a focus on the entity's transactions provide an 
organizational framework that can be applied across all audits. 
The process is neither overly rigid nor lacking in direction and thrust—it 
provides a disciplined approach based on risk assessment to determine audit 
effort. Recognizing that no two companies are identical, the process focuses on 
the company's transactions, a focus that unifies the audit effort as it does the 
company's operations. It works this way: first, we understand the company's 
business because that understanding is vital to a focused audit. Second, we 
understand the company's operating transactions because these are the 
tangible evidence of business activity and the unifying ingredient in every 
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company's internal accounting control systems. This understanding is then 
focused (a) on the potential errors in transactions or their recording for the 
period under audit and (b) on judgments about probable future transactions and 
their effect on the financial information being reported. 
The process is performed, as illustrated in Figure 1, in three phases: 
• Phase I, Planning and Evaluation: Where should audit attention be 
concentrated and how shall we satisfy our audit objectives? That 
depends, of course, on what the company does, its location, size, 
control systems, and many other matters. Using our knowledge of 
the industry, we broadly consider information about the client's 
business, identify areas of significance and risk, document major 
accounting systems, begin evaluation of internal control, and develop 
the overall audit plan. 
• Phase II, Testing: If our reliance on internal control will be signifi­
cant, we test and evaluate the system. This is an efficiency and 
effectiveness decision based on the apparent reliability of the system. 
Ordinarily, the larger the company, the more significant is the need 
for a well-developed control system that sorts and processes its vast 
number of transactions. The smaller the company, the more neces­
sary it becomes, usually, to test transactions and balances them­
selves rather than the control system. In either case, both kinds of 
tests are significant. The process uses both approaches to transac­
tion testing, as appropriate, to achieve our integrated, specific audit 
objectives. 
• Phase III, Completion of the Audit: The nature and extent of the 
work required depends on our assessment of the likelihood of errors 
in the financial statements, together with our conclusions from 
Phases I and II of the audit. The procedures, all of which are 
correlated with specific audit objectives, are analytical and detailed. 
Other Types of Audit Approaches and Their Basis 
Two other basic types exist, namely: 
• Unique approach—each audit is so different that a generalized 
approach is not possible, and each audit must be individually de­
signed. 
• Predesigned approach—all audits are so similar that a specific ap­
proach can be designed for all parts of the audit. 
The "unique" approach is based either on the assumption that each audit is 
so different that it must be designed without use of a general approach or 
structure, or that use of a general approach is not cost effective. This approach 
places a particular burden on the planner of the audit to use the full measure of 
audit knowledge and experience in each engagement. It requires the audit 
planner to be a seasoned and knowledgeable audit professional with a 
particularly good grasp of audit techniques and interrelationships. More than 
likely, it requires a management group professional (supervisor, manager, or 
partner) as the planner. 
The "predesigned" approach is based on the assumption that all audits, or 
at least a very large part of all audits (say 80-90 percent), have so many 
similarities that a predesigned approach (with modest tailoring) is effective. 
Naturally a number of predesigned approaches can be developed. This 
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approach requires more than a recognition that different industries may require 
different approaches—it would also have to address such issues as whether the 
audit would be conducted substantially at year end or would involve significant 
work at an interim date. 
Another possible assumption that may support the "predesigned" ap­
proach could be characterized as the work-level assumption. Simply put, there 
would be a tradeoff between investing more experienced audit team members 
in the planning of a specific audit and requiring far more work than necessary to 
achieve the audit objective. 
Auditing Today and Tomorrow 
While each approach in the abstract can be argued to be best, auditing is not 
performed in the abstract. Before comparisons can be made, we must look at 
the audit environment as it is today and as it may become. 
Auditing today is much more competitive than it was not too long ago. 
Consequently, some emphasis must be placed on how audit objectives can be 
achieved in a cost-beneficial way. Additionally, retaining good auditors is 
becoming a real concern of the public accounting profession because audit 
experience continues to be an excellent background for financial and manage­
ment positions in the private and public sector. This situation requires a 
recognition of the nature and level of work performed by our audit staff as to 
whether it is challenging, pertinent, and builds useful skills. As well, the 
mid-1980s are a period of rapid, significant change and unprecedented 
challenge. Whole sectors of our economy and those of other countries are 
undergoing profound restructuring. As an example, the U.S. has moved from 
essentially a manufacturing-based to a service-based economy; moreover, 
some of our most stable sectors are now much more fluid (e.g., the whole 
financial services sector). All these factors relate to an assessment of 
competitive approaches to designing and executing audit activities. The 
assessment should also give serious attention to the services the audit team is 
expected to provide now and in the next few years. 
More specific discussion may help to make these choices more apparent. 
Auditing is a demanding profession. It encompasses a significant range of 
activities from specific activities (e.g., determining how many items to test) to 
complex and subjective procedures (e.g., assessing the adequacy of an 
accounting estimate). Auditing will become even more demanding as the 
business community takes on different reporting responsibilities, such as 
widespread assurances on prospective financial information or on significantly 
different financial information such as a larger role for human resource 
accounting information that seems a natural part of the evolution to a service-
based economy. 
Financial Information Continuum 
A useful way to address the audit and choose which of the three audit 
strategies might be best is to consider the nature of the financial information 
subject to audit. Financial information can be roughly segmented, as illustrated 
in Figure 2. Perhaps an illustration would help. Inventory is a simple example 
and can be segmented in the following manner: 
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Mostly Factual—how many and what types of inventory items are 
there? One related audit decision: how many items to count. 
Interpretive and Allocation—How should the cost of material and labor 
be related to each inventory unit? One related audit decision: how 
consistent is the method used this year to allocate these costs 
compared with prior years, and does the allocation result in reasonable 
cost for each inventory item? 
Mostly Predictive—Should the inventory be valued at cost or market? 
One related audit decision: is the probable sales price of the item 
greater than cost? If not, what is the probable sales price? 
Audit activities should be directly related to who on the audit team will 
perform them and to the level of their knowledge, skill, and experience base. 
Also the activities should focus directly on the conclusions that each audit team 
member can actually make so that those performing the activities have 
sufficient ability to understand the findings and how they interrelate to other 
parts of the audit. With this overview of the nature and relative subjectivity of 
financial information, a broad analysis of audit activities can be made and a 
consideration of who should perform them discussed. 
• Audit activities associated with the verification of mostly factual 
information involve staff from the initial to senior category (usually less 
than four years' experience). This area usually makes up the largest 
part of the time spent on each audit. These activities are critical to 
the audit because they provide the basis on which certain financial 
statement items are stated. Just as critically, they provide the 
evidence basis necessary for more skilled and experienced audit team 
members to challenge other assertions in the financial statements 
Figure 2 
Financial Information Continuum 
MORE SUBJECTIVE AND UNCERTAIN 
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that require subjective or more complex judgments, especially those 
involving consideration of future probabilities. 
• Audit activities associated with the interpretive and allocation aspects of 
financial information. These audit activities generally interrelate the 
audit work on mostly factual data to the financial information pre­
sented. Since it is the same basic process as the supervision of the 
audit field work, it is normally performed by the in-charge person— 
either a senior or supervisor. Specifically, as related to the financial 
statements, the activity is directed at determining whether the 
entity's underlying events and transactions have been presented in 
the financial information in conformity with generally accepted ac­
counting principles. Related to the audit work, the activity is directed 
at determining whether all of the underlying audit activities and 
findings have been correlated to the financial information and have 
been presented in a manner that will provide a reasonable basis for 
the audit opinion on the financial information under examination. 
• Audit activities associated with the professional challenge of the more 
complex, subjective, or predictive judgments that are reflected in 
financial statement assertions. This area usually involves audit en­
gagement management using information that has been verified by 
audit staff together with their own skills, experience, and knowledge 
as expert auditors and accountants. Though it is not a large part of 
the time spent on most audits, it is usually the most critical in that it 
deals with the most significant risks that the financial statements 
might contain a material misstatement. 
How to Assess 
The competing audit strategies have been briefly defined and discussed. 
The nature of the audit has been segmented and discussed to illustrate what is 
involved and who is involved in terms of staff and in-charge and engagement 
management. Who should be involved in the performing of the different parts of 
the audit also has been specified. The balance of this paper attempts to deal 
with how each audit strategy relates to each of these segments of the audit and 
the effect on the audit staff. 
What Audit Strategy For Mostly Factual Information? 
The work associated with the verification of the mostly factual information 
underlying the audit is performed by the less experienced members of the audit 
team and is a large part of most audits. This part of the audit involves a number 
of possible audit approaches, e.g., an audit involving some reliance on internal 
accounting controls, one involving little reliance on internal accounting con­
trols, or a mix of reliance on some internal accounting controls for some parts 
of the audit and little reliance in other parts of the audit. This stage also 
involves a number of generic audit procedures, e.g., compliance and substan­
tive tests with a substantial number of actual procedures that can be used 
depending on how the entity authorizes, executes, records, and maintains 
accountability for its resources. The objective of the audit activities here, as 
with all audit work, is to have an audit plan to "search for errors or 
irregularities that would have a material effect on the financial statements, and 
to exercise due skill and care in the conduct of that examination." AICPA 
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Codification of Statements on Auditing Standards at Section 327.05 goes on to 
say: 
The Auditor's Responsibility 
.05 The independent auditor's objective in making an examination of 
financial statements in accordance with generally accepted auditing 
standards is to form an opinion on whether the financial statements 
present fairly financial position, results of operations, and changes in 
financial position in conformity with generally accepted accounting 
principles consistently applied. Consequently, under generally accepted 
auditing standards the independent auditor has the responsibility, within 
the inherent limitations of the auditing process. (see paragraphs 
.11-.13), to plan his examination (see paragraphs .06-.10) to search for 
errors or irregularities that would have a material effect on the financial 
statements, and to exercise due skill and care in the conduct of that 
examination. The auditor's search for material errors or irregularities 
ordinarily is accomplished by the performance of those auditing pro­
cedures that in his judgment are appropriate in the circumstances to 
form an opinion on the financial statements; extended auditing pro­
cedures are required if the auditor's examination indicates that material 
errors or irregularities may exist (see paragraph .14). An independent 
auditor's standard report implicitly indicates his belief that the financial 
statements taken as a whole are not materially misstated as a result of 
errors or irregularities. 
Therefore, it is necessary to determine where such possible risks could 
exist. Again using inventory as an example, the three approaches could be 
roughly compared. 
For work on a specific account or transaction: 
• Unique Audit. The planner is a member of engagement management 
and would know whether inventory has such a risk in it. 
• Structured Audit. Using a transaction and a risk approach, the 
significance of inventory is determined, and the specific risk of 
possible material error or irregularity is assessed (i.e., high, moder­
ate, low). 
• Predesigned Audit. The specific amount of audit activities subject to 
some tailoring is designated without specific consideration of risk in 
this engagement. It would be based on a general consideration of risk 
in a number of similar engagements. 
Relating work on a specific account or balance to other audit work: 
• Unique Audit. The planner knows how the audit work interrelates 
and specifies the effect of that interrelationship on other audit work to 
be performed. 
• Structured Audit. Transactions tie together most of the major 
activities of the entity under examination. Therefore, following the 
transaction from initiation to its final destination enables the relation­
ship to other audit work to be detailed. 
The relationships that need to be understood and interrelated in either 
approach for just a single transaction will indicate the complexity. The normal 
interrelationships and effects of just a single transaction, assuming that a 
significant risk could exist, requires consideration that a number of possible 
things can go wrong with a transaction. For example, some of the things that 
can go wrong with a sales transaction are: 
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• Sales can be recorded, but goods are not shipped; 
• Goods can be shipped but not recorded; 
• Sales can be recorded incorrectly; 
• Sales can be improperly costed; 
• Sales can be recorded in the wrong period. 
To prevent or detect these possible errors, many different controls may 
appear to exist. A decision has to be made as to which controls—manual or 
EDP-based—to test in relation to one or more potential errors. Alternatively, 
controls may not be a significant part of the audit, and substantive tests will not 
take into the account any reliance on controls (except that necessary to meet 
the objectives of auditability and controls sufficient to enable substantive audit 
tests to be performed). Note that some auditing procedures may pertain to 
more than one potential error, whereas in other cases a combination of auditing 
procedures and related assurances may be necessary to deal with a single 
potential error type. 
Finally, a single transaction (and related potential errors) will affect at least 
two financial statement account balances as a consequence of double-entry 
bookkeeping. In many cases, transaction and related potential errors in one 
transaction can affect other parts of the transaction stream (e.g., the 
relationship between the sales system and the costing system). While this 
formulation takes some license with the audit process—it would need to be 
substantially expanded to specifically address the decisions that actually need 
to be made—it does point out the complexity of the interrelationships the 
auditor must deal with. 
• Predesigned Approach. All of these relationships can be specified in 
general statements of audit activities that will require only modest 
tailoring. 
What Audit Strategy For Interpretive 
and Allocative Aspects of Financial Information? 
This part of the audit addresses whether all the underlying events and 
transactions have been presented in conformity with generally accepted 
accounting principles in the financial information to be presented prior to the 
necessary valuation decisions addressed in the next section (mostly the 
predictive aspects of financial information). As it relates to this level of audit 
work, it means whether all of the underlying audit activities have been 
correlated in a manner that provides a reasonable basis for an audit opinion as 
to whether the financial information under examination represents appropri­
ately authorized, executed, recorded, and summarized transactions and 
events. 
The different approaches in this area are: 
• Unique Audit. The focus would be on exceptions to the plan, whether 
they were different than anticipated and how that affects work still to 
be done or already done. The work is usually arranged in relation to 
account balances. 
• Structured Audit. The work performed is arranged in relation to 
major transactions (initiation to account balance) or balance (interre­
lated to transaction base). It provides an indication of risks and 
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considers their significance and how the audit work leads to the 
specific assessments. 
• Predesigned Approach. The predesigned approach is modified to 
consider matters that were different than anticipated. The work is 
usually arranged in relation to account balances. 
The differences are pronounced. Both the unique and the predesigned will 
usually result in working papers that relate audit findings to account balances 
and separate the work done to understand systems, etc., and the amount of 
work shown in other sections of the working papers. The structured approach 
normally interrelates transactions, systems, procedures performed, and as­
surances achieved in relation to the transaction stream and resulting year-end 
balances. 
What Audit Strategy For Mostly Predictive Aspects 
of Financial Information? 
This area of audit activities relates mostly to subjective and complex 
decisions made by engagement management in relation to the necessary 
valuation decisions inherent in generally accepted accounting principles. 
Consider this analysis of the different approaches: 
• Unique Approach. Usually whoever develops the audit approach 
would make these difficult decisions. Although some generalization is 
necessary, the audit work should be directly helpful to these 
significant audit decisions. 
• Structured Approach. This approach provides an integrated presenta­
tion in relation to major transaction streams and assessments of risk, 
how those risks were dealt with, and the related conclusions (why 
more work was done and the results of that work). In effect, it is an 
integrated view segmented by major groups of transactions and 
balances. 
• Predesigned Approach. This approach is usually a segmented articula­
tion of work performed, accounts analyzed, and points to be consid­
ered. Integration of the audit work requires specific work by the 
manager or partner at this point to get information from the audit that 
is necessary to make these difficult and complex decisions. 
Overall Assessment—Effect on Audit 
While all these different audit strategies can work, their differences should 
be considered when deciding which one is best or when to use each one. 
Unique Approach. This approach places the responsibility for planning the 
whole audit on management group personnel. If a firm does not have a defined 
way of performing its audit, then the auditor who will be making the final 
decision or some other auditor with a very high level of skill and ability would 
have to plan the audit. The fact that a person at this level needs to be involved 
in the planning of the part of the audit dealing with mostly predictive 
information does not justify the need to have to do all the planning. This 
stipulation seems excessive and inefficient. It should not be necessary for a 
professional at this level to interrelate all of the detail previously described in 
the section for mostly factual information. Further, since the mostly factual 
area addresses a large segment of audit work performed by the audit staff, is it 
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not also incumbent on this planner to do most of the supervision and staff 
guidance necessary? Few would or could adequately describe in an audit plan all 
of the matters that they believe the staff should be alert to when performing 
this work. At the same time, in firms and audits where the partner works 
closely with one or two audit team members, this could not only be a good 
approach but more than likely the best approach. Therefore, where there is 
frequent and direct supervision, review, and guidance of the audit staff, this 
approach works well. However, it probably would not provide a good base for 
building audit skills, since most staff members would be reluctant to constantly 
be asking questions about why such an approach was taken. 
Predesigned Approach. In small entities and simpler environments, a 
predesigned approach can work well because the number of audit options is 
limited. There may only be two or three different approaches that could be 
used in a year-end audit of a small entity where control systems are adequate 
enough to make the entity auditable and to enable the design of substantive 
tests; however, no reliance could be placed on such controls in performing an 
audit. Except for these circumstances, the predesigned approach is severely 
limited in that it can miss actual important risks and allocate excessive work in 
relation to risk in other areas. It also does not provide a good basis for 
developing audit skills since staff will normally be presented with an approach 
thought to be sufficient for the specific audit. It does not provide insight into 
why it is sufficient for the specific circumstance because it is a general 
program. Moreover, it invariably states that modification should be made, but 
without a framework, modifications are difficult to make and not always 
welcomed. Usually, modifications require reasoning and, with the exception of 
doing more work because problems were found, reduction of the work without 
a framework is difficult to justify and can even be dangerous. 
Structured Approach. This approach provides a framework of the major 
transactions or balances and the assessment of the nature of the risk in relation 
to the possibility that material error or irregularities may exist. This approach 
is quite different in the way it relates to auditors' planning and performance. It 
requires that they study the company and think through their own plan as to 
what is necessary. Consequently, the person performing the task is much 
more aware of why the task is performed and what the results of the work 
might mean. The structured approach moves the responsibility for actual 
involvement in audit strategy much closer to those who perform the task than 
do the other approaches. But it does require a clear understanding and use of 
the skills and knowledge of the specific individual who will perform the task; it 
also requires firms using this approach to provide training in audit techniques, 
theory, and the interrelationships of the audit to the work they will perform. 
(For example, Touche Ross has a comprehensive curriculum that segments 
these considerations in relation to the audit task that each staff member is 
authorized to perform.) This approach also brings the focus of audit strategy 
much closer to the person who will do the work so as to provide the basis 
needed to assess the results of the work performed. While this effect is a key 
as to why it is a good approach, a significant investment in training and on-the-
job supervision is required. If the staff is engaged mostly in audit activities or 
closely related activities, it is cost effective. On the other hand, if audit work is 
infrequent, it is doubtful if the investment required will be cost effective. 
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The Effect of Different Audit Approaches on Staff 
Auditing is not only a demanding profession, but it is also one where a 
person never stops learning: for example, understanding many different kinds 
and sizes of businesses; how management organizes for success; and different 
control systems and control strategies. Which audit process is used also affects 
how much the staff learns and determines who should perform what pro­
cedures. The predesigned approach obviously provides the least possibility for 
staff growth in relation to particular auditing procedures. In that it is a 
predesigned approach, those using it are predisposed to accepting the 
approach and are reluctant to tailor it extensively. Also, they might be 
discouraged by engagement management from substantially tailoring the 
predesigned approach because it may require more extensive justification to 
specify why the predesigned approach was tailored than to execute the 
predesigned approach. 
Similarly, the unique approach designed by an experienced auditor leaves 
the staff with little ability to tailor because it is prepared by a more experienced 
person. The staff would be reluctant to use their insights to challenge a more 
senior person who likely will be reviewing their work and determining what is 
appropriate in the circumstances. 
The structured approach, on the other hand, specifies that interrelation­
ships should exist within a framework of dealing with the risks in an audit and 
would not only provide a basis to allow earlier involvement in audit planning but 
would provide more clarity as to the objective of the work performed. As a 
result, individuals think through their part of the audit with transactions and 
risk as a guide. They would be more inclined to tailor programs specifically to 
the risk since there is no general program available dealing with the specific 
way to plan this part of the audit. Depending upon what plans the firm has for 
people, the audit approach could be significant. The structured approach 
requires individuals to think through the process in relation to the specific risk 
they will be dealing with. Thus, it encourages them to be intensive in their 
consideration of the risk and specific in relation to how those risks are dealt 
with. At the same time, it requires that more planning time be given in a 
specific audit to this process of thinking through the audit objectives and how 
they can be achieved. Therefore, it requires more time in planning than 
ordinarily would be the case in the other approaches. 
However, if the firm's desire is to build a strong business consultation 
function with its auditors, then dealing with objectives and how objectives are 
met in an early part of the career of an individual auditor is a good strategy. On 
the other hand, if the firm is oriented to delivery of an audit at least cost, then 
the time spent by people struggling with risks and how risks can be met in 
specific circumstances may not turn out to be the way to accomplish that 
objective most effectively. In fact, having a more senior person plan and 
directly participate in a large part of the audit may actually result in similar 
objectives being met with less total cost. 
Summary 
The decision points for the best approach are within the firm and how it 
actually practices. On balance, the structured approach for firms that have 
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substantial audit work provides a vehicle for staff development and a clearer 
understanding of the work they are performing. It provides a framework that 
all levels of staff can understand and use in determining what work needs to be 
done and interrelating their work to achieve the audit objective. In essence, it 
provides a vehicle for the staff to understand the audit objectives they are 
assigned, to design effective approaches, and indeed, even to challenge 
approaches in a logical and knowledgeable way. 
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Discussant's Response to 
The Case for the Structured Audit Approach 
Gary L. Holstrum 
University of Southern California 
My comments on this paper relate to two overriding factors. The first is my 
basic agreement with the argument for a structured audit approach, and the 
second is my disagreement with the polar extreme used by Mullarkey to 
describe what he calls the "predesigned" audit approach. With respect to the 
first factor, many of the participants in this symposium are already aware of my 
advocacy of a structured audit approach. During the past few years, I have 
argued in support of such a structured approach—with a related overall 
conceptual framework and integrated decision aids—in various articles, confer­
ence papers, and seminar presentations. It seems appropriate and fair for me 
to disclose my prior orientation and biases regarding this topic. When I 
originally read this paper, I dutifully attempted to be very critical and 
immediately made numerous critical comments. However, after reading the 
Sullivan paper, which is presented at this symposium as a case against a 
structured audit approach, I realized that any criticisms I had of the Mullarkey 
paper were relatively editorial. 
Polar Extremes 
With respect to the second factor, I take issue with the polar extreme used 
to describe the predesigned approach in Mullarkey's presentation of his 
trichotomy of audit approaches (unique, structured, and predesigned). Specifi­
cally, I question whether any firm that is actively engaged in audit practice 
could appropriately be placed in the "predesigned approach" category. 
According to the author, an important characteristic of a "predesigned" 
approach is its failure to evaluate the audit risks of specific clients and to adapt 
the audit approach in response to such specific client risk. In describing the 
predesigned approach, Mullarkey states: "The specific amount of audit 
activities subject to some tailoring is designated without specific consideration 
of risk in this engagement." I am unaware of any firm that engages in audit 
practice that has a policy of not giving consideration to audit risk in the specific 
engagement. Furthermore, the only comparative study of audit approaches of 
firms conducted to date (Cushing and Loebbecke)1 did not find any firms that 
could appropriately be placed in the "predesigned" approach category upon 
the basis of this criterion. 
Comparison with the Cushing and Loebbecke Study 
Cushing and Loebbecke conducted a comparative analysis of the auditing 
methodologies of all of the "Big 8" firms plus four other large national 
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accounting firms. The 12 firms cooperated in the study by supplying their audit 
practice manuals and related materials to the researchers and designating a 
liaison person to help interpret such materials. Let us consider some sim­
ilarities and differences between this paper and the Cushing and Loebbecke 
study. Mullarkey's definition of a structured audit approach is similar to that of 
Cushing and Loebbecke in the sense that both definitions indicate that a 
structured approach would include a meaningful frame of reference that 
interrelates various components of the audit through the use of a set of 
guidelines and a definite pattern of organization. However, Cushing and 
Loebbecke included in their description an important property that charac­
terized firms with a structured approach: the development and implementation 
of various decisions aids to enhance the quality of audit judgments beyond the 
placement of complete reliance on subjective judgment. I believe the concept of 
using decision aids should be incorporated into the definition of a structured 
audit approach. 
Cushing and Loebbecke attempted to identify some dimension that would 
best explain the basic similarities and differences among the firms, and they 
determined that the dimension with the greatest explanatory power was the 
degree of structure employed in the audit approach. They found that the firms 
in the study could appropriately be arrayed along a continuum representing 
degree of structure such that two firms were "highly structured," four firms 
were "semi-structured," four firms were "partially structured," and two 
firms were "unstructured." 
The Cushing and Loebbecke study revealed two important facts about the 
most highly structured firms that are relevant to the Mullarkey paper. First, 
both of the "highly structured'' firms explicitly consider and adjust for the audit 
risk of the specific client engagement. Concerning the two "highly structured" 
firms, Cushing and Loebbecke state: "Both utilize explicit criteria for evaluat­
ing materiality and risk to shape their overall audit approach to each engage­
ment." Second, both of the "highly structured" firms in the study made 
extensive use of decision aids in many aspects of the audit process. 
General Comments on the Paper 
I have three general comments regarding this paper. The first is that the 
"predesigned" audit approach is basically a "straw man" or a "null set" in 
that no known firm fits into that category; i.e., no existing firm has been 
identified that has a policy of not considering the audit risk of the specific client 
engagement. 
The second general comment is that the discussion of the structured 
approach is mostly a reiteration of some basic ideas that are already found in 
the Statements on Auditing Standards and that should apply to all approaches, 
not just to a structured approach. Mullarkey discusses how the structured 
approach develops an understanding of the client's business, evaluates the 
client's specific audit risk and internal accounting control, and adjusts substan­
tive tests accordingly. These concepts are well ingrained in current profes­
sional guidelines, especially the recently issued SAS 43, "Omnibus Statement 
of Auditing Standards,'' and SAS 47, "Audit Risk and Materiality in Conducting 
an Audit." 
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The third general comment is that the paper would be more helpful if it 
included specific examples of how a structured audit approach could use 
decision aids in various aspects of the audit. It would be helpful to know how 
the nature of decision aids should vary for the different types of information 
processing represented in Mullarkey's Financial Information Continuum in 
Figure 2. For example, for the "purely factual" information, auditors may 
utilize relatively simple decision aids such as flowcharts, decision tables, or 
statistical formulas. For "interpretive/allocative" information, decision aids 
may take the form of worksheets, checklists, or questionnaires that help 
remind the auditor of various accounting and auditing guidelines that should be 
considered. For "purely predictive" information, more complex decision aids 
may be needed, such as financial planning models or artificial intelligence 
(decision-support) systems. 
Specific Comments 
I have four specific comments that are limited to particular sections of the 
paper: 
1. Although I generally agree with the definition of a structured audit 
approach offered on the study's first page, I believe reference to a 
"predetermined way of proceeding" is inappropriate. The use of 
the word "predetermined" seems to be more consistent with what 
Mullarkey calls the "predesigned approach" and is not a necessary 
(nor even desirable) characteristic of a structured approach. 
2. Mullarkey discusses audit strategy for interpretive and allocative 
aspects of financial information, which comprise only a part of the 
audit, by stating: "This part of the audit addresses whether all the 
underlying events and transactions have been presented in conform­
ity with generally accepted accounting principles in the financial 
information to be presented." My contention is that this statement 
describes what should be the objective for the entire audit process, 
not for just the interpretive and allocative aspects. 
3. The paper indicates that audit work for both the "unique" and 
"predesigned" approaches is usually arranged in relation to account 
balances, whereas the work for a structured approach is arranged in 
relation to both balances and transactions. I would maintain that 
there is nothing in the nature of either the "unique" or "pre­
designed" approaches (as defined in the paper) that would preclude 
or even discourage arranging audit work in relation to both balances 
and transactions. 
4. Regarding the relative efficiency of the various audit approaches, 
Mullarkey states: " . . . if the firm is oriented to delivering an audit 
at least cost, then the time spent by people struggling with risks and 
how risks can be met in specific circumstances may not turn out to 
be the way to accomplish that objective most effectively.'' I disagree 
with the implications of this statement. In my opinion, analyzing the 
audit risk associated with specific client circumstances and adapting 
subsequent audit work accordingly are crucial factors in conducting 
an efficient as well as an effective audit. 
Summary 
By far the most important point to be emphasized in my evaluation of this 
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paper is that I wholeheartedly agree with the basic principles of a structured 
audit approach. Although I basically agree with Mullarkey's description of the 
desirable components of a structured approach, I believe his description of the 
"predesigned approach" represents a polar extreme that cannot be found in 
any existing firms. Furthermore, the paper could be improved significantly by 
adding specific examples of decision aids applicable to various aspects of the 
audit process. Finally, the paper provides a useful basis for dialogue concerning 
the proper approach for integrating microcomputers and decision aids into the 
audit process. 
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5 
An Analysis of the Audit Framework 
Focusing on Inherent Risk and 
the Role of Statistical Sampling 
in Compliance Testing 
Donald A. Leslie 
Clarkson Gordon 
Auditors are a loyal brotherhood of arithmetic wizards who when their profession starts to go 
down the pipe . . . band together and disagree with one another. 
with apologies to J. Hart 
The highly competitive professional environment that has developed in the 
U.S. over the past 10 years has spread like a cancer throughout most of the 
world. As a result, meaningful professional standards are currently more 
important to the profession's survival than at any time in its relatively short 
existence. Competition can and should be healthy for a profession, ensuring 
that users of the professional services receive "value for their money" and 
that the profession keeps "abreast of modern technology." Unfortunately, far 
too many users of accounting services are tending to treat them as simple 
commodities that can be purchased like "groceries on a shelf." Some 
observers are of the opinion that "the standard audit is increasingly viewed as 
a simple commodity item" and that "a lot of companies are starting to treat 
their accountants the way they treat their janitorial service."1 Extracts from a 
recent interview with Ralph Walters on the subject of accounting regulation and 
competition in the profession in the U.S. are set out in the Appendix. 
The purpose of this paper is to assist the profession in establishing a 
common audit objective.* In order to ensure that readers do not misinterpret 
my intent, I should make it clear at the outset that I do not believe that it is 
necessary for all auditors to carry out their audits in exactly the same manner in 
similar situations. Rather, it is important that the work that every auditor 
carries out achieves a clearly established and well understood audit objective. 
Specific audit strategies, audit techniques, and levels of staff expertise and 
competence (used to achieve the audit objective) will vary, and it is this 
variation that will provide proper, healthy competition for users of accounting 
and auditing services. 
* Some might argue that current professional pronouncements in Canada and the U.S. provide for 
a common audit framework. Others (myself included) would respond with "current practice 
certainly does not support this view." 
89 
The Audit Risk Equation 
The heart of the audit objective is the audit risk equation which flows 
directly from the standard auditor's report. "Present fairly" implies that the 
financial statements taken as a whole are not materially misstated while "in our 
opinion" provides the user with the knowledge that there is some (relatively 
small?) risk that the financial statements could contain a material misstatement. 
Over the past few years, the most authoritative risk equation in the audit 
literature (the Appendix to SAS 39—which had its origin in SAP 54) has been 
the subject of critical comments relating to both its validity and its application in 
practice on an increasingly frequent basis.2 
Before analyzing the various risk equations found in the literature, it will be 
useful to establish a standard notation to facilitate comparison. The following 
terms will be used: 
AR—analytical review risk 
DIC—detective internal control risk 
FAR—final audit risk 
IC—internal control risk 
IR—inherent risk 
PIC—preventive internal control risk 
PPE—prior probability of error 
PR—posterior risk 
STD—substantive test of details risk 
FAR is the equivalent of "audit risk" in SAS No. 47 (which replaced "ultimate 
risk" [UR] in SAS No. 39). The most common meaning of "ultimate" is "that 
beyond which there is no other," and this was certainly not the meaning 
intended in SAS 39.** 
The SAS 39 risk equation can be expressed as: 
FAR = IC x AR x STD 
Figure 1 uses a ladder tree diagram to illustrate this equation. Starting at the 
lower left rung, there is a .70 probability that IC will detect a material error and 
a .30 probability that it will not. If the error is not detected by IC, there is a .60 
probability that it will be detected by AR and a .40 probability that it will not be 
detected by AR. Likewise, if it is not detected by AR, there is a .75 probability 
that it will be detected by STD and a .25 that it will not. The right hand column 
sets out the probability of each possible outcome for this model. The FAR (or 
ultimate risk in SAS 39 terminology) would be .03* 
One of the major flaws with this model is that it does not recognize that the 
components of a set of financial statements have different risks because of their 
different inherent natures. SAS 39 addressed the inherent risk with the 
following footnote: 
The risk that monetary errors equal to tolerable error would have 
** Readers may have noticed that SAS 47 does not use the term "tolerable error." It was 
replaced by the expression "errors that could be material, when aggregated with errors in other 
balances or classes, to the financial statements taken as a whole." 
* Although the .05 ultimate risk used in the Appendix to SAS 39 was intended (?) to be illustrative, 
it nonetheless seems to have become a standard. 
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Probability 
of each 
outcome 
1 . 0 0 0 0 
IC Internal Control 
AR Analytical Review 
STD Substantive Tests of Detail 
Figure 1 
occurred in the absence of internal accounting controls related to the 
account balance or class of transactions under audit is difficult and 
potentially costly to quantify. For this reason in this model it is implicitly 
set conservatively at one, although audit experience indicates clearly 
that it is substantially lower. Accordingly, it is not a factor in the 
relationship expressed above. Therefore, the actual risk will ordinarily 
be less than UR. 
It is exceedingly difficult to agree with the above logic as will be 
demonstrated later in this paper. In any event, in SAS 47 the AICPA decided to 
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Ladder Tree Diagram 
Illustrating SAS 39 
Sample Risk Equation 
recognize inherent risk as a full-fledged factor in the risk equation. Its status is 
similar to that of internal control and analytical review in that the auditor can 
"include it if he so desires" by virtue of the statement: 
If an auditor concludes that the effort required to evaluate inherent risk 
for a balance or class would exceed the potential reduction in the extent 
of his auditing procedures derived from reliance on the evaluation, he 
should assess inherent risk as being at the maximum when designing 
auditing procedures. (paragraph 22) 
Thus, the AICPA risk equation now becomes: 
FAR = IR x IC x AR x STD 
Figure 2 illustrates this modified equation in ladder tree diagram form. The 
inherent risk that a material error occurs has been set at .25, and its 
complement, the probability that a material error does not occur, is .75. Note 
the substantial reduction in FAR (or audit risk as used in SAS 47). If the desired 
FAR were .03 as used in Figure 1, the result would be the elimination of STD 
(since IR x IC x AR= .25 x .30 x .40 = .03). Later in the paper, it will be 
demonstrated that a reduction of STD of this magnitude is not justified with this 
IR. 
Cushing and Loebbecke (1983) use this equation as the focal point of their 
critique of the risk analysis model. It is here that they make one of a number of 
critical errors in their paper. They say that this equation is "equivalent to the 
CICA model" in the CICA Extent of Audit Testing (EAT) Study. Had they 
continued reading on the page that contained this model (p. 97), they would 
have learned that this model was not recommended by the Study Group. The 
EAT Study Group recommended the following model: 
FAR= IR x IC x AR x STD 
(IR x IC x AR x STD) + (1 - IR) 
A footnote on page 97 of the EAT Study indicates that further information on 
the approach can be found in Leslie et al, "Dollar-Unit Sampling," page 296. In 
fact, this model is the posterior risk model in Leslie et al (1979). The EAT 
Study Group adopted this model because it "takes the effect of inherent risk 
more accurately into account." Figure 3 uses the details from Figure 2 and 
calculates the "posterior risk." In this instance (highly artificial as will be 
demonstrated later), the difference would appear trivial, although the posterior 
model would not totally eliminate STD. 
It is important to understand the logic applied to Figure 3 to arrive at the 
posterior risk. It is entirely Bayesian, applied in a discrete (and thus artificial) 
manner. If the prior probability of error is .25, then, if the auditor proceeds up 
the steps on the ladder and gets to the end without detecting a material error 
(of course, it would be necessary for him to investigate the findings of 
employees responsible for internal control in order to determine if IC detected 
a material error), he can only be in one of two possible outcomes. Either the 
material error actually occurred (.25 probability), and IC, AR, and STD failed 
to detect it, or the material error never occurred in the first place (.75 
probability). Since preventive internal controls help prevent the error from 
occurring in the first place, it is only logical that they be considered together 
with the inherent risk of error (this will be dealt with in more detail later). 
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Not 
Detected 
Not 
Detected 
Probability 
of each 
outcome 
. 2 5 x . 3 0 x . 4 0 x .25= . 0 0 7 5 
Audit 
Risk 
Detected 
. 2 5 x . 3 0 x . 4 0 x . 7 5 = . 0225 
. 2 5 x . 3 0 x . 6 0 = .0450 
. 2 5 x . 7 0 = .1750 
.7500 
1.0000 
IR Inherent Risk 
IC Internal Control 
AR Analyt ical Review 
STD Substant ive Tes ts of Detail 
Assume for the moment that all internal controls identified were of a detective 
nature and, thus, that the PPE is based entirely on IR. 
While the difference between the SAS 39-47 equation and the posterior 
model was trivial in the illustration in Figure 3, in Figure 4 we see that it can be 
several times the nominal risk. In this illustration, the prior probabilities of a 
material error and no material error are the reverse of those in Figure 3. If the 
proponents of each of these models used an STD of .25 in the situation 
illustrated in Figure 4, their equations would be as follows: 
SAS 39=.30x.40x.25 =.03 
SAS 39-47 =.75 x .30 x .40 x . 25 = .0225 
Posterior = .75 x .30 x .40 x .25 = .0826 
(.75 x .30 x .40 x .25) + (1 - .75) 
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Ladder Tree Diagram 
Illustrating SAS 39 - 49 
Simple Risk Equation 
Probability 
of each 
outcome 
However, if they planned to obtain a (final) risk of .03 based on their planning 
models, their equations would appear as follows: 
SAS 39 = .30x.40x.25 =.03 
SAS 39-47 = .75 x .30 x .40 x .333 = .03 
Posterior = .75 x .30 x .40 x .0859 = .03 
(.75 x .30 x .40 x .0859) + (1 - .75) 
What would these different values for STD mean in practice? It is useful to 
compare the difference in sample extents that would result from these STDs. 
Using dollar-unit sampling (zero expected error case) and setting the SAS 39 
sample size equal to " 1 , " we get the following relationship: 
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Ladder Tree Diagram 
Illustrating Posterior 
Risk Equation 
F i g u r e 3 
SAS 39 1.00 
SAS 39-47 .79 
Posterior 1.77 
The most significent conclusion that can be drawn from this comparison is 
that the formal inclusion of IR in SAS 47 will result in an unjustifiable reduction 
in STD. Of course, it can be argued that the model in SAS 39 is simply an 
example and that it is only intended for planning purposes. However, this 
proposition can be countered with the argument that the model used for 
planning should be consistent with the model appropriate for evaluation when 
the audit evidence has been collected. In my opinion, the only appropriate 
conceptual model for audit evaluation is the posterior risk model (with some 
Probability 
of each 
outcome 
F i g u r e 4 
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Ladder Tree Diagram 
Illustrating Risks When 
IR/PPE Is High 
modifications as will be described later) because it relates directly to the 
auditor's objective and the audit opinion. In order to give a clean opinion, the 
auditor must be satisfied that there is a reasonably low risk (.03 in this 
example) that the financial statements do not contain a material error. The two 
AICPA "simple risk models" address this issue only at the planning stage. If 
the auditor does not find a material error, the error is not addressed at the 
evaluation stage, and the audit objective is simply "assumed" to have been 
achieved. It was for this reason that the CICA EAT Study Group adopted the 
posterior model. The Study Group was of the view that the auditor's opinion 
should be based on the evaluation of the risk that the financial statements 
actually contain a material error, given all of the avidence available to the 
auditor, and that this model "takes the effect of inherent risk more accurately 
into account." 
Some members of the AICPA Materiality and Audit Risk Task Force were 
concerned that the inclusion of IR in the risk model would result in a reduction 
of work because an auditor could always "fall back'' to IR "for more assurance 
in highly competitive situations." I certainly share the view of some of my 
fellow Task Force members. However, I believe that auditors must address IR 
when planning and evaluating an audit (and I believe the judiciary would agree 
with my belief). Accordingly, it is even more important that the risk model used 
in practice not deceive the auditor by permitting him to think he is achieving a 
specific audit risk objective when, in fact, he may be incurring a real risk that is 
substantially higher. 
Numerical Illustrations 
Table 1 provides a comparison of the risks generated by the three different 
models based on the risks for IC, AR, and STD in the previous illustrations (the 
first three columns). Column 4 contains the risk objective based on the SAS 39 
model (.03). Column 5 contains various IR/PPE values from .05 to 1.0, and the 
two right-hand columns reflect the risks that would be generated by the SAS 47 
model and the posterior model. These risks have been computed in the manner 
described earlier in this paper (examples §4 and §10 relate to Figures 3 and 4). 
It should be noted that both risks in the final two columns are less than the 
SAS 39 risk until the PPE exceeds .50 (actually slightly over .50). Above a 
PPE of .50, the SAS 47 risk continues to increase until it reaches its maximum 
of .03 when the PPE is 1.0. It is then equal to the SAS 39 risk, demonstrating 
in theory, the comment in the footnote to the Appendix of SAS 39 that "the 
actual risk will ordinarily be less than UR." Clearly, the word "ordinarily" 
should be interpreted to mean situations where the PPE does not exceed .50. 
Perhaps this limitation is what the authors of SAS 39 had in mind when it was 
drafted. I would suggest, however, that this qualification is not being observed 
in practice. 
Note that when the PPE is 1.0, the actual (posterior) risk is also 1.0, as is 
only logical because a PPE of 1.0 means that the auditor has "perfect" 
knowledge that a material error exists and, thus cannot believe the results of 
the audit if the error has not been detected. (Obviously, the auditor rarely has 
such "perfect" knowledge that a material error exists. Likewise, there rarely 
is "perfect" knowledge that a material error does not exist—a PPE of 0.) 
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Whereas SAS 39 "conservatively" set IR equal to 1, SAS 47 uses the term 
"maximum" to "solve" this problem.3 Unfortunately, this change will 
probably not be noticed by most readers of SAS 47, and it is likely to be 
obscure to those who do recognize it. 
Table 2 contains some comparisons of these three models based on the IC 
and AR values used in Table 2 of the Appendix to SAS 39. Here, the .05 risk 
objective used in SAS 39 has also been used. For the first eleven examples, IR/ 
PPE has been set at .50 (often referred to as the equivalent of a uniform prior). 
The STD risk for SAS 39 and the posterior model are basically identical. 
Logically (from an arithmetic point of view), the SAS 47 allowable risk is double 
the risk of the other two. 
COMPARISON OF TESTING RISK LEVELS REQUIRED 
SUBSTANTIVE TEST OF DETAILS 
RISK REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE A .05 
SAS 39 ; SAS 47 LESLIE 
EX. INHERENT INTERNAL ANALYTICAL "ULTIMATE" AUDIT POSTERIOR 
# RISK CONTROL REVIEW RISK RISK RISK 
1 0.5000 0.1000 1.0000 0.5000 NTR 0.5260 
2 0.5000 0.3000 1.0000 0.1667 0 . 3 3 3 3 0.1753 
3 0.5000 0.3000 0 . 5 0 0 0 0 . 3 3 3 3 0.6667 0.3510 
4 0.5000 0.3000 0.3000 0 . 5 5 5 6 NTR 0.5850 
5 0.5000 0.5000 1.0000 0.1000 0.2000 0.1052 
6 0 . 5 0 0 0 0.5000 0 . 5 0 0 0 0 . 2 0 0 0 0.4000 0 . 2 1 0 5 
7 0.5000 0.5000 0.3000 0 . 3 3 3 3 0.6667 0.3510 
8 0.5000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0500 0.1000 0.0526 
9 0.5000 1.0000 0.5000 0.1000 0.2000 0.1053 
10 0.5000 1.0000 0.3000 0 . 1 6 6 7 0 . 3 3 3 3 0.1753 
11 0.5000 1.0000 0.1000 0.5000 NTR 0.5260 
12 0 . 2 5 0 0 0.1000 1.0000 0 . 5 0 0 0 NTR NTR 
13 0.2500 0.3000 1.0000 0 . 1 6 6 7 0.6667 0.5260 
14 0.2500 0.3000 0.5000 0 . 3 3 3 3 NTR NTR 
15 0 . 2 5 0 0 0.3000 0.3000 0.5556 NTR NTR 
16 0.2500 0.5000 1.0000 0.1000 0.4000 0.3160 
17 0.2500 0.5000 0.5000 0.2000 0.8000 0.6320 
18 0.2500 0.5000 0.3000 0 . 3 3 3 3 NTR NTR 
19 0.2500 1.0000 1.0000 0.0500 0.2000 0.1580 
20 0.2500 1.0000 0.5000 0.1000 0.4000 0.3160 
21 0.2500 1.0000 0.3000 0.1667 0.6667 0.5260 
22 0.2500 1.0000 0.1000 0.5000 NTR NTR 
NTR = NO TEST REQUIRED 
INTERNAL CONTROL AND ANALYTICAL REVIEW 
FACTORS FROM TABLE 2 , APPENDIX, SAS 39 
TABLE 2 
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The bottom eleven examples are based on an IR/PPE set equal to .25 (a 
favourable prior). In these cases, the SAS 47 allowable STD risk is four times 
the allowable SAS 39 STD risk. On the other hand, the allowable STD risk for 
the posterior model is slightly more than three times the SAS 39 allowable STD 
risk. 
Table 3 contains some additional comparisons where the IR/PPE is 
unfavourable (.75 and .90). These comparisons have been made via the dollar-
unit sampling extent that would be used if no errors were expected.* The SAS 
* Given these priors an auditor would be foolish to use what is termed a "discovery sample" 
(designed to accept only when no errors are found). However, it is the most convenient case to 
use. For sample sizes designed to accept errors without breaching the materiality limit, the 
differences in extents would be somewhat less. 
COMPARISON OF DUS EXTENTS - HIGH PRIOR PROBABILITY OF ERROR 
RATIO OF DOLLAR-UNIT SAMPLE SIZES 
SAS 47 POSTERIOR POSTERIOR 
EX. INHERENT INTERNAL ANALYTICAL TO TO TO 
# RISK/PPE CONTROL REVIEW SAS 39 SAS 39 SAS 47 
• 
1 0.7500 0.1000 1.0000 0.5850 2.5121 4.2945 
2 0.7500 0.3000 1.0000 0.8394 1.5843 1.8874 
3 0.7500 0.3000 0.5000 0.7381 1.9530 2.6458 
4 0.7500 0.3000 0.3000 0.5106 2.7812 5.4473 
5 0.7500 0.5000 1.0000 0.8751 1.4547 1.6624 
6 0.7500 0.5000 0.5000 0.8213 1.6505 2.0098 
7 0.7500 0.5000 0.3000 0.7381 1.9530 2.6458 
8 0.7500 1.0000 1.0000 0.9040 1.3495 1.4928 
9 0.7500 1.0000 0.5000 0.8751 1.4547 1.6624 
10 0.7500 1.0000 0.3000 0.8394 1.5843 1.8874 
11 0.7500 1.0000 0.1000 0.5850 2.5121 4.2945 
12 0.9000 0.1000 1.0000 0.8480 4.0954 4.8295 
13 0.9000 0.3000 1.0000 0.9412 2.1975 2.3348 
14 0.9000 0.3000 0.5000 0.9041 2.9530 3.2662 
15 0.9000 0.3000 0.3000 0.8208 4.6503 5.6659 
16 0.9000 0.5000 1.0000 0.9542 1.9318 2.0244 
17 0.9000 0.5000 0.5000 0.9345 2.3331 2.4966 
18 0.9000 0.5000 0.3000 0.9041 2.9530 3.2662 
19 0.9000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9648 1.7162 1.7788 
20 0.9000 1.0000 0.5000 0.9542 1.9318 2.0244 
21 0.9000 1.0000 0.3000 0.9412 2.1975 2.3348 
22 0.9000 1.0000 0.1000 0.8480 4.0954 4.8295 
INTERNAL CONTROL AND ANALYTICAL REVIEW 
FACTORS FROM TABLE 2, APPENDIX, SAS 39 
TABLE 3 
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39 sample size has been set equal to " 1 " for these comparisons. In all cases, 
the SAS 47 sample size is less than the SAS 39 sample size. The sample sizes 
produced by the posterior model are much larger than both the SAS 39 and 
SAS 47 sample sizes. 
With respect to the reflection of IR in the audit process, these illustrations 
demonstrate that SAS 47 can actually be a retrogressive step if an appropriate 
risk model is not employed. It gives too much weight to favourable priors, and 
it dangerously ignores those that are unfavourable. On the other hand, SAS 39 
ignores the priors entirely, resulting in overauditing when they are favourable 
and underauditing when they are unfavourable. It might be tempting to argue 
that the situation more than "averages out'' for SAS 39 since far fewer than 50 
percent of all audits would have a PPE greater than .50 (and thus overauditing 
is more frequent than underauditing). Would such a defense be acceptable in 
court? Would users of financial statements who have suffered losses as a result 
of inadequate audit extents be happy with such an answer? Losses are certainly 
not "averaged out'' over all the clients of an auditor when they are discovered. 
Prior Probability of Error—Inherent Risk 
and Preventive Internal Controls 
Cushing and Loebbecke (1983) express serious concerns about the 
independence of the factors in the risk model. As a solution, they suggest (page 
29): 
A more reasonable approach might be to define inherent risk as 
conditional upon the quality of the internal control system. Mathe­
matically speaking, this is the correct way to formulate the model. It is 
also consistent with the frequent audit practice of identifying "special 
risks" or "sensitive areas" during audit planning. However, neither 
the AICPA nor CICA model suggests or implies such an approach. 
I noted earlier that what they referred to as the CICA model is, in fact, the 
AICPA post SAS 47 model. I would strongly submit that the CICA model (and, 
obviously, the Leslie et al model on which it was based) adequately addresses 
this issue. Leslie et al (1979, p. 307) stated: 
Of particular relevance to the auditor is the distinction between 
preventive controls and detective controls. Preventive controls seek to 
prevent the occurrence of errors or irregularities—or, more accurately, 
to reduce their chance of occurrence. Detective controls seek to detect 
such errors or irregularities as do occur—or, more accurately, to 
increase their chance of detection. Usually, both types of control are 
desirable. The need for controls of a preventive nature is less, the 
greater the inherent insusceptibility to material error. Most auditors 
assess the prior probabilities of an error occurring in the first place after 
considering the nature and effectiveness of preventive controls. 
The Cushing and Loebbecke article leads directly to the conclusion that IR 
should be considered "high" if IC is "high." I believe that this is a myth that 
should be dispelled. An example will illustrate my point: 
Consider the inventories of two different types of business. Firm A is a 
large financial institution that holds billions of dollars worth of marketa­
ble securities for its own account and as custodian for customers. Firm 
B makes steel reinforced concrete supports for expressway construc-
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tion (minimum weight of two tons). An auditor would be very concerned 
if Firm A did not have a well designed system of preventive controls (an 
appropriate class of vault, armed guards, controlled securities cage, 
segregation of duties relating to the recording and custody functions, a 
record of certificate numbers, registration of certificates, use of jumbo 
certificates [for example, where the holding of Ford Motor Company 
stock had not dropped below 900,000 shares for a considerable period, 
one share certificate for 900,000 shares would be obtained from the 
transfer agent rendering the certificate virtually impossible to dispose of 
if stolen or lost], etc.). We know that if Firm A were to leave these 
securities sitting on tables in the general office with no such controls, 
they would disappear rapidly. Firm B, on the other hand, would waste 
money if it fenced the yard, installed an alarm system, hired armed 
guards with attack dogs, etc. 
Many more examples of contrasting situations of this nature can be cited, 
and I am sure that practitioners will find that many come to mind rather quickly. 
Thus, if auditors automatically consider IR to be high when IC is high, they are 
virtually certain to overaudit in a high proportion of cases. Further, to make 
recommendations for preventive control improvements when IR is low (and, 
thus, potential benefits are limited) could cause clients to question an auditor's 
understanding of the purpose of internal control. Management generally seeks 
some constant low risk of errors occurring, and its decision on the implementa­
tion of preventive controls will be strongly influenced by the inherent risk of 
error in the first place. K.P. Johnson (1981) made some useful comments on 
assessing risks that warrant repeating here. 
Before a system of internal control can be designed, or an existing 
system evaluated, management must know something about the kinds 
of business and transaction risks that exist in its particular organization, 
assess their significance, and determine which ones cannot be avoided. 
Only then can controls be designed to reduce the remaining risks to 
those that are consciously acceptable to management and are at a level 
that management has consciously determined. 
Internal controls should not be confused with, or limited to, the 
accounting system. While an accounting system is a necessary element 
of a system of internal control, the control system is much larger in 
scope. A good system of internal control contains elements that have 
little or no relationship to accounting activities. For example, require­
ments for advance approval of transactions and restrictions on physical 
access to assets are examples of internal controls that reduce the risk of 
errors; they also operate outside of the accounting system. Internal 
controls are introduced into the accounting system and into other 
aspects of enterprise operations to prevent errors from occurring in the 
first place, and to detect them on a timely basis if they do occur. 
It is important that the inherent risk judgments be made separately for each 
financial statement assertion. The illustration above involved the existence 
assertion. With respect to the valuation assertion, the inherent risk assess­
ment could be just the opposite. For example, the market values for securities 
are readily available from reputable independent pricing services. On the other 
hand, the steel reinforced structures could involve very complex pricing since 
many consist of special high-strength steel rods. The steel is purchased from a 
German mill in units of 1,000 kilograms, and the purchase invoice is in 
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Deutsche marks. To arrive at a cost, it is necessary to convert steel rod 
measurements for length and diameter to pounds, and then to kilograms. It is 
then necessary to apply a price per kilogram based on a conversion of Deutsche 
marks to dollars with the addition of freight and duty—a far more complex 
calculation than the pricing of securities based on an independent pricing 
service. The auditor, therefore, would assess the inherent risk for the 
valuation assertion as high and would try to identify controls that reduce that 
risk. 
Figure 5 is an illustration of how an auditor could go about making an 
assessment of the PPE. If he were a "quanto," he would make the 
assessment in numerical terms by stating a probability. If he were a "judgo," 
he would make the assessment in nonquantitative terms4 such as high, 
moderate, or low. In examples A, B, and C, the IR is high, and he would look 
for preventive controls to mitigate the risk. In example A, the preventive 
controls are excellent (such as those described for the financial institution 
above), and he concludes that the PPE is low. In example B, the PICs are good 
(rather than excellent), and he makes an assessment of the PPE as moderate. 
In example C, there are no PICs (or any that exist are evaluated as ineffective), 
and, thus, he assesses the PPE as high. The same logic applies to examples D 
to I. In examples G and H, it should be noted that there is no apparent payback 
for identifying PICs. These two examples demonstrate that the auditor is 
cognizant of the risk of "double counting."* For example, G would be similar 
to Firm B (in the earlier example) fencing its storage yard, installing an alarm 
system, hiring armed guards with attack dogs, etc. Any reduction of an already 
low risk would be so trivial that it would not be sensible to give any credit for it. 
In example D, only partial credit is given since excellent PICs would not 
improve the situation beyond a low PPE. The additive illustration in Figure 5 is 
not intended to imply that the associated probabilities are additive but, rather, 
that the auditor's knowledge of these two components is additive. 
This figure can also illustrate why the auditor must work harder when there 
is a high PPE. Consider examples A and C. Suppose that in each of these 
examples the risks for DIC, AR, and STD are identical and neither auditor finds 
a material error during the audit. Logically, the auditor in example A should be 
able to sleep well at night because his sample confirmed his prior belief. 
However, the auditor in example C should have trouble sleeping at night. His 
sample did not find evidence that supported his prior belief—that a material 
error more than likely existed. The posterior model would require more 
evidence (from one or all of DIC, AR, and STD) to be obtained in example C 
than both of the AICPA models. More evidence is required to obtain a "not 
guilty" verdict when there is prima facie evidence of a crime than when it is 
highly likely that a crime was not committed in the first place. 
* Cushing and Loebbecke expressed concern over the independence of the component risks. 
Making the PPE assessment in this manner provides protection against this potential problem. 
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INHERENT RISK + PREVENTIVE CONTROLS 
= PRIOR PROBABILITY OF ERROR 
Auditor's Assessment of 
Example Inherent Risk 
Pre­
ventive [=] 
Controls 
Prior 
Probability 
of 
Error 
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Figure 5 
Have We Now Identified the Theoretically 
Correct Audit Risk Model? 
I have a great subject [statistics] to write upon, but feel keenly my literary incapacity to make 
it easily intelligible without sacrificing accuracy and thoroughness. 
Sir Francis Galton 
Unfortunately, we have not. Cushing and Loebbecke (page 27), in criticiz­
ing the SAS 47 model (which they mistakenly identified as the CICA model) 
made some valid observations about discrete models of the type we have been 
dealing with to this point.* 
Models such as this are abstractions of reality. They are used to gain a 
better understanding of reality and to make reasonably reliable and 
useful predictions. However, they are always simplified; i.e., all aspects 
of reality can rarely if ever be accurately incorporated into a model. This 
simplification is appropriate as long as it is not overdone or done 
improperly. The measure of this would be whether the model caused 
the user to misunderstand the reality being represented, or to use the 
model unwittingly to make unreliable predictions. 
After a discussion of these simple joint risk models, Leslie et al (p. 304) 
described the oversimplification as follows: 
The joint risk model discussed is an oversimplification because it 
assumes that there is only one discrete risk, namely, the risk of a 
material error. In fact, there should be a continuous distribution of 
probabilities of occurrence (and detection) of errors aggregating various 
amounts. . . . 
The audit can be described as a continuous process. In theory, the auditor 
commences this process with a continuous distribution representing the prior 
probability of error based on his assessment of inherent risk and preventive 
controls. As each piece of evidence is obtained the auditor revises this 
distribution. If the evidence is favourable, the peak of the curve will move away 
from materiality, and the area of the curve beyond materiality will diminish. 
Conversely, if a piece of evidence is unfavourable, the peak will move toward 
materiality, and more of the area will be beyond that point. When all 
procedures have been completed, the final (posterior) distribution is the basis 
for the opinion given on the financial statements. If the distribution peaks well 
to the left of materiality with only a small portion in the right tail, an unqualified 
opinion would be warranted. If the distribution peaks to the right of materiality 
(most likely error exceeds materiality), a qualified opinion would usually be 
warranted. If the distribution peaks to the left of materiality but the area to the 
right of materiality is too large, then the risk would be too high to warrant an 
unqualified opinion even though a material error would not be likely. The 
auditor would not have obtained "reasonable assurance" that a material error 
did not exist. 
In the past, the theoretically correct model has been virtually impossible to 
use in practice. Now, with the increasing use of computerized audit decision 
* It should, however, be noted that their concerns are considerably different than mine. Their 
paper proposes a model that lacks the same reality that causes their criticism of the post SAS 47 
model. 
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aids, it is becoming increasingly more feasible. It is not difficult to predict that 
within the foreseeable future such complex models will be an integral part of 
the audit. In the process of describing the theoretically correct model, I will 
avoid the use of calculus and continuous distributions* by chopping up such 
distributions into smaller pieces for use in an extended discrete posterior risk 
model that behaves like the "real thing." 
As noted above, one of the deficiencies with the discrete model is that it 
loads all of the prior distribution on two points—zero error and exactly a 
material error. In the real world, the prior distribution will extend from at or 
near zero to some amount beyond materiality (since there is no known natural 
law preventing errors from being greater than materiality). Table 4 contains an 
illustration of a model with a uniform prior error distribution. In the far left 
column, all possible population error rates are listed in .01 intervals (.00 to 
.99—although .34 to .99 have been omitted). The prior probability of each of 
these possible error rates is shown in column 2. This is the "no knowledge" 
case where every possible error rate is equally probable (a .01 probability for 
each). Column 3 contains the probability of finding "0" errors in a sample of 
100 if the corresponding error rate in column 1 really exists. For example, if a 
.01 error really did exist, the probability of obtaining 0 errors in a sample of 100 
would be .36603.** Since the possible population error rate of .01 would (given 
this uniform prior) only occur with a frequency of .01, the product of columns 2 
and 3 represents the frequency of 0 error samples from this particular 
underlying error rate. The aggregate of all such values in column 4 represents 
all possible samples that contain 0 errors. 
Column 2 illustrates how quickly the probability of obtaining 0 errors in a 
sample of 100 approaches 0. By the time the possible error rate has reached 
.12, the probability of obtaining 0 errors in a sample of 100 has declined to less 
than .000003. For this reason, it was not necessary to include the remainder of 
the distribution since all values in columns 3 to 6 are 0. This aspect also 
resolves another apparent inconsistency with a uniform distribution. While it is 
equated to the "no knowledge" state, if materiality were .03, we would have 
.03 distributed below materiality and .97 above. In other words, the prior 
probability of an error equal to or greater than materiality would aggregate .97. 
Since possible population error rates beyond .03 have a diminishing impact on 
the model, they do not create a problem. 
Since column 4 contains all of the possible 0 error samples of 100 that could 
be produced by this underlying uniform error distribution, when we obtain one 
of them, we know that it must be one of those in this column. Thus, in column 5 
we determine the relative frequency of each of the values in column 4 (each 
value divided by the total of column 4). Column 6 contains the values in column 
5 "summed-up." If our sample must be one of these (since we found 0 errors) 
and we are concerned about an error rate of .03 or greater (the materiality 
level), we can see that the probability (posterior risk) that our sample comes 
* It is not as a consideration of readers that I avoid the use of calculus to deal with this issue. 
Rather, it is the fact that I have never taken calculus that forces this approach. 
** All calculations are based on the binomial distribution. Although 5 digits to the right of the 
decimal are shown in the tables, Microsoft's Multiplan manual for the Apple Macintosh indicates 
that internal calculations are carried out using 14 digits. 
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EXAMPLE OF POSTERIOR RISK - UNIFORM PRIOR ERROR 
Prior Relative Posterior 
Possible Probability Probability Frequency Risk 
Population Of Error Of 0 Error Column 2 Of Prob. ( o f error 
Error Rate In In Sample X In rate t h a n 
Rates Column 1 Of 100 Column 3 Column 4 Column 1) 
0.000 0.010 1.00000 0.01000 0.63609 1.00000 
0.010 0.010 0.36603 0.00366 0.23283 0.36391 
0.020 0.010 0.13262 0.00133 0.08436 0.13109 
0.030 0.010 0.04755 0.00048 0.03025 0.04673 
0.040 0.010 0.01687 0.00017 0.01073 0.01648 
0.050 0.010 0.00592 0.00006 0.00377 0.00575 
0.060 0.010 0.00205 0.00002 0.00131 0.00198 
0.070 0.010 0.00071 0.00001 0.00045 i 0.00068 
0.080 0.010 0.00024 0.00000 0.00015 0.00023 
0 .090 0.010 0.00008 0.00000 0.00005 0.00008 
0.100 0.010 0.00003 0.00000 0.00002 0.00003 
0.110 0.010 0.00001 0.00000 0.00001 i 0.00001 
0.120 0.010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.130 0.010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.140 i 0.010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.150 0.010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.160 0.010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.170 0.010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.180 0.010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.190 0.010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.200 0.010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.210 0.010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.220 0.010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.230 0.010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.240 0.010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.250 0.010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.260 0.010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.270 0.010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.280 0.010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.290 0.010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.300 0.010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.310 0.010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.320 i 0.010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.330 0.010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
TABLE 4 
106 
from a population with an underlying error rate of .03 or more is .04673. This is 
virtually identical to the classical (i.e., non-Bayesian) sampling risk for a sample 
of 100 and a .03 population error rate (which is .04755 as shown in column 3). 
If our sample of 100 had contained, say, 1 error, the probability in column 3 
would have been computed for 1 error instead of 0 errors. All other calculations 
would remain the same. We make this calculation for the exact number of 
errors we find, ignoring all of the other error cases because we know we 
cannot be in any of them. 
Table 5 (in 3 parts) contains a complete example of a uniform prior. In this 
instance, the possible population error rates have been limited to a narrower 
range (0 to .099, in 100 increments of .001). This is probably a closer 
resemblance to a "no knowledge" distribution for an audit (0 to 3.3 times 
materiality rather than 0 to 33 times materiality). At the .03 possible error rate 
at the bottom of part 1, it can be seen that the posterior risk of this much error 
(or more) is still equivalent to the classical sampling risk. 
The subsequent posterior risk tables are all based on a sample of 115 to 
facilitate a comparison with Figures 1 to 4. If a .03 error existed, the probability 
of a sample of 115 containing 0 errors would also be .03.* Thus, a sample of 
115 will yield the same risk as the product of IC, AR, and STD in Figures 1 to 4 
(.30 x.40 x .25 = .03). 
The illustration at the top of Table 6 represents the 50/50 distribution for a 
discrete model (the equivalent of the uniform priors in Tables 4 and 5).** At 
the material error value (.03001), the classical sampling probability and the 
posterior risk are virtually equal (.03008 and .02920). The SAS 39 model would 
imply a risk of .03, the SAS 47 model would imply a risk of .015, and the simple 
discrete posterior model would indicate .0291 (see Table 1). However, if the 
prior is stacked 50/50 at $1 over and $1 under materiality, the posterior risk 
rises to virtually .50 as illustrated at the bottom of Table 6. The illustration at 
the top of Table 7 spreads the .5 portion of the prior below materiality in a level 
or uniform manner, but stacks the .5 above, right at materiality. In this case, 
the posterior risk rises to .08347 or almost three times the stated risks for the 
discrete posterior model and the SAS 39 model. It is almost six times the 
stated risk for the SAS 47 model. This result is due to the fact that the simple 
discrete models ignore reality when they stack the priors on 0 errors and a 
material error. Of course, these last two illustrations are not realistic either. 
The illustration at the bottom of Table 7 reflects the circumstances in 
Figure 3. This condition results in the same posterior risk of .0099. The 
circumstances in Figure 4 are reflected in the illustration at the top of Table 8, 
and once more the results are in agreement. But neither of these two 
illustrations can be considered to represent reality. The illustration at the 
bottom of Table 8 contains the same prior as the illustration at the top, but in 
* Readers should ensure that they do not confuse the two .03 values. One is a risk; the other is the 
materiality level selected for purposes of the illustration. The fact that they are the same in this 
illustration is entirely coincidental. 
** If $30,000 is the materiality level, does this mean that an amount greater than $30,000 ($30,001 
and above) would be material, or does it mean $30,000 and above? To avoid splitting hairs, I have 
loaded the portion of the distribution applicable to a material error at or above .03001 and the 
portion applicable to less than a material error at or below .02999. 
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EXAMPLE OF POSTERIOR RISK - LIMITED UNIFORM PRIOR ERROR 
Prior Relative Posterior 
Possible Probability Probability Frequency Risk 
Population: Of Error Of 0 Error Column 2 Of Prob. (of error 
Error Rate In In Sample X In rate x than 
Rates Column 1 Of 100 Column 3 Column 4 Column 1) 
0.000 0.010 1.00000 0.01000 0.09607 1.00000 
0.001 0.010 0.90479 0.00905 0.08692 0.90393 
0.002 0.010 0.81857 0.00819 0.07864 0.81701 
0.003 0.010 0.74048 0.00740 0.07114 0.73837 
0.004 0.010 0.66978 0.00670 0.06435 0.66723 
0.005 0.010 0.60577 0.00606 0.05820 0.60288 
0.006 0.010 0.54782 0.00548 0.05263 0.54469 
0.007 0.010 0.49536 0.00495 0.04759 0.49206 
0.008 0.010 0.44789 0.00448 0.04303 0.44447 
0.009 0.010 0.40492 0.00405 0.03890 0.40144 
0.010 0.010 0.36603 0.00366 0.03516 0.36254 
0.011 0.010 0.33085 0.00331 0.03178 0.32737 
0.012 0.010 0.29902 0.00299 0.02873 0.29559 
0.013 0.010 0.27022 0.00270 0.02596 0.26686 
0.014 0.010 0.24417 0.00244 0.02346 0.24090 
0.015 0.010 0.22061 0.00221 0.02119 0.21745 
0.016 0.010 0.19930 0.00199 0.01915 0.19625 
0.017 0.010 0.18003 0.00180 0.01730 0.17710 
0.018 0.010 0.16261 0.00163 0.01562 0.15981 
0.019 0.010 0.14686 0.00147 0.01411 0.14419 
0.020 0.010 0.13262 0.00133 0.01274 0.13008 
0.021 0.010 0.11975 0.00120 0.01150 0.11734 
0.022 0.010 0.10811 0.00108 0.01039 0.10583 
0.023 0.010 0.09760 0.00098 0.00938 0.09545 
0.024 0.010 0.08810 0.00088 0.00846 0.08607 
0.025 0.010 0.07952 0.00080 0.00764 0.07761 
0.026 0 . 0 1 0 i 0.07176 0.00072 0.00689 0.06997 
0.027 0.010 0.06476 0.00065 0.00622 0.06307 
0.028 0.010 0.05843 0.00058 0.00561 0.05685 
0.029 0.010 0.05271 0.00053 0.00506 0.05124 
0.030 0.010 0.04755 0.00048 0.00457 0.04617 
0.031 0.010 0.04289 0.00043 0.00412 0.04161 
0.032 0.010 0.03868 0.00039 0.00372 0.03748 
0.033 0.010 0.03489 0.00035 0.00335 0.03377 
TABLE 5 - PART 1 
108 
E X A M P L E OF POSTERIOR RISK - LIMITED UNIFORM PRIOR ERROR 
0.034 0.010 0.03146 0.00031 0.00302 0.03042 
0.035 0.010 0.02836 0.00028 0.00272 0.02739 
0.036 0.010 0.02557 0.00026 0.00246 0.02467 
0.037 0.010 0.02305 0.00023 0.00221 0.02221 
0.038 0.010 0.02077 0.00021 0.00200 0.02000 
0.039 0.010 0.01872 0.00019 0.00180 0.01800 
0.040 0.010 0.01687 0.00017 0.00162 0.01621 
0.041 0.010 0.01520 0.00015 0.00146 0.01458 
0.042 0.010 0.01369 0.00014 0.00132 0.01312 
0.043 0.010 0.01234 0.00012 0.00119 i 0.01181 
0.044 0.010 0.01111 0.00011 0.00107 i 0.01062 
0.045 0.010 0.01001 0.00010 0.00096 0.00956 
0.046 0.010 0.00901 0.00009 0.00087 0.00859 
0.047 0.010 0.00812 0.00008 0.00078 0.00773 
0.048 0.010 0.00731 0.00007 0.00070 0.00695 
0.049 0.010 0.00658 0.00007 0.00063 0.00625 
0.050 0.010 0.00592 0.00006 0.00057 0.00562 
0.051 0.010 0.00533 0.00005 0.00051 0 .00505 
0.052 0.010 0.00480 0.00005 0.00046 0.00453 
0.053 0.010 i 0.00432 0.00004 0.00041 i 0.00407 
0.054 0.010 0.00388 0.00004 0.00037 0.00366 
0.055 0.010 0.00349 0.00003 0.00034 0.00329 
0.056 0.010 0.00314 0.00003 0.00030 0.00295 
0.057 0.010 0.00283 0.00003 0.00027 0.00265 
0.058 0.010 0.00254 0.00003 0.00024 0.00238 
0.059 0.010 0.00229 i 0.00002 0.00022 0.00213 
0.060 0.010 0.00205 0.00002 0.00020 i 0.00191 
0.061 0.010 0.00185 0.00002 0.00018 0.00172 
0.062 0.010 0.00166 0.00002 0.00016 0.00154 
0.063 0.010 i 0.00149 0.00001 0.00014 0.00138 
0.064 0.010 0.00134 0.00001 0.00013 0.00124 
0.065 0.010 0.00121 0.00001 0.00012 i 0.00111 
0.066 0.010 0.00108 0.00001 0.00010 0.00099 
0.067 0.010 0.00097 0.00001 0.00009 0.00089 
0.068 0.010 0.00087 0.00001 0.00008 0.00079 
0.069 0.010 0.00079 0.00001 0.00008 0.00071 
0.070 0.010 0.00071 0.00001 0.00007 0.00063 
0.071 0.010 0.00063 0.00001 0.00006 0.00057 
0.072 0.010 0.00057 0.00001 0 .00005 i 0.00051 
0.073 0.010 0.00051 0.00001 0 .00005 i 0.00045 
T A B L E 5 - PART 2 
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E X A M P L E OF POSTERIOR RISK - LIMITED UNIFORM PRIOR ERROR 
0 . 0 7 4 0.010 0 . 0 0 0 4 6 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.00004 0 . 0 0 0 4 0 
0 . 0 7 5 0.010 0.00041 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.00004 0 . 0 0 0 3 6 
0 . 0 7 6 0.010 0.00037 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 4 0 . 0 0 0 3 2 
0 . 0 7 7 0.010 0 . 0 0 0 3 3 0.00000 0.00003 0 . 0 0 0 2 8 
0 . 0 7 8 0.010 0.00030 0.00000 0.00003 0 . 0 0 0 2 5 
0.079 0.010 0.00027 0.00000 0.00003 0.00022 
0 . 0 8 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 0 2 4 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.00002 0.00020 
0.081 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 0 2 1 0.00000 0 . 0 0 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 1 7 
0 . 0 8 2 0.010 0 . 0 0 0 1 9 0.00000 0.00002 0 . 0 0 0 1 5 
0 . 0 8 3 0.010 0 . 0 0 0 1 7 0.00000 0.00002 0 . 0 0 0 1 3 
0 . 0 8 4 0.010 0 . 0 0 0 1 5 0.00000 0.00001 0 . 0 0 0 1 2 
0 . 0 8 5 0.010 0.00014 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 1 0 
0 . 0 8 6 0.010 0.00012 0.00000 0.00001 0 . 0 0 0 0 9 
0 . 0 8 7 0.010 0.00011 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.00001 0 . 0 0 0 0 8 
0 . 0 8 8 0.010 0.00010 0.00000 0.00001 0 . 0 0 0 0 7 
0 . 0 8 9 0.010 0 . 0 0 0 0 9 0.00000 0.00001 0 . 0 0 0 0 6 
0.090 0.010 0.00008 0.00000 0.00001 0 . 0 0 0 0 5 
0.091 0.010 0.00007 0.00000 0.00001 0 . 0 0 0 0 4 
0 . 0 9 2 0.010 0 . 0 0 0 0 6 0.00000 0.00001 0 . 0 0 0 0 3 
0 . 0 9 3 0.010 0.00006 0.00000 0.00001 0 . 0 0 0 0 3 
0 . 0 9 4 0.010 0 . 0 0 0 0 5 0.00000 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 2 
0 . 0 9 5 0.010 0 . 0 0 0 0 5 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.00000 0 . 0 0 0 0 2 
0.096 0.010 0.00004 0.00000 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.00001 
0 . 0 9 7 0.010 0.00004 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.00000 0.00001 
0 . 0 9 8 0.010 0 . 0 0 0 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.00000 0.00001 
0 . 0 9 9 0.010 0.00003 0.00000 0.00000 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 
1.000 1 0 . 4 0 9 0 7 0 . 1 0 4 0 9 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 
T A B L E 5 - PART 3 
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POSTERIOR RISK - 50/50 PRIOR [STACKED ON ZERO AND MATERIALITY] 
Prior Relative Posterior 
Possible Probability Probability Frequency Risk 
Population Of Error Of 0 Error Column 2 Of Prob. (of error 
Error Rate In In Sample X In rate than 
Rates Column 1 Of 115 Column 3 Column 4 Column 1) 
0.00000 0.50000 1.00000 0.50000 0.97080 1.00000 
0.03001 0.50000 0.03008 0.01504 0.02920 0.02920 
POSTERIOR RISK - 50/50 PRIOR [STACKED AT MATERIALITY] 
Prior Relative Posterior 
Possible Probability Probability Frequency Risk 
Population Of Error Of 0 Error Column 2 Of Prob. (of error 
Error Rate In In Sample X In rate than 
Rates Column 1 Of 115 Column 3 Column 4 Column 1) 
0.02999 0.50000 0.03015 0.01507 0.50059 1.00000 
0.03001 0.50000 0.03008 6.01504 0.49941 0.49941 
TABLE 6 
this instance the spread is somewhat realistic (0 to .054, peaking at mate­
riality). This produces a posterior risk of .24640 in comparison with the simple 
posterior risk of .08276, the SAS 39 risk of .03, and the SAS 47 risk of .0225 
(see example §10 in Table 1). 
The illustration at the top of Table 9 spreads the 75/25 prior in a similar 
manner (0 and .04 peaking at materiality). Here we see a true posterior risk of 
.04301 in comparison with the simple posterior risk of .0099, the SAS 39 risk of 
.03, and the SAS 47 risk of .0075 (see example §4 in Table 1). The illustration 
at the bottom of Table 9 spreads the 75/25 prior again but with a lower peak (0 
to .05, peaking at .015, which is 50 percent of materiality). The true posterior 
risk dropped to .01693, and, of course, the three simple risk model results do 
not change. 
We have seen that the simplistic risk models can significantly understate 
the auditor's risk when he is giving a clean opinion. The SAS 39 model totally 
ignores IR/PPE. The SAS 47 model gives too much credit to inherent risk 
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POSTERIOR RISK - 50/50 PRIOR [LEVEL BELOW MATERIALITY] 
Prior Relative Posterior 
Possible Probability Probability Frequency Risk 
Population Of Error Of 0 Error Column 2 Of Prob. (of error 
Error Rate In In Sample X In rate than 
Rates Column 1 of 115 Column 3 Column 4 Column 1) 
0.00000 0.05000 1.00000 0.05000 0.27754 1.00000 
0.00300 0.05000 0.70785 0.03539 0.19645 0.72246 
0.00600 0.05000 0.50053 0.02503 0.13892 0.52601 
0.00900 0.05000 0.35357 0.01768 0.09813 0.38709 
0.01200 0.05000 0.24949 0.01247 0.06924 0.28897 
0.01500 0.05000 0.17586 0.00879 0.04881 0.21973 
0.01800 0.05000 0.12383 0.00619 0.03437 0.17092 
0.02100 0.05000 0.08710 0.00435 0.02417 0.13655 
0.02400 0.05000 0.06120 0.00306 0.01698 0.11238 
0.02700 0.05000 0.04295 0.00215 0.01192 0.09539 
0.03001 0.50000 0.03008 0.01504 0.08347 0.08347 
POSTERIOR RISK - 75/25 PRIOR [FIGURE 3] 
Prior Relative Posterior 
Possible Probability Probability Frequency Risk 
Population Of Error Of 0 Error Column 2 Of Prob. (of error 
Error Rate In In Sample X In rate than 
Rates Column 1 Of 115 Column 3 Column 4 Column 1) 
0.00000 0.75000 1.00000 0.75000 0.99007 1.00000 
0.03001 0.25000 0.03008 0.00752 0.00993 0.00993 
TABLE 7 
when it is favourable, and when it is unfavourable the impact is in the wrong 
direction. The simple posterior model suffers when the PPE is stacked on zero 
and materiality and the portion below materiality should be spread in what 
would amount to an unfavourable pattern. Since none of the simple models 
recognize the possibility of the actual underlying error being well in excess of 
materiality, it is not clear how the auditor would evaluate the results when a 
single material error is actually discovered. If a significant portion of the prior 
distribution actually extended beyond twice materiality, he could well be 
ignoring undetected error that still exceeded materiality. 
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POSTERIOR RISK - 25/75 PRIOR [FIGURE 4] 
Prior Relative Posterior 
Possible Probability Probability Frequency Risk 
Population Of Error Of 0 Error Column 2 Of Prob. (of error 
Error Rate In In Sample X In rate x than 
Rates Column 1 Of 115 Column 3 Column 4 Column 1) 
0.00000 0.25000 1.00000 0.25000 0.91724 1.00000 
0.03001 0.75000 0.03008 0.02256 0.08276 0.08276 
POSTERIOR RISK - 25/75 PRIOR [SPREAD - PEAKED AT MATERIALITY] 
Prior Relative Posterior 
Possible Probability Probability Frequency Risk 
Population Of Error Of 0 Error Column 2 Of Prob. (of error 
Error Rate In In Sample X In rate x than 
Rates Column 1 Of 115 Column 3 Column 4 Column 1) 
0.00000 0.01000 1.00000 0.01000 0.21967 i 1.00000 
0.00750 0.02000 0.42074 0.00841 0.18485 0.78033 
0.01500 0.04000 0.17586 0.00703 0.15453 0.59548 
0.02250 0.08000 0.07302 0.00584 0.12832 0.44095 
0.02999 0.10000 0.03015 0.00301 0.06623 0.31263 
0.03001 0.20000 0.03008 0.00602 0.13214 0.24640 
0.03600 0.25000 0.01475 0.00369 0.08102 i 0.11425 
0.04200 0.15000 0.00720 0.00108 0.02371 0.03324 
0.04800 0.10000 0.00349 0.00035 0.00767 0.00953 
0.05400 0.05000 0.00169 0.00008 0.00185 0.00185 
TABLE 8 
Some Interim Alternatives 
While I am tempted to suggest that auditors abandon their simple discrete 
models and use either an expanded discrete posterior model or a continuous 
posterior model, I recognize that in some quarters they still shoot the 
messenger who brings bad news (much larger substantive testing extents). In 
addition, some practitioners are of the view that the Bayesian approach is a 
"frame of mind'' and that anyone who would recommend its use must be "out 
of his mind." (With respect to this latter point, anyone who does not believe in 
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POSTERIOR RISK - 75/25 PRIOR [SPREAD - PEAKED AT MATERIALITY] 
Prior Relative Posterior 
Possible Probability Probability Frequency Risk 
Population Of Error Of 0 Error Column 2 Of Prob. (of error 
Error Rate In In Sample X In rate than 
Rates Column 1 Of 115 Column 3 Column 4 Column 1) 
0.00000 0.02000 1.00000 0.02000 0.15745 1.00000 
0.00500 0.05000 0.56189 0.02809 0.22117 0.84255 
0.01000 0.08000 0.31481 0.02518 0.19826 0.62138 
0.01500 0.10000 0.17586 0.01759 0.13844 0.42312 
0.02000 0.15000 0.09795 0.01469 0.11566 0.28468 
0.02500 0.22500 0.05439 0.01224 0.09634 0.16902 
0.02999 0.12500 0.03015 0.00377 0.02967 0.07268 
0.03001 0.12500 0.03008 0.00376 0.02960 0.04301 
0.03500 0.07500 0.01662 0.00125 0.00981 0.01341 
0.04000 0.05000 0.00915 0.00046 0.00360 0.00360 
POSTERIOR RISK - 75/25 PRIOR [SPREAD - PEAKED AT 0.5 MATERIALITY] 
Prior Relative Posterior 
Possible Probability Probability Frequency Risk 
Population Of Error Of 0 Error Column 2 Of Prob. (of error 
Error Rate In In Sample X In rate than 
Rates Column 1 Of 115 Column 3 Column 4 Column 1) 
0.00000 0.05000 1.00000 0.05000 0.26618 1.00000 
0.00500 0.07500 0.56189 0.04214 0.22435 0.73382 
0.01000 0.12500 0.31481 0.03935 0.20949 0.50947 
0.01500 0.17500 0.17586 0.03078 0.16384 0.29998 
0.02000 0.15000 0.09795 0.01469 0.07822 0.13614 
0.02500 0.10000 0.05439 0.00544 0.02896 0.05792 
0.02999 0.07500 0.03015 0.00226 0.01204 0.02897 
0.03001 0.02500 0.03008 0.00075 0.00400 0.01693 
0.03500 0.09000 0.01662 0.00150 0.00796 0.01293 
0.04000 0.07000 0.00915 0.00064 0.00341 0.00496 
0.04500 0.05000 0.00502 0.00025 0.00134 0.00155 
0.05000 0.01500 0.00274 0.00004 0.00022 0.00022 
TABLE 9 
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the Bayesian approach should be doing a constant amount of work on all audits 
regardless of how low or high inherent risk is assessed. I believe that the 
competitive environment will adequately deal with this problem when the PPE 
is favourable. As well, the increase in litigation resulting from significant audit 
failures will, no doubt, cause auditors to do more work when the PPE is 
unfavourable.) 
Cushing and Loebbecke (1983) suggest that the SAS 39 model not be used 
"when the auditor believes that the likelihood of material error is high." They 
suggest that some other model (unspecified) would be more appropriate in 
such circumstances. Given the foregoing illustrations of the failure of the SAS 
39 and 47 models when the prior risk of error is high, it is not difficult to agree 
with this suggestion. But the question remains as to what alternative the 
auditor has at the present time. He could throw up his hands in frustration and 
revert to "good old gut feel" until a reliable computerized Bayesian planning 
and evaluation model becomes available.* This would certainly not be a very 
progressive step. 
One interim solution might be to modify the discrete posterior model in an 
attempt to correct the deficiency resulting from the stacking of the prior 
probability of error on only two points. One approach that I am in the process of 
investigating involves using some fraction of materiality (such as ½ or 2/3) as the 
cut-off for the portion of the prior distribution that would be stacked on zero. 
The balance would be placed on materiality, resulting in a reduction of the 
allowable STD risk and, thus, requiring a larger sample. Although too early to 
judge, this approach might provide a workable procedure. 
Another interim solution would be to use an extended discrete model with 
the auditor actually specifying the prior distribution over reasonably short 
intervals (such as 10hs or 5ths of materiality). IC and AR could be integrated 
into the model by using the equivalent prior sample concept.5 This procedure 
involves inputting the values for IC and AR in terras of a sample size and a 
specific number of errors (this is very convenient because the parameters for 
the βeta distribution can be described in these terms and the βeta distribution 
can model audit priors in a very "realistic" manner). Such a model could be 
used for planning and evaluation, and it could be programmed for use on a 
micro-computer at a reasonable cost. 
When an auditor believes that a material error does not exist (low PPE), he 
collects evidence to support this belief. When he believes that a material error 
does exist (high PPE), he should attempt to prove that case rather than cross 
his fingers and hope he can prove that the situation is actually acceptable (this is 
why the posterior risk model requires a much larger substantive sample if the 
auditor wishes to "accept" when the PPE is high). The auditor can use the 
posterior risk model in another manner that would address the concerns 
expressed by Cushing and Loebbecke and also reduce the size of the 
substantive sample. This approach would require the auditor to change his 
outlook when the PPE is high. Instead of accepting the underlying population as 
* A quasi-Bayesian model purported to contain all of the desirable features of an audit risk model 
was recently described by McCray (1984). While this model may have some promise, it has not yet 
been subjected to a thorough analysis by the accounting and statistical professions. In addition, it 
has not been tested in a live audit environment. 
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being free of material error when he failed to detect it, he would search further 
because the result would be inconsistent with his expectation. Thus, he could 
start with a reduced sample extent and enlarge it if he failed to identify the 
expected error condition. The most common decision rule used in practice at the 
present time is just the opposite—start with a small sample and enlarge it only 
if errors are found. 
Researchers in practice and academe must be cognizant of the competitive 
environment. Understandably, client-handling partners of accounting firms will 
exhibit resistance to changes in the audit risk model if the result is more work. 
If they could be assured that their competitors were using the same model and 
achieving the same audit objective, I feel certain that they would not resist 
what we might all agree are "advances in theory and practice." However, we 
know that, in the "real world," even the simple models that we criticize are 
used by only a small minority of practitioners.* An impartial observer might be 
of the view that we are criticizing the Model T because more advanced models 
are available when, in fact, our profession is still in the horse and buggy era. 
Some Related Issues 
Even if we were to obtain complete agreement on the appropriate audit risk 
model, it would mean little if we could not achieve some degree of uniformity in 
materiality judgments. Audit risk by itself has absolutely no meaning. It can 
only be quantified and used in a model when it is related to a specified level of 
materiality.** In a forthcoming CICA Audit Research Study,6 I have recom­
mended that the profession solve this problem by providing users of financial 
statements with the level(s) of materiality used in the audit. 
Cushing and Loebbecke raised the issue of the aggregation of evidence 
throughout the audit and lamented the fact that "none of the sources cited in 
the literature review indicate how the model could be expanded to address the 
aggregation problem." Once again, they did not look very carefully at the 
literature they cited since Leslie et al (1979) described a methodology*** for 
aggregation that is consistent with paragraphs 27 to 32 of SAS 47. I believe that 
in the very near future this method of aggregation will be attacked in the 
literature as being without logic, statistical validity, or any other redeeming 
qualities. In this respect, one is reminded of the mid 1970s when almost 
everyone was attacking the validity of the Stringer bound. Several researchers 
recommended alternate bounds that generated much higher upper error limits. 
Now, of course, all of the literature in this area attacks the Stringer bound as 
being too inefficient because it is so conservative. A look into my crystal ball 
suggests that history is about to repeat itself. 
* This contention will be illustrated in a forthcoming AICPA Audit Research Monograph by Carl 
Warren. The basis of this monograph will be the 690 questionnaires submitted by 60 accounting 
firms as part of the Materiality and Audit Risk Task-force project. 
** Readers may have noticed that the final title of SAS 47 reversed the order of "risk" and 
"materiality" set out in the title of the Exposure Draft. This was the result of the mistaken belief 
of several members of the ASB that risk is determined before materiality and then used to 
determine the amount that is material. 
*** This method of aggregation, or a variation thereof, is used by Clarkson Gordon, Deloitte 
Haskins & Sells and several other firms. 
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The Role of Statistical Sampling 
in Compliance Testing 
"If there's no meaning in it," said the King, "that saves a world of trouble, you know, as 
we needn't try to find any.'' 
C.L. Dodgson 
The debate over the role of statistical sampling in auditing has spanned 
several decades. One segment of the profession holds the view that statistical 
sampling has no place in auditing since it results in a reduction in the use of 
judgment by the auditor. The other segment is of the view that without the use 
of quantitative methods the auditor has no reasonable method by which to 
determine testing extents. This latter segment also believes that the use of 
statistical sampling enhances the use of judgment in the audit process. 
Members of these two segments are now commonly referred to as "judgos" 
and "quantos," respectively. I make no attempt to hide the fact that I am a 
member of the "quanto" segment. 
Earlier in this paper, internal controls were identified as being either 
preventive or detective, and preventive internal controls were considered 
together with inherent risk in order to determine the prior probability of error. 
The preventive and detective distinctions are described in both the AICPA 
"Statements on Auditing Standards" and the CICA "Handbook." The latter 
includes the following description in paragraph 5205.13: 
Internal controls may be characterized as preventive or detective. Preventive 
controls are those which prevent, or minimize the chance of occurrence of, 
fraud and error. Detective controls do not prevent fraud and error but rather 
detect them, or maximize the chance of their detection, so that corrective 
action may be promptly taken. The known existence of detective controls may 
have a deterrent effect, and be preventive in that sense. 
It is reasonable to classify a detective control as a preventive control provided 
that detection will result in the recovery of the particular asset that would 
otherwise be lost to the entity. Prompt recognition (recording) of a loss by the 
entity would not qualify the control as one with preventive value. As an 
example, consider the earlier case of a large financial institution that holds large 
quantities of securities. If this institution could detect missing securities 
promptly and recover them, this control feature would serve as a preventive 
control since a dishonest (or potentially dishonest) employee would be 
reluctant to steal certificates if negotiating them exposed him to a high 
probability of being caught. On the other hand, if the institution could detect 
missing certificates promptly but do little to recover them, the control would be 
considered entirely detective since it would have no deterrent value. 
Certain types of control will be clearly preventive or detective in nature 
while others may be difficult to classify. In this respect, it is important to 
develop a decision rule for audit staff in order to avoid "classifications of 
convenience." 
Objectives of Compliance Testing 
In order to employ statistical sampling in compliance testing, the auditor 
must first establish the objective of his compliance tests. SAS Au § 320.59 
describes the purpose of compliance tests as follows: 
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The purpose of compliance tests is to provide reasonable assurance that 
the accounting control procedures are being applied as prescribed. Such 
tests are necessary if the prescribed procedures are to be relied on in 
determining the nature, timing, or extent of substantive tests of 
particular classes of transactions or balances, as discussed later . . . 
Other than the reference to "reasonable assurance," the above passage 
provides no guidance as to "how much compliance testing is enough." Of 
course, reasonable assurance (the complement of risk) must be related to 
"something" if it is to have any meaning. The "something" is described in 
paragraph 31 of SAS 39 (Au § 320.31) as '"the maximum rate of deviations from 
prescribed control procedures that would support his planned reliance." The 
subsequent discussion in paragraphs 32 to 42 of SAS 39 has, through the use of 
examples, established the internationally known and (ab)used "5 & 5 gets ya 
60" syndrome. This magic "60" is without a doubt the most commonly 
employed compliance testing extent in the world. If one is prepared to accept 
this number,* all of the problems related to compliance testing extents quickly 
vanish. 
Even though this approach would appear to have the blessing of a 
substantial portion of the profession (silence implies acceptance), it should not 
go unchallenged. SAS Au § 320.68 states: 
The auditor's evaluation of accounting control with reference to each 
significant class of transactions and related assets should be a conclu­
sion about whether the prescribed procedures and compliance there­
with are satisfactory for his purpose. The procedures and compliance 
should be considered satisfactory if the auditor's review and tests 
disclose no condition he believes to be a material weakness for his 
purpose. In this context, a material weakness is a condition in which the 
specific control procedures or the degree of compliance with them do 
not reduce to a relatively low level the risk that errors or irregularities 
in amounts that would be material in relation to the financial statements 
being audited may occur and not be detected within a timely period by 
employees in the normal course of performing their assigned functions. 
(emphasis added) 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine how the magic number "60" can 
meet the materiality criterion for every audit engagement. 
The following illustration demonstrates the variability in compliance testing 
payback when this approach is used. These calculations use the SAS 39 model 
(they ignore inherent risk for simplicity). AR is not effective and has been set 
equal to 1. In these cases, when the auditor takes his compliance sample of 60 
and finds no deviations, he subjectively determines that the IC risk is .25, and, 
using his risk equation, he increases his allowable sampling risk from a βeta of 
.05 to a βeta of .20. Columns (4) and (5) contain the DUS extents for each of 
the βeta risks based on the assumption that no errors will be found throughout 
the entire audit. In some instances, there is a positive payback, and in others it 
is negative. It can be seen that the payback is highly variable. But, suppose 
some of these populations are a part of the same audit engagement. Population 
2 is the western accounts receivable supervised by the credit office in Los 
* I suspect that Charles Dodgson would consider acceptance of a magic number of this nature as 
blind faith. 
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Angeles, population 3 is the eastern accounts receivable supervised by the 
credit office in New York, and population 4 is the Florida accounts receivable 
supervised by the credit office at the head office in Miami. Since all of the 
accounts are on the same computer and all of the systems are uniform, another 
auditor decides to compliance test the entire system as one and spreads his 
sample of 60 over the three locations. His payback is shown in case 5. Note 
that the net payback for 2, 3, and 4 is a sample reduction of 254, whereas for 
population 5 it is a reduction of 374. Is there any logic in the difference of 120 
between the two approaches? 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DUS For DUS For Internal Control 
Pop. 
No. 
Population 
Book Value 
Mate­
riality 
0 Errors 
and β= .05 
0 Errors 
and β = .20 
Payback 
(4)-(5)-60 
1 $ 1,000,000 $ 30,000 100 54 -14 
2 $10,000,000 $100,000 300 160 + 80} Net 
3 $20,000,000 $100,000 600 320 + 2 2 0 } » + 254 
4 $ 1,000,000 $100,000 30 16 -46} 
5 $31,000,000 $100,000 930 496 + 374 
6 $10,000,000 $300,000 100 54 -14} Net 
7 $20,000,000 $300,000 200 107 + 33} » - 36 
8 $ 1,000,000 $300,000 10 5 -55} 
9 $31,000,000 $300,000 310 166 + 84 
Now, along comes a bright young auditor, and she points out that the 
materiality level used was far too low based on various studies she has seen in 
the literature. A decision is made to increase materiality to $300,000. The 
impact of this decision is shown in cases 6 to 9. When the segments of the 
population are considered separately, there is a negative payback of 36 items. 
If they are considered "one" population, there is a positive payback of 84 
items. In either case, the level of materiality played an important role. 
However, the compliance testing guidance provided in SAS 39 provides no 
linkage to materiality. Clearly, a linkage is necessary. Consider this second 
case with materiality of $300,000 versus the first with materiality of $100,000. 
One would think that a system would have to work much harder to prevent or 
detect errors aggregating $100,000 than it would to prevent or detect errors 
aggregating $300,000. Thus, a higher tolerable rate of noncompliance should 
be acceptable for a materiality level of $300,000, resulting in a smaller sample. 
Unfortunately, this fact has been consistently ignored by most of the profession 
around the world. A fixed sample size of 60 (or any other magic number) cannot 
provide a linkage to materiality. 
In order to achieve this linkage, all the auditor need do is establish some 
reasonable relationship between the frequency of monetary errors and com­
pliance deviations. If such a relationship cannot be developed, then one must 
question the concept of relying on internal control in the first place. This 
concept is actually recognized in SAS 39 (paragraph 34): 
In assessing the tolerable rate of deviations, the auditor should consider 
that, while deviations from pertinent control procedures increase the 
risk of material errors in the accounting records, such deviations do not 
necessarily result in errors. For example, a recorded disbursement that 
does not show evidence of required approval may nevertheless be a 
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transaction that is properly authorized and recorded. Deviations would 
result in errors in the accounting records only if the deviations and the 
errors occurred on the same transactions. Deviations from pertinent 
control procedures at a given rate ordinarily would be expected to 
result in errors at a lower rate. 
As many researchers are aware, my associates and I have been expounding 
this approach for many years. When we first contemplated using the "5 & 5" 
fixed sample approach, our associate, Albert Teitlebaum of McGill University, 
pointed out the lack of logic and statistical consistency. It was his objective 
view from the sidelines, uncontaminated by the audit literature of the time 
(SAP 54), that forced us to see the illogical aspects of not relating the extent of 
compliance testing to materiality. In addition, whenever we attempted to 
incorporate the value for IC in a risk model, we found that it had to have a 
relationship to materiality in order to make any sense. The result was the 
"smoke/fire" methodology that we have described in two books and several 
papers.7 I hope that participants in this Symposium will focus some of their 
attention on this issue. 
Comparison of Value-Oriented and Neutral 
Sampling Methods for Compliance Tests 
The decision on the objective of compliance testing will impact the auditor's 
decision on method of sampling and, therefore, the method of selection. If the 
auditor subscribes to the magic number "60," he will more than likely use a 
neutral sampling method (all physical units will be given the same chance of 
selection—physical unit attribute sampling). A decision to relate compliance 
testing to materiality will generally result in the use of a value-oriented 
sampling method (DUS, CMA, PPS). The following is an example taken from 
the forthcoming CICA Audit Research Study on Materiality and from Leslie 
(1977). The sample of 257 is based on using a βeta risk of .20 and a three times 
multiple of materiality (see Leslie et al (1979) page 150). The sample of 95 is 
the magic number "60" expanded to allow acceptance of one compliance 
deviation without rejecting reliance on IC (consistent with the 257 calculation). 
Although the distribution in this illustration is hypothetical, it follows the 
shape of those found in actual accounting populations. This illustration demon­
strates the stark contrast between the selection methods and, perhaps, the 
importance of using value-oriented selection (where the maximum possible 
error in an item is related to its book value) regardless of the philosophy used 
to determine the sample size. 
In a number of research experiments carried out by the writer and others, 
groups of auditors have been requested to select samples from populations on a 
"judgmental representative" basis. Analysis of these samples revealed that 
the average judgmental allocation is very close to the V-O (DUS) average and 
in no way even resembles the neutral allocation. This is the reason why many 
auditors prefer to use judgmental value-oriented selection rather than physical-
unit attributes sampling in cases where they feel the cost of selecting a rigorous 
value-oriented probability sample (DUS) is not warranted by the added 
objectivity. When one envisages an auditor describing these two different 
approaches to an audit committee (or a judge), it is difficult to visualize any 
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Upper 
Stratum Number Stratum Average Sample Allocation 
boundary 
($000) 
of 
items 
value 
($000) 
n = 257 n = 95 
V-0 Neutral V-0 Neutral 
100 4 330 [ 3 { 1 
75 9 500 41 { 5 15{ 2 
50 31 1,100 { 11 3 { 4 1 
25 98 2,200 { 22 { 8 
20 154 2,700 27 3 10 1 
15 200 2,600 26 4 10 2 
10 357 2,500 25 7 9 3 
5 655 2,900 29 13 11 5 
4 795 2,700 27 16 10 6 
3 1,230 3,200 32 25 12 9 
2 1,360 1,900 19 27 7 10 
1 2,150 1,700 17 43 6 16 
.5 5,825 1,400 14 116 5 43 
12,868 25,730 257 257 95 95 
Average item value is $2,000 
V-O (257)—select 1 dollar unit out of every $100,000 on average. 
Neutral (257)—select 1 physical unit out of every 50.07 on average. 
V-O (95)—select 1 dollar unit out of every $270,526 on average. 
Neutral (95)—select 1 physical unit out of every 135.45 on average. 
support for the neutral approach since it concentrates on the small items and 
ignores the large ones. 
Sample Extension 
Kinney (1983) addresses the problem of the increasing risk when a sample 
is extended. He points out that, if a compliance sample of 60 is selected and a 
deviation is found, the auditor is not in a position to accept. On the other hand, 
if he had taken a sample of 95, he would have been able to tolerate one 
deviation. Thus, he selects another 35 items, and, if he finds no further 
deviations, he accepts. Kinney rightfully points out that in a strict statistical 
sense the auditor's risk will be in excess of the desired .05. 
This example serves to illustrate why Bayesian methods are required in all 
areas of auditing. Suppose in this example the auditor decided to extend his 
compliance test by 200 instead of 35. In accordance with strict statistical 
theory, the auditor's risk is still in excess of .05. But what if he extended by 
another 5,000 items and found no additional deviations? The statistical 
conclusion remains the same—-the risk is greater than .05 (but only very 
slightly). Now this does not seem very intuitive to the average auditor. He 
cannot imagine how he can have a sample of 5,060 with one deviation and be 
worse off than an auditor with a sample of 60 and no deviations. Of course, the 
auditor's intuition is correct. It is the statistical conclusion that is incorrect. 
This problem was first brought to our attention by Herbert Arkin in 1971. 
Needless to say, we found it very puzzling even though we could understand 
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the strict statistical conclusion. As reported by Teitlebaum (1973), the solution 
to this problem can be found in Bayesian analysis. For example, if a prior 
distribution of compliance deviation rates in a population is established 
(subjectively, of course—and it should be favourable or the auditor has no 
business considering reliance on IC) and then combined with the results of a 
compliance sample of 60 containing one deviation, a certain posterior distribu­
tion is produced. If this posterior distribution is then used as the prior 
distribution and combined with a deviation free sample of 35, the posterior 
distribution produced is identical to the posterior distribution produced by using 
the original prior and a sample of 95 with one compliance deviation. 
Thus, the auditor who employs Bayesian methods can ignore the issue of 
increasing risk when extending his samples. If his priors are favourable, his 
results will be acceptable. If his priors are unfavourable, deviation or error free 
results may not even be acceptable. This posture contrasts to that of the non-
Bayesian who will only react to sample results—with no recognition given to his 
prior beliefs. 
Much more extensive research in Bayesian methods and their application to 
auditing would be desirable. They are applicable to all areas of the attest audit. 
While prior probability distributions are subjective (and usually somewhat 
fuzzy) and cannot be "verified," they do and should reflect what the auditor 
actually believes. If he is prepared to "fudge" his priors in order to do less 
work, he knows when he concludes his audit that he really does not have the 
reasonable assurance he set out to obtain. He is then forced to live with his 
conscience. 
Is Compliance Testing Really Necessary in 
Order to Place Reliance on Internal Control? 
Based on auditing standards in Canada and the U.S., the answer would 
seem to be an obvious "yes." Perhaps it is time, however, to take another 
look at this requirement. It may well be that analysis of internal control results 
would be a far more useful and efficient approach than compliance testing in 
many situations. Consider the following three situations: 
(1) (2) (3) 
Inherent risk High High Low 
Preventive internal 
controls Excellent Poor Good 
Prior probability 
of error 
occurring Low High Low 
In case (2), the auditor identified detective internal controls and evaluated them 
as structurally sound. He would like to place reliance on these DICs in order to 
reduce his substantive test. Should he compliance test these key controls? 
Since the PPE is high, he expects a material error to occur (or there is a high 
probability that it will occur). It would seem logical that the first step should be 
an investigation of the errors detected by the DICs. If these controls did not 
find errors, he would have to question their effectiveness (and perhaps review 
the evidence supporting his decision relating to the high PPE). He might be 
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wise to ignore the DICs altogether and rely entirely on AR and STD for his 
assurance. 
If, on the other hand, the controls were detecting errors regularly and if 
these errors were being dealt with properly by management, would it still be 
necessary to compliance test the controls in order to place the planned reliance 
on them? It would seem to me that compliance testing should not be necessary. 
After all, the auditor would have discussed these controls with the employees 
responsible for their execution (when documenting them), traced a handful of 
different types of transaction through the key points in the system, and 
observed their effectiveness in detecting errors. Would compliance testing add 
anything in a situation of this nature? 
In cases (1) and (3), the auditor might well decide that the risk was low 
enough that any substantial reliance on DICs would not be warranted. He might 
already be prepared to use a risk of .20 for substantive work. An increase in 
this risk to, say, .37, as a result of reliance on DICs, would not have an 
adequate payback to warrant the compliance testing effort. He would then 
concentrate his efforts on AR and STD. He should, nonetheless, investigate 
the results obtained by any DICs. If they did detect significant errors, he would 
logically reconsider his PPE decision. 
With respect to PICs, the auditor would ignore them in both cases (2) and 
(3). In case (2), they do not help prevent error, and in case (3) his PPE 
evaluation would not change in their absence. In case (1), the auditor would 
carry out compliance verification procedures that would usually be observation 
oriented (segregation of duties, physical security, etc.), although in some cases 
audit trails would exist and compliance testing would be possible. If analysis of 
errors found by DICs and prior audits revealed that errors were not being 
prevented, no reliance would be taken for PICs. 
This compliance verification philosophy began to crystallize over the past 
few months while I analyzed the audit framework. If the concept is valid, 
implementation would help reduce audit costs by eliminating unnecessary 
compliance testing in many situations. 
Recommendations 
It has been demonstrated that the simple risk model set out in the Appendix 
to SAS 39 (and modified by SAS 47 to include the inherent risk factor) is not 
reliable and can seriously mislead auditors in the most dangerous situations 
they face. The Auditing Standards Board should give this model immediate 
attention. Simple risk models based on SAP 54 have served a useful purpose, 
but it is now time to take another step forward. Although the simple posterior 
model illustrated earlier is not perfect, I believe that it is more appropriate than 
the SAS 39/47 model. It would be a reasonable alternative until an "auditor 
friendly" continuous model is developed. Accordingly, I would recommend 
that the ASB withdraw the model in the Appendix to SAS 39 and replace it with 
the posterior model. 
An alternative to this recommendation would be to change the examples in 
the Appendix to SAS 39 to a .025 desired final audit risk so that a .50 inherent 
risk would provide the same final audit risk as the present .05 examples (that 
ignore inherent risk). This change would be accompanied by a caution 
informing users that, where the prior probability of error is high and evidence 
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of a material error is not detected by detective internal controls or the audit, 
the adequacy of the audit should be reconsidered. This admonition would 
require minor modifications to various SASs in order to explain the link 
between inherent risk and preventive internal controls (also required for the 
previous recommendation). 
SAS 39 has resulted in the undesirable adoption of a fixed compliance 
testing extent by a significant segment of the profession (in the U.S. and 
Canada). The ASB should review this outcome and either bless it or condemn 
it. If it decides to bless this approach, it should provide the logic that justifies a 
fixed sample size. In addition, some guidance as to how the auditor uses 
compliance testing results together with his assessment of the structure of 
internal control and materiality to determine the risk factor used in the equation 
would be welcomed by most of the profession. 
A Final Comment 
The focus of audit research over the past two decades has been primarily 
on quantitative techniques. It would not be unrealistic to state that technique 
development (statistical sampling, regression analysis, etc.) is leading practice 
by a wide margin. On another front, academics conducting behavioral research 
do not always receive a warm welcome from practitioners. It is to be hoped 
that practitioners will recognize the contribution that behavioral research can 
make to the advancement of the profession. The cooperation of practitioners is 
necessary for such research to be conducted properly and to provide the 
maximum benefits to the profession. More research on how auditors assess 
prior probabilities as well as how they should assess such probabilities would be 
useful. 
End Notes 
1. See for example, Power (1984). 
2. See for example, Leslie et al (1979), Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (1980), 
Kinney (1983), Cushing and Loebbecke (1983) and McCray (1984). 
3. See earlier quotation from paragragh 22 of SAS No. 47. 
4. Paragraph 21 of SAS 47 concludes with the sentence "These components of audit risk may 
be assessed in quantitative terms such as percentages or in nonquantitative terms that range, for 
example, from a minimum to a maximum." 
5. For more information on the equivalent prior sample (EPS) approach see Teitlebaum 
(1973), Felix (1976) and Leslie et al (1979, pp. 305-307). 
6. ''MATERIALITY—The Concept and Its Application To Auditing." This study should be 
released in late 1984 or early 1985. 
7. See for example, Leslie et al (1979), Anderson, R.J., (1977), and Leslie, D.A. (1977). 
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Appendix 
Comments of Ralph Walters (ex FASB board member—retired December 1983, formerly 
a senior partner with Touche Ross), extracted from a recent interview conducted by 
Professor Edward Stamp and published in a supplement to the International Accounting 
Bulletin, January 1984, entitled "Accounting Regulation in the U.S.: The Growing 
Debate." The supplement also contains interviews with Don Kirk, Robert Sprouse, Jim 
Leisenring, and Lee Seidler. 
I think when you become highly competitive as they have, and they have 
very strong growth instincts, they feel they have to grow; there's a tendency 
to lose sight sometimes of how you grow. I mean, grow all you want on the 
basis of better quality work, there's nothing wrong with that, but in their 
eagerness to grow they may have in some cases stooped a bit low. That's the 
impression we get here. 
If somebody is doing substandard work, cutting corners and isn't found out, 
you cannot upgrade the profession and upgrade the work. You know, there's a 
truism in auditing—it isn't whether you do a good audit or a bad audit that 
makes the difference, it's whether you get caught. That's all that counts. 
You could do a crummy audit and, as long as it never comes to light—and 
probably the chances are that in most cases it never will—everything's fine. 
You can do perfect audits and you're really in no better shape than the guy that 
did a bad audit and was never found out. 
Yet when you talk to individual CPAs, as I do quite a bit, they're a high-
minded group of people. They want to do what's right. Most of them have very 
strong professional instincts. I've never talked to anybody who was stealing 
somebody else's client or low-balling, but there's got to be somebody out 
there somewhere that's doing it. It needs leadership and it needs to be looked 
at as an extremely serious problem, because I maintain that, if accountants 
don't pull up their own socks, somebody's going to do it for them and they may 
do it in a fairly rough fashion. 
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Discussant's Response to 
An Analysis of the Audit Framework 
Focusing on Inherent Risk and the Role of 
Statistical Sampling in Compliance Testing 
William R. Kinney, Jr. 
University of Michigan 
Don Leslie has prepared a paper with many ideas that give rise to a number 
of implications for both the theory and practice of auditing and that merit careful 
thought, discussion, and debate. I agree with most of what he has to say but, of 
course, have some caveats, reservations, and qualifications. 
The paper has nine sections, and I plan to comment on parts of all nine, 
concentrating on three central topics: the audit risk formula, assessment of the 
prior probability of material error, and the role of compliance tests. My closing 
comments will address some of the political aspects of Leslie's policy 
recommendations. 
The Audit Risk Formula 
Leslie is correct that the audit risk formula of SAP 54 and SAS 39 can 
understate the "final audit risk" (FAR)* relative to the approach suggested in 
Leslie, Teitlebaum, and Anderson (1979) and the CICA's Extent of Audit 
Testing (EAT). He is also correct that a reasonable interpretation of SAS 47 
may lead to a formula that will always understate FAR relative to the EAT 
approach. Finally, he is correct that the difference between FAR calculated 
using SAS 39 and FAR using EAT is small when the prior probabiity of material 
error (PPE) is small. 
Leslie implicity assumes that for the zero error population, every item in 
the population has zero error and any audit test will confirm this fact. I make a 
slightly less restrictive assumption that net error in the population is zero. 
Under the latter assumption, substantive tests of details (STD) may lead to 
incorrect rejection, and, of course, analytical review (AR) may lead to incorrect 
rejection even if every item has zero error. Under the zero net error 
assumption, the EAT formula understates FAR relative to a slightly more 
complete "Bayesian Risk Product" (BRP) calculation* because the EAT 
approach ignores the risk of incorrect rejection for both analytical review 
procedures and substantive tests of details. 
* Since Leslie sometimes uses "final audit risk" and "posterior risk" interchangeably and since 
posterior risk seems to be a misnomer as used here, I will use "final audit risk'' (FAR) throughout. 
* I refer to this approach as the Bayesian risk product rather than Bayesian since it assumes that 
decisions are made on the basis of the likelihood information and not the posterior that combines 
the likelihood information with the prior distribution. 
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To illustrate, consider Leslie's Figure 3. Leslie's "ladder-tree diagram" is 
reproduced as the top part of Figure 1.** The bottom branches diagram the 
state for which there is zero net error in the account. Leslie calculates the final 
audit risk by dividing the probability of receiving "accept" signals from both 
AR and STD under the condition of "intolerable" error (ME) that has not been 
detected by internal control by the sum of the probabilities that such audit tests 
would be obtained under either ME or zero net error condition.*** He 
implicitly assumes that the zero (net) error case will always lead to acceptance 
by the auditor. 
While the assumed outcome of no incorrect rejection signals is likely given 
that there is zero net error in an account, it is also true that even in the absence 
of error the analytical review procedures and/or the substantive tests of details 
will sometimes indicate that material error may exist. That is, the auditor may 
incur the cost of needlessly extending the audit, revising the audit plan, 
suggesting incorrect adjustments, or withdrawing or qualifying the opinion. For 
specificity, I have included these branches with incorrect rejection probabilities 
equal to .05 and .10 respectively. 
With the inclusion of these additional branches to the bottom branch of 
Leslie's ladder tree, we see that the possibility of completing the audit with no 
indication of material error from any test can arise by the top most route (with 
probability .0075) or via the top route of the bottom branch (with probability 
.6412 (.75 x .95 x .90)). The denominator for the FAR calculation is the sum of 
the probability of the top route and the top route of the bottom branch. Thus, 
the FAR for BRP is: 
F A R = PPE x PIC x AR x STD  
(PPE x DIC x AR x STD) + (1-PPE) x (1-RIRAR) x (1-RIRSTD) 
.0075 
= = .0116 
.0075 + .75 x .95 x .90 
where RIRAR and RIRSTD are the risks of incorrect rejection. The formula is 
identical to that of EAT with the exception of the RIRAR and RIRSTD factors. 
Since these factors are always 1.0, the Bayesian risk product will always be 
greater than or equal to the FAR from the EAT formula. How much less will 
depend, in part, upon the level of the RIR factors. Thus, the BRP approach will 
always lead to planned sample sizes that are equal to or greater than those 
using EAT. 
To elaborate on the comparison, the relative sample sizes for SAS 39, SAS 
47, EAT, and BRP (with PPE = .75, DIC = .30, AR=.40, and FAR =.03) 
would be 1.00, .79, 1.77 and 1.88. Thus the sample size for BRP is about 6% 
greater than that for EAT. A similar calculation using PPE = .25 would yield 
1.0, 0, .19 and .31. Thus, for the low PPE case, SAS 47, EAT and BRP 
require much less substantive tests of details than does SAS 39. 
As shown in the figure, the difference in FAR for PPE= .25 is .0017 or 
about 17% more than FAR using EAT. For the PPE = .75 case, FAR using 
** For those familiar with Bayesian decision trees, the Leslie approach differs in that his "ladder 
tree" places the prior probabilities of states at the start of the tree rather than at the end of each 
branch. 
* * * I will use ME to denote "just intolerable" monetary error for the account. Thus it is the single 
account counterpart of materiality for the financial statements taken as a whole. 
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FAR (SAS 39) = 1 x .3 x .4 x .25 = .0300 
* IA denotes "incorrect acceptance", CR denotes "correct rejection", etc. 
BRP is .0116 or 15.3% more than EAT. While these differences are not huge, 
they aren't negligible either. If the EAT formula provides appropriate correc­
tion of the SAS 39 formula then the BRP correction to EAT would also seem 
justified. 
As to the direction of the misstatement of risk, Leslie shows that, under his 
assumptions, the SAS 39 formula is conservative relative to EAT for PPE .5 
and is not conservative for PPE > .5. He is especially concerned about the use 
of SAS 39 for PPE>.5 since statement users may not have adequate 
protection against material error in audited financial statements. Yet it seems 
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FAR (SAS 47) = .25 x .3 x .4 x .25 = .0075 
FAR (EAT) . 0075 .0075 + .75 .0099 
FAR (BRP) .0075 .0075 + .6412 .0116 
likely that, in the presence of a high expectation of material error, the auditor 
would probably not use the risk formula in an "hypothesis testing" mode.1 
Rather, the auditor might use an "estimation" approach to adequately 
estimate the extent of error so that adjustments can be made or perhaps some 
other strategy pursued in which the client attempts to correct errors. In the 
latter case, sampling may not even be applicable. Thus, apropriate use of the 
SAS 39 formula may not lead to excessive risk of incorrect acceptance but may, 
of course, lead to costly overauditing for the PPE .5 cases and would be of 
concern to an auditor who faces competition. 
A reader familiar with Bayesian statistics will note at least two deficiencies 
in all four formulations of the auditor's problem. First, all approaches assume 
that ME that is detected by DIC cannot lead to incorrect rejection (i.e., 
Leslie's original assumption). A more complete formulation would direct the 
.70 branch from the DIC node to the lower AR node. This change would lead to 
FAR = .0080 for EAT and FAR = .0094 for BRP. Second, all of the approaches 
ignore the possibility that the auditor might misassess IR or misassess the 
reliance to be placed on internal control. For example, the auditor might 
conclude, on the basis of a study and evaluation of internal control, that DIC is 
.30 when the correct probability is .50. A complete Bayesian formulation would 
consider such misevaluations. 
Finally, the AICPA models, EAT, and BRP implicitly assume that one of 
two states must occur—either net error is zero or net error is equal to ME. 
Outcomes between zero and ME as well as error greater than ME cannot 
exist. Leslie believes that such simplification may lead to substantially different 
answers than would a continuous outcome space. I am not convinced that 
relative sample sizes will be substantially affected by allowing continuous state 
spaces. I base this view on the lack of meaningful differences for several 
continuous state follow-up studies of the Kinney (1975) discrete Bayesian 
model. Also, the imprecision inherent in the auditor's subjective assessments 
may overshadow any differences due to continuous state modelling. 
How Should IR and Internal Control Risks be Assessed? 
Another area of considerable controversy in the profession concerns the 
appropriate way to consider the three client-specific factors related to PPE. 
These factors are inherent risk (IR), preventive internal controls (PIC), and 
detective internal controls (DIC). In SAS 47, para. 24, the Auditing Standards 
Board suggested that the auditor may separately assess IR and "control risk" 
(PIC and DIC) and presumably multiply them together to get the risk that ME 
will occur and not be detected by IC. Leslie suggests that IR and PIC be 
considered together and multiplied by DIC to yield the same risk. A third 
alternative, also mentioned in SAS 47, para. 24, is to jointly assess the effects 
of all three factors. That is, the auditor would assess the overall risk that ME 
would occur in the accounting process and not be prevented or detected by 
internal controls. The joint method requires no separate assessment of 
individual factors that have not been separately observed and does not specify a 
particular combination algorithm (e.g., multiplication).2 
Using as an analogy, gun control at Kansas City International Airport, we 
might ask a gun control worker to assess the joint probability that a plane 
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departing the airport h a s one or more guns on board. Alternatively, we might 
ask the worker to estimate the number that would, in the absence of all 
controls, carry a gun on board and the number that would be caught by the 
controls. The worker's response to the alternative question is likely to be 
"How should I know?—I've never observed would-be passengers without the 
control." Furthermore, the worker is not likely to be able to separately assess 
PIC and DIC (it seems clear to me that the X-ray machine is detective but has 
preventive aspects as well). Finally, it is not clear that simple multiplication of 
separately assessed risks is in order due to lack of independence, because 
passengers' behavior is conditioned by their expectation of the control 
components. 
I favor the alternative of joint assessment and argued for it at the Auditing 
Standards Board deliberations on SAS 47. As discussed by the ASB and Don 
Leslie, behavioral research may lead to a determination of the best method. 
Compliance Testing 
Leslie's concern about the "5 and 5 will get ya 60" syndrome deserves 
comment. The example of a .05 tolerable rate (which, in practice, would have 
been set based on the auditor's judgment about the relationship of the 
prescribed control to ME) and .05 risk of overreliance due to compliance 
deviations originated in SAP 54 in 1972 as an example of reasonable levels of 
the factors. These levels were continued in SAS 39, and an example sample 
size of 60 was added. Sixty was chosen to show nonstatistical samplers that a 
compliance sample size that would satisfy the required criteria of "acceptably 
low" risk that the error rate for the population does not exceed a "reason­
able" tolerable rate requires a compliance sample size of considerably greater 
than, say, 5 or 10—even if no deviations are observed. It is only an example 
and not intended to be a standard itself. Leslie does not cite evidence to 
support his claim that it has become the standard the world over. Even if it has, 
however, it has probably led to an increase in compliance sample sizes and, 
thus, is not necessarily bad. 
Furthermore, it is not clear to me that a "smoke to fire" ratio is the only 
way to assess the risk of overreliance due to the compliance portion of the joint 
risk of overreliance. There would seem to be various ways to map the design 
evaluation and rate of deviation (whether based on documents or dollars of 
book value) to the posterior probability of error. 
Is compliance testing always necessary for reliance? Leslie raises some 
challenging questions with respect to required compliance testing for preven­
tive controls. He suggests that a preferred alternative is to look for evidence 
that such controls have actually detected errors. While such a procedure may 
be acceptable under some circumstances, in a generally poor control environ­
ment employees may document phony "prevention hits" or detected errors 
that were not really errors. That is, evidence of effectiveness may not indicate 
application of a control at all. Again, joint assessment of risk may help. 
Conclusions 
To summarize, I agree with Leslie that the audit risk formula can be 
improved. For example, it can be modified to be less conservative for low PPE 
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audit situations. Also, I agree that future Auditing Standards Board considera­
tion should be given to elaboration of the PIC and DIC concepts. Whether 
official improvement of the formula is possible within the present ASB is, of 
course, an open question. 
It has been my experience at the ASB that the firms that have the most 
structured audit approaches generally vote in support of structured standards. 
Similarly, those with the least structured approaches regularly vote against 
further structure. In drafting standards, there is a desire to make them "read" 
better by simplifying the wording, and yet complex concepts often require 
seemingly difficult wording to be correct. The audit risk formula seems to be a 
victim of such a conflict. The concepts of audit planning and evaluation are 
complex—a simple formula and few words are not likely to be technically 
correct. Yet complex formulae and discussion will not receive Board support. 
While there is little disagreement that auditors tend to behave as if they are 
Bayesians, there is much disagreement as to how this should be expressed in 
professional standards. There is a valid question of how much "theory" should 
be in professional standards. I do not believe that much more structure is likely 
to be forthcoming from the ASB. Elaboration of the PIC and DIC concepts is 
more likely since they are easier to understand. 
While the audit risk formula of SAP 54 and SAS 39 may be subject to 
misuse, it has led to considerable research and experimentation as well as to 
enlightenment of scholars and practitioners. It indicates relevant audit planning 
factors and the direction of their effects on auditing procedures. Furthermore, 
even if a practitioner uses the formula "simplistically," I know of no evidence 
or even claims that those not using the formula take larger samples or conduct 
more thorough or extensive audits. That is, I have never heard critics of the 
formula claim that they do not use it because they feel that they should be 
taking larger samples. 
I have heard the opposite claim—that a firm does not use the formula 
because it leads to sample sizes that are too large. This latter result, however, 
is often because the auditor has not taken advantage of his or her judgment in 
designing the sampling applications, rather than the potential problem that 
Leslie mentions. SAS 39 is quite clear in the statement that nonstatistical 
sample sizes for a given level of effectiveness cannot be smaller than a well 
designed statistical sample. 
I am concerned that those who have been using the SAP 54 and SAS 39 
formula may now apply the implicit formula of SAS 47 in a way that increases 
FAR. It seems to me that many practitioners have already included some 
allowance for inherent risk in assessing IC under the SAS 39 guidance. That is, 
they have implicitly adjusted the IC factor to include an allowance for inherent 
risk as well as internal controls. In effect, they use IC as the PPE when 
planning AR and STD. If they now use the same value for the IC factor and 
multiply it by an IR less than one, they will double count IR and will unduly 
restrict STD. The extent of this potential problem can also be addressed by 
behavioral research, of course. 
In conclusion, I believe that Don Leslie has written a thoughtful and very 
timely paper. Increasing competition and the micro computer are making 
operational many of the models that we have discussed at this conference for 
the last ten years, beginning with Felix (1974). Field workers now have the 
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computing power necessary to do sophisticated audit planning and evidence 
integration. We scholars can no longer avoid these issues by using the excuse 
of computational impracticality. Consideration of Leslie's analysis, criticisms, 
and suggestions can help all of us improve the practice, theory, and, perhaps, 
the regulation of auditing. 
End Notes 
1. See Cushing and Loebbecke (1983), for additional discussion. 
2. A similar problem with multiplication of risks is noted in Jiambalvo and Waller (1984), p. 87. 
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6 
Current Developments in 
United Kingdom Auditing Research 
David R. Gwilliam 
The University College of Wales, Aberystwyth 
A recent American academic visitor to the U.K., Raymond Johnson, wrote 
on more than one occasion (e.g., 1983) that "auditing research in the U.K. has 
been minimal" and further observed that the research that has taken place has 
concentrated on broad issues (e.g., the value of the external audit function, the 
extension of the auditor's role to include wider issues of efficiency and social 
accountability, etc.) to the virtual exclusion of consideration of the actual audit 
process. This orientation he considered to be one-sided and something of an 
obstacle to the development of worthwhile U.K. research. 
This view is widely shared among U.K. academic accountants and, indeed, 
is one with which I have much sympathy. The purpose, therefore, of this paper 
is four-fold: 
• To identify what auditing research has recently been carried out or is 
currently in progress in the U.K. 
• To consider why there has been relatively little auditing research in 
the U.K. 
• To consider to what extent the auditing research work carried out in 
the U.S. is directly applicable to the U.K. situation. 
• To consider where developments in U.K. research effort may be of 
most benefit both for the U.K. 's own needs and in complementing 
the work of U.S. researchers. 
Current Research Activity 
Appendix 1 details the results of a recent survey of U.K. universities and 
polytechnics designed to establish the level of interest in auditing research and 
to ascertain current and recent research interests. Appendix 2 lists recent 
work published in Accounting & Business Research and in Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, the principal U.K. academic journals containing audit 
research. 
Although the survey and journal review show that there is a certain degree 
of interest in auditing research (rather more in Scotland than the rest of the 
U.K.) and some projects have been completed, the overall impression is one of 
an academic accounting community for whom auditing is considered to be 
something of a sideline. The findings also bear out, with one or two exceptions, 
Johnson's contention that academic interest focuses on wide questions of the 
auditor's professional and social function rather than on more practical 
questions of identifying and improving suitable audit techniques. 
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The bulk of academic research in the U.K. is funded by the government via 
quasi autonomous research councils. The council concerned with the social 
sciences (the ESRC)* has shown some interest in auditing and acted as 
cosponsor (with Deloitte, Haskins + Sells) of a conference entitled "Auditing 
Research: Issues and Opportunities," the proceedings of which have been 
published (Hopwood et al, 1982). Apart from this activity, however, there has 
been no funding for any specific auditing projects in recent years. 
The U.K. academic establishment does not, of course, have a monopoly on 
research skills and interests. The large U.K. auditing firms have sufficient 
resources in terms of finance and personnel to carry out their own "in-house" 
research programs. Indeed, they may prefer to do their own studies when they 
perceive the possibility of commercial benefits deriving from advances in audit 
methods and techniques. Alternatively, they may undertake collaborative 
research under the aegis of the professional organizations in the U.K. such as 
the ICAEW or the CCAB. 
The question of the extent of research by U.K. professional firms was 
addressed in a series of discussions with the technical and technical develop­
ment partners and staff of the U.K. offices of large international firms (Gwilliam 
and Macve, 1982). (The specific views of one particular technical partner are 
also noted below.) To summarize, although the firms have an active interest in 
keeping abreast of the changing legal, commercial, and technical (particularly 
computing) environment within which they and their clients work—and are also 
seeking workable improvements to every day audit techniques (e.g., sample 
selection, internal control decisions, and methods of obtaining audit evidence 
such as analytical review)—they are carrying out little that could be described 
as "pure" or even "applied" research in these fields. Indeed they rather 
object to the use of the word "research" to describe their activity. 
The professional firms show even less interest in what they see as general 
and rather hypothetical questions as to the optimum level of the external audit 
function, being largely content to operate within the existing statutory 
framework (which in the U.K. requires all active registered companies to be 
audited annually). As to possible extensions to the audit role, their outlook is 
again strictly practical. Some interest is shown in the concepts of "efficiency" 
and "value for money'' auditing, but only in relation to the perceived expansion 
of the market for public sector, in particular local authority (i.e., local 
government) audits. (Currently, the great majority of these audits are carried 
out by "district auditors" who are central government employees. The 
present Conservative government is encouraging local authorities to appoint 
private sector auditors, and a number of them have now done so.) 
Auditing is, to be sure, an activity where it is difficult to secure for any 
length of time any commercial advantage derived from improved techniques 
and methods of operation. The free flow of personnel between firms, the 
review of working papers of other auditors, etc. make the retention of any 
benefit within one firm virtually impossible. This characteristic may act as a 
disincentive to research by individual firms but may encourage collaborative 
research projects, e.g., via the collective professional body which, for the sake 
of clarity, if not strict accuracy, I shall refer to as the ICAEW. The ICAEW, 
* See Appendix 3 for the full names of organizations given in acronym form. 
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which acts as the representative of the profession, might also be expected to 
be more interested in wider topics, e.g., the need to demonstrate to other 
sectors of the business community the benefits derived from audit or, say, to 
explore questions of auditor independence. 
The professional body has, in fact, recognized a need for research in 
auditing, and a number of projects have been commissioned. The Auditing 
Practices Committee (APC) (effectively—although not constitutionally—a sub­
committee of the ICAEW), which is primarily responsible for developing 
auditing standards and guidelines, has already sponsored projects on: 
• Statistical Sampling T. McRae 
(completed and published [1982]) 
• Analytical Review C. Westwick 
(completed and published [1981]) 
• Fraud D. Flint 
(report recently submitted) 
• Materiality J. Shaw and T.A. Lee 
(report recently submitted) 
Westwick is a former technical director of the ICAEW and is now with Arthur 
Andersen; the other four are academics, but both Flint and Shaw have been 
presidents of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland and Lee is its 
(part-time) research director. Following the appointment of Professor Bryan 
Carsberg as its part-time director of research, the ICAEW published a 
"Programme for Research" (Accountancy, May 1982) which includes certain 
specific auditing topics: 
• Guidelines for decisions in auditing. 
• The auditor's duty in relation to bribery. 
• The purpose and scope of the audit of a small company. 
• Judgmental sampling, statistical sampling, and audit scope. 
• Value for money auditing. 
A project on the last of these areas has recently been completed by J. Glynn at 
the University of Exeter. 
The ICAEW has also sponsored a survey of audit research which I am 
presently carrying out with Richard Macve at Aberystwyth. This survey is 
primarily a literature review covering the major U.K., U.S., and Australian 
research journals, together with a number of other sources, e.g., conferences 
and symposia, and the findings should be published later this year. Another 
ICAEW project with important auditing implications is that of Bhaskar and 
Williams at the University of East Anglia investigating the impact of micro­
processors on the work of small firms. This study has recently been 
completed. The ICAEW's growing interest in encouraging more research in 
auditing is also illustrated by its recent sponsorship of a conference on this 
theme at Manchester University. 
Overall then, the extent of U.K. auditing research, if not "minimal," has 
certainly been limited (e.g., of more than 20 articles published on "auditing" 
topics (broadly defined) in Accounting, Organizations and Society, all but two 
have been written by academics from North America, Israel, and Australia). 
There have been recent signs of a greater awareness of, and interest in, 
auditing research, but this has not yet been translated into an output of 
published work which remotely compares with that in North America. 
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Why Has There Been So Little U.K. Auditing Research? 
The first and most obvious reason is the relative lack of numbers of 
academic researchers within the U.K. There are approximately 300 U.K. 
academic accountants within universities (there are more in polytechnics, but 
the great majority of research takes place within the university sector). This 
figure compares with an estimate of approximately 5,800 academic accountants 
in the U.S. (Steele, 1983). The U.K. university accounting departments are 
recent in origin; until the 1950s, there was only one full-time chair of 
accounting (at the L.S.E.) in the U.K. Consequently, the opportunity for 
completed research has been limited until recently. 
The U.K. academic approach to accounting research has looked for its 
theoretical underpinning mainly to economics (Wells, 1983), but only recently 
has there been much in the way of a formal and coherent economic theory from 
which to appraise and evaluate the audit process. However, the development 
of "agency theory" and its application by U.S. researchers to auditing (e.g., 
Ng, 1978; Ng & Stoeckenius, 1979; DeAngelo, 1981; Chow, 1982) may now 
stimulate more intellectual interest in the U.K. 
It may also be a fact that the U.K. academic accountants are not so 
research oriented as those in the U.S. For example, only 15 percent of U.K. 
academic accountants hold doctoral degrees as compared with approximately 
45 percent in the U.S. (Steele, 1983). Although one needs to allow for 
differences between the two countries in university and professional examina­
tion structure, still the disparity is striking, and the conclusion that most U.K. 
academics have been less well trained in research methodology (particularly 
quantitative empirical methodology) than their U.S. counterparts seems 
inevitable. Just as U.K. academics have tackled relatively little quantitative 
accounting research of the "efficient market" type (Peasnell, 1981), so have 
they done little on the more quantitative theoretical or empirical topics in 
auditing research, e.g., statistical sampling, analytical review, and the effect on 
market prices of audit qualifications. 
As part of our survey of academic research interests (Appendix 1), we 
inquired as to whether respondents agreed that auditing was relatively under 
researched in the U.K. and, if so, why this was the case. The great majority of 
respondents agreed with the proposition that auditing was under researched in 
the U.K. and advanced a number of reasons, including lack of funding, the 
absence of "glamour" of the subject vis-a-vis other accounting questions, and 
also the status of many U.K. academic accountants who, as "unsuccessful 
refugees" from a professional world dominated by routine and mundane 
auditing, adversely perceive the benefits of auditing. Again, it would be unwise 
to take this argument too far, but it is true that the majority of U.K. academic 
accountants have worked in professional practice (approximately two thirds 
hold professional qualifications) and also that the majority of these left the 
auditing profession fairly soon after qualification. 
Most U.K. financial accounting research has concentrated on aspects of 
how to report the activities of a business entity and how such information is 
used by investors and other interested parties in their decision processes 
rather than on the processes by which the credibility of such information is 
attested to. In particular, the question of how best to provide useful 
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information during a period of rapidly changing prices has been the focal point of 
much of the research. That focus is not surprising since in the 10 years January 
1972 to January 1982, the U.K. index of retail prices increased nearly fourfold 
from 83 to 311. In one very real sense then, auditing research has been 
squeezed by the need for research in other areas seen as having overriding 
priority. 
Academic interests and perceptions may change for a number of reasons. 
One of the most important causes is purely economic: the availability of funds 
to enable major research projects to take place. To an outside observer, the 
U.S. appears to be amply endowed with funds for auditing research projects, 
much as London must have appeared to be paved with gold to the medieval 
English countryman. In the U.S., not only is there Peat Marwick Mitchell's 
ROA program (which is well into the second million dollars of financial support 
for auditing projects), but there are also doctoral and other programs 
supported by large firms and a generous supply of funds for colloquia, 
symposia, and ad hoc projects available from accounting firms, large and small. 
Contrast this with the situation in the U.K. Steele (1983) reviewed a four-
year period of ESRC grants running from October 1979 and concluded that, 
whereas approximately £150,000 of public money went into accounting 
projects, not a single project in the area of auditing could be identified. The 
Programme for Research of the ICAEW is being run on a shoestring budget 
with only about £40,000 per annum with which to cover the whole range of 
accounting research relevant to the profession. Much of this total has been 
devoted to the priority area of the inflation accounting debate, which despite, 
or because of, recently reduced levels of inflation, is still a matter of 
considerable controversy. 
Direct sponsorship from the professional firms is equally rare. There are 
isolated examples, e.g., Professor Skerratt at Durham University has carried 
out a study for Spicer and Pegler on the application of Bayesian methods to 
auditing, and Arthur Young McClelland Moores sponsor the research fellow­
ship at Southampton which has recently been filled by Raymond Johnson of 
Portland State University (although the fellowship is not restricted to those 
intending to carry out auditing research). However, overall the attitude of the 
professional firms was admirably summed up by Graham Stacy, Price Water-
house's national technical partner, who in his paper at the above-mentioned 
Deloittes/SSRC conference (Hopwood et al, 1982) identified the auditing 
research needs of the professional firms as follows: 
'The audit research needs of a professional firm can, I suggest, be 
grouped under three broad headings: 
1) the need to establish and maintain existing standards, 
2) the need to adapt to the external changes which affect its 
clients, and, 
3) the need to keep up with, and develop new audit techniques.' 
Stacy is of the opinion that for a professional firm these needs can be satisfied 
almost entirely from its own resources and, for a variety of reasons (familiarity 
with specific firm procedures, applicability to "real-world" auditing, and 
competitive confidentiality), he believes that most firms do indeed prefer to 
carry out their own research. 
The reluctance of U.K. professional firms to provide academic researchers 
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access to "real" audit data (including audit working papers) has, in itself, been 
an obstacle to the development of U.K. auditing research. Traditionally, 
barriers to third parties gaining access to actual audit data derive from the 
desire of the firm to protect the confidentiality of its relationship with its client. 
There may also be a "defensive" aspect to this reluctance to release working 
papers, i.e., a wish not to expose too widely auditing practices which might be 
at odds with those prescribed in the firm's audit manual and/or by professional 
standards. In the U.S. in recent years, there does appear to have been a 
degree of relaxation of this stance and, increasingly, research papers are being 
published based on access to real data, such as about the detection and 
treatment of matters requiring audit adjustments, the investigation of actual 
error characteristics in audit populations etc. 
Why then is the situation different in the U.S. where the professional firms 
do dispose of considerable sums for the support of academic auditing research 
and may also provide additional support in terms of access to personnel, data, 
and introductions to clients? Presumably, the question is one of costs and 
benefits. The perceived benefits (benefits which may have only a tenuous 
connection with the results of the research) may be greater, and the cost 
structures may be different, e.g., it may be cheaper for U.S. firms to employ 
external rather than internal researchers. 
With regard to the benefits, the interest of large U.S. accounting firms in 
auditing research may be conditioned as much by factors such as recruitment, 
image, and publicity as by any expected return from the results of the research 
work carried out. Particularly with regard to recruitment, the structures of the 
U.K. and U.S. university and professional training differ in a way suggesting 
that the U.S. professional firms have more to lose by not having a "high 
profile" on campus. One cost-effective means by which to achieve the desired 
profile may be to sponsor research activities by university teachers with the 
incidental expectation of some usable results. In contrast, while a graduate 
qualification is normal (although not necessary) to train and qualify as an 
accountant in the U.K. , the majority of graduates recruited will not have 
studied any accounting topics in their degree course. The impact of any 
university support by firms on recruitment is, therefore, likely to be much 
lower. 
External Influence 
Moreover, the 1970s were a period of considerable unease for the U.S. 
auditing profession; indeed, one past president of the AICPA christened them 
"the years of trial" (Olson, 1982). (This is not a universally held view, for 
Burton and Fairfield (1982) consider these years to have been part of a period 
in which "the auditing profession has experienced growing economic pros­
perity in a sheltered environment.") Criticism directed at the profession from 
within the business community and from farther afield following a series of 
spectacular business and audit failures culminated in investigations by Congres­
sional committees and increasingly aggressive action by the SEC. The 
provision of a significant amount of resources (such as the Peat Marwick 
Mitchell ROA Program) to an essentially public-spirited activity such as 
auditing research has helped, no doubt, to restore the public image of the 
profession. 
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It is true that the U.K. also experienced a significant number of major 
corporate failures in the early 1970s, particularly those associated with the 
1973 collapse in property values, and that in a number of these cases 
subsequent Department of Trade investigations asked searching questions as 
to whether suitable audit procedures had been used and appropriate judgments 
made. 
Nevertheless, public reaction against the auditing body as a whole was 
more muted than that in the U.S., and any governmental anxiety was paraded 
far less publicly. Consequently, the U.K. profession may not have seen any 
compelling reason to invest substantial sums in auditing research. 
Similarly, one might surmise that in the U.S. the costs of audit failure in 
terms of litigation and adverse publicity are greater than in the U.K. and that 
the U.S. firms see auditing research as both helping to prevent such failures 
and also as a useful "back-up" should it be necessary to defend in court 
specific procedures such as statistical sampling techniques and analytical 
reviews. 
In-House v Academic Research 
Turning to the relative costs of "in-house" and academic research, it is not 
clear, within the rather limited role for auditing research envisaged by Stacy, 
that academics have any comparative advantage. However, one would antici­
pate that where more rigorous study was necessary, the skills and training of 
academic researchers would allow results with greater validity to be obtained 
at less expense than by the use of in-house personnel with limited recent 
research experience. Nevertheless, U.K. firms may not see sufficient benefits 
to overcome their reluctance to give "outsiders" access to confidential data. 
One reason for this perspective may be that U.K. firms do not have the U.S. 
experience of peer review and are much less used to having nonfirm personnel 
investigating their working practices and methods. 
Finally, one has to allow for the differences in the "culture of giving" 
between U.K. and U.S. business organizations. Not only is the tax treatment 
of charitable (including educational) giving much less favourable in the U.K., 
there is generally a weaker sense of obligation to provide large amounts of 
"good citizen" support. It is interesting to note that in a recent report into the 
funding of the ESRC (Rothschild, 1982) which explored, inter alia, the extent 
to which accounting and business research could be funded by the accounting 
profession, the response of the profession to this suggestion was that 
government funding should continue as such research was of wide social 
importance and the profession had inadequate resources to pay for it (para. 
3.17). 
To summarize, there has been no growth in U.K. auditing research in the 
last decade to match the great expansion of interest that has occurred in the 
U.S. academic community. A lack of numbers, interest, and expertise among 
U.K. researchers has been matched by a lack of tangible support from the 
U.K. profession which has largely remained skeptical of the benefits of 
sponsoring research. There are, however, signs of a change of attitude and 
that interest is now developing. 
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To What Extent Is U.S. Research 
Directly Applicable To The U.K.? 
This question is important for two reasons. First, where the results of the 
U.S. research are directly transferable to the U.K. , then a priori it might be 
sensible for U.K. academics and professional firms to leave such research in 
American hands and to employ their limited resources in other, more profitable 
areas. Second, where the results are not directly transferable, a danger exists 
that U.S. firms may mistakenly "export" approaches and techniques that will 
be ineffective, or inefficient, outside the U.S. context—in such cases, research 
is needed in the U.K. to complement the U.S. work. 
The approach currently being followed in the U.K. , both by the professional 
bodies and by the individual firms, is largely to rely on U.S. work. This posture 
is not limited to auditing but applies also to accounting research and can be 
illustrated by two examples: in the case of the professional bodies, the 
monitoring by the ICAEW of the FASB's conceptual framework project: and, 
in the case of an individual firm, the adoption by Peat Marwick Mitchell in the 
U.K. of the SEADOC method of documenting and evaluating systems of 
internal control. 
With regard to the "conceptual framework," given the need to allocate 
their limited resources to the specific priority of inflation accounting and given, 
in any case, the absolute impossibility of matching or emulating the scale of the 
FASB's financial commitment to its conceptual framework project, the ASC 
commissioned a report (Macve, 1981) which relied heavily upon surveying the 
results as then available of the FASB's work. One does not have to be skeptical 
of the ultimate value of the conceptual framework project to appreciate the 
appeal of a low cost monitoring exercise of this nature. 
The introduction by Peat Marwick Mitchell in the U.K. of SEADOC is a 
good example of the manner in which the major U.K. accounting firms rely 
heavily upon their North American counterparts for the development of new 
audit techniques, e.g., the introduction of standardized audit sampling ap­
proaches, the introduction of methods of documenting and assessing internal 
control, and, perhaps most significantly, the introduction of audit manuals 
intended to be operational on a worldwide basis. 
The manner in which SEADOC was developed, tested, and introduced in 
the U.S. has been reported by Mock and Willingham (1983). SEADOC was 
developed out of research work on the variability of auditors' judgments with 
regard to internal control, with the twin aim of introducing greater consensus in 
such judgments within Peat Marwick Mitchell and of providing a more efficient 
set of procedures for internal control documentation than those in use. 
In such circumstances, an important question arises: To what extent is it 
necessary for U.K. firms to test and validate the conclusions of U.S. research 
in U.K. conditions? Indeed, this question is especially pertinent because it is 
not always clear whether such "imports" primarily benefit the U.K. firm 
(which can take advantage of the development costs incurred in the U.S.) or 
whether the changes in audit procedures and techniques in the U.K. are 
instigated by U.S. firms so as to ensure 1) compliance with U.S. auditing 
standards, SEC requirements, etc. for multinational companies and 2) also to 
obtain the benefits deriving from standardized procedures of quality control and 
freer movement of staff between countries. 
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As far as I am aware, no research has specifically addressed the issue, but 
it is important to ask what differences there may be between the U.K. and the 
U.S. auditing environments. 
The similarities are perhaps more obvious than the differences. Both 
economies are "mixed" in the sense of having significant private and public 
sectors operating alongside each other, albeit in rather differing proportions. 
As well, both economies are developed in the sense of having an advanced 
industrial base and a sophisticated financial community, although again the U.S. 
has a much greater GNP both absolutely and proportional to population. 
The development of multinational companies and, in particular, of U.S. 
subsidiaries operating in the U.K. together with the relatively free flow of 
capital between the two countries has helped to preserve the basic similarities 
of the systems of financial accounting and reporting in the two countries and the 
evolution of largely compatible sets of accounting and auditing standards. 
Within the profession itself, the leading firms in North America are closely 
identified with the leading firms in the U.K. Although, as noted above, there 
are differences in recruitment and training policies, these may be diminishing as 
the leading U.K. firms now almost exclusively recruit graduates, of whom a 
steadily increasing proportion have accounting degrees. Communication be­
tween offices and the transfer of personnel is greatly eased by the common 
language. 
Differences in Perceived Professional Responsibility 
In terms of general attitudes towards business and business ethics, there 
may be relevant differences, whether due to historical or other reasons. One 
interesting question is whether U.S. auditors are expected to carry out their 
duties of investor and creditor protection more rigorously than their U.K. 
counterparts because of differences in the legal framework within which the 
auditing profession operates. To take one example, to what extent is 
compliance with professional standards a sufficient defense against allegations 
of auditor negligence? In the (U.S.) Bar Chris case in 1968, the court stated: 
"Accountants should not be held to a higher standard than that recognized in 
their profession." 
However, in the case of U.S. v Simon in 1969, a criminal liability case, the 
judge stated that proof of compliance with generally accepted standards was 
"evidence which may be very persuasive but not necessarily conclusive that he 
acted in good faith, and that the facts as certified were not materially false or 
misleading" (see, e.g., Arens & Loebbecke, 1980). 
It seems unlikely that such a decision would be reached in the U.K. In the 
case of the Royal Mail in 1931 (see, e.g., Hastings, 1949), the auditor, a 
partner in Price Waterhouse, was acquitted of criminal charges in relation to 
the use by the client, a major shipping company, of "secret reserve 
accounting" (specifically the release of redundant provisions against excess 
wartime taxes) which gave a misleading picture of the trading results. A major 
part of the defense case was the fact that such practices were commonplace 
and accepted by the profession. 
Much more recently, the ASC obtained a written opinion from legal counsel 
on the meaning of "true and fair" (Accountancy, November 1983). U.K. audit 
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reports have to confirm that the accounts give a true and fair view of financial 
position and results, rather as U.S. reports confirm "fair presentation." The 
legal opinion was that "true and fair" in the eyes of the law is still essentially 
defined for practical purposes by the accounting standards that are generally 
accepted by the profession. One would expect, therefore, that a similar 
attitude would be taken in regard to the role of the auditing standards in the 
U.K. in setting out what may reasonably be expected of an auditor. 
Apart from the question of whether compliance with professional standards 
is sufficient to establish that the auditor has taken due skill and care in forming 
his opinion, there is the question of whether these standards differ between the 
U.S. and the U.K. It may be that the specific requirements in terms of the 
codified auditing standards, together with more stringent interpretations by the 
courts, suggest a requirement for a higher level of skill and care in the U.S. 
than in the U.K. For example, for many years the U.K. professional bodies 
lagged behind those in the U.S. in making audit procedures, such as attendance 
at stocktaking, normal audit requirements. More generally, as noted above, 
audit "failures" which might have aroused not only significant public concern in 
the U.S. but also action by private investors and/or regulatory bodies against 
the auditors appear to have been more readily condoned, if not accepted, in the 
U.K. 
Because of the very small number of recently decided U.K. cases 
concerning auditor negligence, it is not easy to provide evidence to support the 
assertion that a less exacting standard of skill and care is expected of the 
auditor in the U.K. However, my surmise is that on the facts of the 
"Hochfelder" case (Schnepper, 1977) a U.K. auditing firm would not have 
been found negligent regardless of considerations as to whether a duty of care 
was owed to the plaintiffs (although the recent Australian case Simonius 
Vischer [Davison, 1982] appears to imply a similar need to identify internal 
control weaknesses). 
While U.K. courts might take a narrower view of what the auditor's duties 
entail in relation to the formulation of an opinion, they probably take a wider 
view as to whom these duties might be owed. In the New Zealand case of Scott 
v Macfarlane in 1979 (Davison, 1982) and the U.K. cases of Jeb Fastners in 
1981 and of Twomax in 1982 (Keenan, 1983), the courts found there to be a 
duty of care to third parties who invested in the company on the strength of the 
audited financial statements, even though those parties were unknown to the 
auditor at the time of the audit. 
Institutional Differences 
Apart from legal differences, institutional differences exist between the 
U.K. and the U.S. Whereas it is probably true that overall the government 
intervenes more in the U.K. than in the U.S. economy, in the particular case of 
accounting and auditing, intervention is less in the U.K. The U.K. has no 
regulatory body with powers or influence comparable to that of the SEC. To 
take one example, the U.K. profession was largely free of the pressures 
generated in the U.S. by the passage of the 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act with the attendant suggestion, at the behest of the SEC, that there should 
be increased auditor responsibility for reporting on whether clients' internal 
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control systems were sufficiently strong to highlight such improprieties 
(Staats, 1981). 
Standard setting in the U.K. is still solely within the province of the 
professional bodies. Consequently, requirements for auditor independence, or 
its appearance, are less detailed than in the U.S. No provisions for peer 
review, mandatory or otherwise, exist; indeed, there have been no such 
reviews in the U.K., and discussions with professional firms elicited consider­
able antipathy to the idea. 
The absence of direct government intervention and influence on the 
workings of the U.K. accounting and auditing profession may well mean that 
there is correspondingly less impetus to develop standards that are acceptable 
throughout the profession or for the profession publicly to justify its perfor­
mance. 
Also, a number of specific practical differences in the audit environment are 
pertinent. To take some examples: 
• Even large listed U.K. companies do not have to publish quarterly 
figures, and U.K. auditors do not have to associate themselves in any 
manner with interim data. 
• The U.K. statutory external audit requirement covers all active 
limited companies, small or large. 
• Partly because of the more extensive audit requirement, the range of 
accounting systems encountered may be wider, e.g., more diverse 
computer hardware and software and, in particular, greater use of 
micro-computers. 
• U.K. auditors are accustomed to giving opinions on "current cost" 
accounts and, in certain circumstances, on profit forecasts. 
These environmental differences may render certain results and findings of 
U.S. research inappropriate in the U.K. For example, U.S. data related to such 
issues as materiality levels, duties in connection with internal control, and 
management impropriety might lead to uncompetitive "over auditing" if U.K. 
courts are less disposed to support allegations of negligence. Conversely, U.K. 
auditors may have to pay greater attention to the possible use of accounts by 
third parties. On a much more practical level, the use of regression packages 
for analytical review techniques may not be possible or efficient if detailed 
quarterly and monthly data are not available. 
One well known example of significant differences in the findings of similar 
research carried out in both the U.K. and the U.S. is that of the effect of audit 
qualifications on security market prices. Benston (1981) notes that "[s]tudies 
with U.S., Australian and U.K. data reveal that auditors' qualifications and 
exceptions generally do not appear to provide investors with information, with 
the exception of one study of U.K. companies." 
The study in question, that of Firth (1978)—to date the only empirical U.K. 
study of this topic—found there to be an instantaneous day-of-the-announce-
ment adverse price reaction to qualifications of a more serious nature, whereas 
other studies essentially found either no reaction (Baskin, 1972; Ball, Walker 
and Whittred, 1979) or that any reaction had been entirely subsumed by the 
market prior to the qualification announcement (Davis, 1982). (It should be 
noted, however, that the results obtained by Chow and Rice [1982] were more 
akin to those of Firth.) Further research is needed to establish whether this 
result reflects genuine differences in circumstances and perceptions (e.g., that 
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U.K. financial markets, despite their extreme concentration, are less efficient 
at acquiring and absorbing price sensitive information than those in other 
countries), or whether the result is explicable in terms of differing meth­
odologies between the various studies. 
U.K. Research: Needs and Future Directions 
I shall approach the question of future U.K. research needs in terms of 
three different sections or "steps." The first step is the need to translate, 
absorb, and, in one sense, catch up with the very considerable scope of U.S. 
research work already carried out. The second step is to "fill-in" those areas 
of U.S. research which need to be adapted to specific U.K. conditions. The 
third step is to identify those topics and related questions which are of greater 
interest in the U.K. than the U.S. and, accordingly, to develop appropriate 
U.K. research work. 
Translation of Existing Research 
The principal current activity in this area is my survey, carried out on behalf 
of the ICAEW and now nearly completed, of recently published and current 
auditing research. This survey is primarily in the nature of a literature review 
(including a bibliography) covering research published in the U.K., North 
America, and Australasia, but it also includes reports of discussions with those 
U.K. professional and academic accountants with an interest in auditing 
research. It is intended to be a useful reference for researchers, sponsoring 
bodies, and practicing firms. 
To attempt to summarize the extensive and wide ranging literature on 
auditing research is, however, an onerous task. Not only is the scale of the 
research work that has been carried out very large, it is also diverse in both 
content and methodology, and, in some instances, e.g., the research into 
statistical sampling, very technical in nature. In other instances, distilling 
practical implications is very difficult, especially where one suspects research 
to be proceeding along the lines of "solutions looking for problems" rather 
than vice versa. It is not, perhaps, surprising that the intention to include 
sectional summaries in the American Accounting Association's bibliography of 
auditing research has been abandoned. 
Nevertheless, we believe that producing such a survey is a worthwhile 
effort and, in particular, that it will be a valuable exercise in communication to 
accounting practitioners and professional bodies. If academic research in 
auditing is to have significant impact upon professional firms and practitioners, 
it needs to be communicated in a manner and language to which they are 
accustomed even if this "translation" requires some sacrifice of academic 
rigor. The communication gap is probably even wider in the U.K. than in the 
U.S., for the average senior practitioner has far less acquaintance with 
academic theory and the methodology of accounting and auditing research than 
his counterpart in the U.S. As yet in the U.K. , there are no research journals in 
either accounting or auditing including on a regular basis contributions from 
both practitioners and academics such as Auditing: A Journal of Practice & 
Theory. 
In covering what is primarily U.S. research work from an essentially 
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transatlantic viewpoint, our survey may have incidental benefits in terms of 
highlighting certain areas of U.S. research where positive results have not yet 
been achieved or where continued research is necessary to turn these results 
into practical applications. To take two examples: 
• Obtaining audit evidence by means of debtors and creditors circular-
izations: 
In the 1970s, a number of U.S. research studies (e.g., Sauls 
[1972], Hubbard & Bullington [1972], Warren [1974], Kinney and 
Warren [1979]), investigated whether debtor and creditor circulariza-
tions produced reliable audit evidence and also which of the various 
types of confirmation (positive, negative, or blank) were most cost 
effective in gathering such evidence. Sorkin [1979] added an "ex­
panded field" (essentially a multiple choice) type of confirmation. 
This type of research is essentially practical in nature and, therefore, 
of great interest to practitioners and audit standard setters. How­
ever, before accepting unreservedly the apparent implications of 
these studies (e.g., that of Kinney and Warren [1979] that, given 
certain assumptions, negative circularizations are most cost effec­
tive), practitioners would probably like to see further work carried 
out to ensure that the costs of the various methods of circularization 
and attendant follow-up work are in fact realistic and, also, to ensure 
that the attributed costs of wrongly rejecting an accounts receivable 
total that, in fact, contains no material error and those of accepting a 
materially erroneous figure are related to those pertaining in prac­
tice. Similarly, with regard to the improvements in response and 
accuracy rates reported by Sorkin (1979) derived from the use of 
"expanded field" circularizations, one would like further evidence on 
how far the improvements are sustainable or are occasioned by the 
novelty of the format to the respondents. 
The studies also need to be further extended beyond their 
present concentration on financial institutions and on quite small 
personal balances "seeded" with errors of 10 percent or less. To 
generalize the results to a wider range of audit conditions, it would be 
desirable to examine circularizations in the context of manufacturing 
and commercial organizations with large corporate debtors and 
creditors (one immediate difference being the absence of direct 
financial involvement of the respondent). It is interesting to note that 
one study (Hubbard & Bullington, 1972) with a proportion of 
corporate debtors suggested that both the response rate and the 
accuracy of the response differed between corporate and individual 
debtors, although the relatively small number of corporate debtors in 
the sample prevents much reliance being placed upon this finding. 
• Audit techniques for detecting management fraud: 
This is another area of considerable practical interest, and one 
which has been the subject of at least two major studies in recent 
years, e.g., those of Albrecht et al (1980) and of Sorensen et al. 
(1983). These studies have been painstakingly thorough: Albrecht et 
al reviewed over 1500 literature sources and also wrote to over 400 
prisons as well as to every state and federal probation and parole 
department in the U.S. and Canada. Both studies make use of the 
idea of "red flags" as indicators to the auditors of possible manage­
ment impropriety (auditors have traditionally used "red flags," but in 
a rather more ad hoc manner, e.g., greater audit care would be 
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employed if the auditor knew management or key personnel to be in 
personal financial difficulty, prone to gambling, drink, etc.). 
However, at this stage of the development of these studies, 
questions of the predictive power of "red flags" (individually or in 
combination) and of the costs of obtaining suitable information have 
not been addressed in a way which enables immediately practical 
conclusions to be derived (e.g., if the managing director of a company 
is a compulsive heavy gambler, this behavior might be a good 
predictor of possible impropriety; however to ascertain, other than 
by hearsay and chance, details of the private life of the managing 
director is likely to necessitate the services of enquiry agents and to 
be extremely expensive). 
To illustrate this problem in the U.K. context, one of the most 
successful schemes of management fraud this century was that 
perpetrated by the chairman and secretary, Harold Jaggard, of the 
Grays Building Society (Accountancy, July 1979). Until his suicide at 
the age of 79, Jaggard had apparently systematically defrauded this 
relatively small "savings and loan" society for 50 years to the extent 
that at the time of his death there was a shortfall in the accounts of 
nearly £7 million (approximately 50 percent of total investors' funds). 
Although the exercise of proper auditing procedures would have 
uncovered the misappropriations of cash at a much earlier stage, it is 
not certain that the use of "red flags" with regard to the personal 
habits of Mr. Jaggard would have initially indicated the possibilities of 
fraud. The official enquiry (Davison and Stuart-Smith, 1979) con­
cluded that the majority of the cash (£2 million) taken was lost in 
unsuccessful gambling: "We believe it all went to his family in 
relatively small amounts, and to bookmakers in large sums of cash." 
However, to the auditors, Mr. Jaggard presented a rather colorless 
character, and it is highly unlikely that his lifelong habit of consuming 
a cheese roll and half a pint of light ale at lunchtime would have 
alerted any suspicions or waved any "red flags." 
Application of U.S. Research Findings to Specific 
U.K. Circumstances 
The second stage of U.K. research must be to complement that already 
carried out or in progress in the U.S. so as to take into account the various 
differences between the auditing environments outlined above and to explore 
how these affect the valid application of U.S. research findings to U.K. 
conditions. To take some examples: 
• Agency theory and the role of auditing: 
Historical studies of the development of voluntary and mandatory 
auditing would both usefully supplement the work carried out in the 
U.S. and also identify any factors peculiar to the U.K. The U.K. has 
had a longer experience with a compulsory audit requirement. Such a 
measure was first introduced in 1844, although it was withdrawn in 
1855 and not fully reintroduced until 1900. These studies might 
further investigate the role of "crises," e.g., nineteenth-century 
bank and insurance failures contributing to the perception of the need 
for government regulation (Tricker, 1982). 
Work of this nature might also consider the widespread use of 
"secret reserve" accounting in the U.K. in the 1920s—a phenome-
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non apparently not paralleled in the U.S. The approval by auditors of 
such practices appears at odds with their supposed role in ensuring 
that management does not bias and coarsen financial information and, 
perhaps, suggests that, at least at that time in the U.K., the auditor's 
behavioral impact on the honesty and propriety of management 
actions was seen to be of more importance than the information value 
of the signed accounts. 
More widely, examination of comparative sociological research 
into the development of the professions in the two countries may give 
further insights into differences in their role, social status, and 
attitudes to professional standards. 
• The impact of audit qualifications: 
Given the different results obtained by Firth in his study of the 
impact of audit qualifications on market prices as compared with the 
majority of results obtained from similar studies in the U.S. and 
Australia, further research work would be of benefit in determining 
whether this difference was caused by environmental differences or 
by reasons associated with the way in which the study was con­
ducted. U.K. auditors attach great importance to decisions as to 
whether or not to qualify a set of accounts, and it is possible, although 
a priori not very probable, that this preference reflects a greater 
economic importance of such decisions in the U.K. as exemplified by 
market reactions. 
• Duties in relation to fraud, bribery and client illegal acts: 
If I am correct in suggesting that the public at large, the investing 
public, and the courts in the U.K. take a less stringent view of the 
auditor's responsibility for the detection of management fraud and of 
the auditor's duty to uncover and draw attention to questionable 
payments, then auditing techniques and levels of auditing appropriate 
in the U.S. might be unsuitable in the U.K. Take for example the 
"red flag" indicators referred to above. Whereas in the U.S. it may 
in certain circumstances be considered cost effective for the auditors 
to employ private investigators to obtain information regarding the 
lifestyle and past history of key personnel, it is unlikely that this step 
would be considered necessary in the U.K. 
This area of auditors' duties and responsibilities is one of direct 
interest to practitioners, and the topic of bribery in particular is to be 
covered by the ICAEW as part of the "Programme for Research" 
outlined above. The APC, which sponsored Professor Flint's study 
on the question of fraud, is currently setting up a broad-based group 
including practitioners, academics, and lawyers to consider further 
the practical implications. 
• Costs and benefits of U.S.-developed auditing techniques: 
More generally, it is important that U.K. professional firms 
explore in detail possible differences in the structure of costs and 
benefits prior to the adoption of new audit procedures and techniques 
"imported" from the U.S. Advances in such areas as sampling 
techniques, analytical review, computer auditing and computer ap­
plications, and circularization of confirmation requests need to be 
critically reviewed in the context of (1) differing audit risks in the 
U.K. (e.g., in terms of potential liability and damages), (2) differing 
costs (e.g., it is probable that the relative cost of junior audit staff is 
much less in the U.K. than the U.S.), (3) differing time pressures 
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(e.g., U.K. companies may be prepared to accept a longer delay 
between the end of the reporting period and the publication of audited 
accounts), and (4) more limited availability of data which may restrict 
the application of multiple regression-based analytical review tech­
niques and similar procedures. 
• Intercountry conformity: 
Indeed, one important research topic in itself is that of determin­
ing just how important are these differences and of investigating to 
what level auditing practices can be and are being successfully 
harmonized on a worldwide basis. A study (similar to that of Cushing 
and Loebbecke comparing audit methodologies between firms) could 
usefully be carried out comparing auditing practice between various 
national offices of one firm. Such a study would be of particular 
interest and value to those firms which have recently introduced or 
are contemplating introducing "world" audit manuals and should 
offer great potential for collaborative projects between U.S. and 
U.K. researchers. 
Areas of Specific U.K. Interest 
For various historical, institutional, environmental, and other reasons, 
there are a number of auditing areas of particular interest to the U.K., and it is 
here that there is special scope for the U.K. to take initiative in the 
identification of research topics and carrying out such research. 
• The audit of small businesses: 
Every U.K. company registered with limited liability requires 
annual external audit (unless dormant). Page (1981b) suggests that 
there are approximately 300,000 active small business entities 
requiring external audit. Recently much debate has been occasioned 
within the U.K. profession concerning the wisdom of such an all-
embracing audit requirement (APC, 1979), a requirement which 
contrasts with that in the U.S. where only listed companies are 
normally compelled to have an external audit. There is scope for 
research, sponsored either by the profession or perhaps by the 
collective organizations representing business interests (e.g., the 
CBI and the Institute of Directors), to identify the particular needs of 
small businesses and of their shareholders, creditors, and other 
interested parties in terms of audited financial information and of 
whether a "review" function might satisfy these needs more 
appropriately than a full audit. 
Such studies might also explore in the small business context the 
relationship between the external audit function and the auditor's role 
in the provision of management advice, assistance with the raising of 
finance, the provision of taxation advice, and accounting services. In 
essence, then, studies of this kind would follow forward on the work 
begun by Page (1981a, 1981b). 
The questions of how best to cater to the needs of small business 
and how to overcome the particular problems associated with the 
audit of small businesses (for example, reduced levels of internal 
control/segregation of duties and excessive reliance on management 
representations) are not, of course, specific to U.K. (the AICPA has 
recently published a research monograph on the problems encoun­
tered in such engagements [Raiborn, 1982]); however, the nature of 
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the general U.K. audit requirement makes these matters of particu­
larly pressing interest to U.K. researchers and professional firms. 
• Association with forecast information: 
This is an area of special interest to the U.K. profession, as 
reports on profit forecasts made in takeover situations are already 
required. While the formal report is currently limited to attesting that 
the forecast calculations have been prepared in accordance with 
reasonable and consistently applied accounting policies, in practice 
the auditor will devote much time and effort to ensuring that all the 
assumptions on which the forecast is based are reasonable. Now that 
the SEC and the AICPA (1982) have relaxed their earlier restrictions 
and some research has begun in the U.S. (e.g. Danos & Imhoff, 
1982a, 1982b, 1983), research into the U.K. experience should be of 
particular interest. 
• Public sector auditing/"Value for Money" auditing: 
U.K. auditing firms have, in recent years, become increasingly 
involved in the work of auditing local government and public utilities 
(such as the water boards) as an addition to their more traditional role 
in the audit of nationalized industries and public corporations. Audits 
of this nature, particularly those of the local authorities, contain 
aspects of efficiency and value for money auditing in addition to the 
requirements of a normal financial audit. Consequently, there is an 
incentive for the development of research studies in this area so as to 
extend the work already carried out by Glynn, Tomkins, and others 
(see Appendix 1). 
There has been U.S. research work on these topics, e.g., 
Robertson & Clarke (1971); Smith, Lanier & Taylor (1972); Nor-
gaard (1972); Uecker (1977); Churchill et al. (1978); Charnes & 
Cooper (1980); however, it is probably fair to say that the issues 
have not received the prominence in terms of academic attention and 
publication in the major journals that other auditing issues have. This 
may be a reflection of a lack of interest in these matters among the 
U.S. professional firms, which has carried through to the teaching 
curricula for university and professional examinations. As an illustra­
tion, one might contrast the contents of two recent auditing text­
books. In the U.S., Auditing: An Integrated Approach (Arens and 
Loebbecke, 1980) contains 22 chapters, none of which consider in 
detail the particular needs of public sector auditing, whereas, in the 
U.K., Auditing and Accountability (Sherer and Kent, 1983) contains 
15 (rather more brief) chapters, no less than seven of which 
exclusively address topics concerning a wider role for auditing and 
public sector auditing. Too much should not be read into this 
comparison in that Sherer and Kent (aimed at university courses) is 
not fully representative of the average U.K. textbook aimed at 
professional courses. Books such as Woolf [1982], Pratt [1983], etc. 
are predominantly system and technique oriented within the context 
of auditing private sector clients. However, the contention that U.S. 
research work has concentrated on areas other than those related to 
public sector auditing would appear to be borne out by Richard 
Brown's words at the last University of Kansas auditing symposium 
(1982): 
"I detect a great lack of interest at our univer­
sities in addressing these kinds of issues in govern-
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mental accounting and auditing. . . . The business 
schools seem to have a preoccupation with public 
accounting and with financial auditing, and do little or 
nothing for the rest of us in accounting and auditing. 
. . . Courses in performance and operational auditing 
are lacking. A little attention may be given to man­
agement or operational auditing, but there is almost 
no coverage of program results or of effectiveness 
auditing. . . . Indeed, the whole development of 
performance auditing and evaluation in government 
has been far more a spontaneous groundswell on the 
part of policy makers than it has been a result of 
academic attention." 
• Reporting on current cost and inflation adjusted accounts: 
In the U.K. , the professional firms report on those accounts prepared in 
accordance with Statement of Standard Accounting Practice 16 which 
requires companies of a certain size to prepare adjusted accounts reflecting 
the effects of certain aspects of changes in the level of prices on their 
business. Unlike the situation in the U.S., these inflation-adjusted accounts 
may, at the client's discretion, be the only accounts produced, in which case 
the auditor has to determine whether they show a "true and fair view." In 
consequence, the U.K. professional firms have a direct interest in the 
problems of auditing inflation-adjusted accounts, e.g., the use of appropriate 
indices to obtain realistic current asset values and depreciation charges. 
Research into their experiences in this field and in the more general 
problems of this kind of attestation would add another perspective both to 
the "inflation accounting" debate and to questions as to further extensions 
of the auditor's attest function. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The U.K. has been an "underdeveloped area" in auditing research by 
comparison with the U.S. While a number of factors have contributed to the 
relative lack of interest both from academic researchers and from practicing 
firms and professional bodies, in the last few years a change of attitude has 
been observed, and interest is increasing. 
It is pertinent to consider the similarities and differences between the 
auditing environments in the two countries to assess the applicability of U.S. 
research to the U.K. My impression is that there are differences both in the 
general legal and regulatory framework within which auditing is practiced and 
also in the specific details of cost structures, data availability, and scope of 
work which need to be taken into account. This question itself deserves 
systematic research. For example, the evidence on the stock-market impact of 
audit qualifications in the two countries needs further investigation as does the 
situation in each country as regards auditors' liability. 
U.K. auditing research is, therefore, likely to develop on three main fronts. 
Initially, a need exists to distill the essence of the U.S. research achievements 
and to communicate these to U.K. researchers, practitioners, and professional 
bodies. This is the objective of my current survey for the ICAEW. It will also 
point up certain areas where further research in the U.S. is needed. 
The second stage is to complement the U.S. research by exploring what 
modifications of its results and implications are needed in the U.K. context, 
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e.g., in understanding the history of the development of auditing and the 
theoretical basis of its role in society; in allowing for different cost structures 
facing audit firms; and in adapting techniques for the differences in the nature of 
the work to be performed and of the evidence available. There is considerable 
potential here for collaborative research between U.K. and U.S. researchers in 
appraising the effectiveness of transatlantic harmonization of procedures and 
standards. 
Finally, U.K. research may be expected to explore areas where U.K. 
auditing experience has differed from that in the U.S., e.g., in regard to the 
public sector, small companies, forecasts, and current cost accounting. 
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Appendix 1 
Survey of Current U.K. Academic Research into Auditing 
This appendix reports the results of a survey of auditing research interests in 57 U.K. academic 
institutions. The initial survey was carried out in 1981, the institutions surveyed being those listed 
in the AUTA (Association of University Teachers in Accounting) Directory in 1979 or 1980. 
Consequently, the majority were universities although a number of the larger polytechnics were 
also represented. Fifty-five responses were obtained from the initial survey. Follow-up procedures 
based on the initial results and the AUTA directory for 1982 were carried out in 1984. (In 1984 the 
name of the AUTA was changed to the "British Accounting Association" ["BAA"].) 
UCW Aberystwyth: Currently carrying out a survey of audit research on behalf of the 
ICAEW (D. Gwilliam and R. Macve). Interest and publications in the field of audit failures as 
revealed by Department of Trade investigations (R. Macve). Research into the history of public 
sector auditing and a comparison of U.S. and U.K. models (G. Williams). 
UCNW Bangor: Current project on audit committees covering U.S. and Canadian experience 
and a detailed survey of practice in the U.K. (C. Brown). 
Bath: Interest and publications in the fields of value for money auditing in the public sector and 
of public sector auditing in general (C. Tomkins and I. Colville). Completed M.Sc. thesis 
"Comparative Study of Audit Methods and Procedures" (B. Emerton) and current research 
project entitled "An International Comparison of State Audit Office Attitudes, Values and 
Cultures" (P. Keemer). 
Birmingham Polytechnic: Interest and publications in the field of management audit (J. 
Santocki). 
Buckingham: Research into the historical development of auditing and audit reports (J. 
Mason). 
UC Cardiff: Interest and publications in the field of current developments in audit techniques 
and audit reporting (R. Chandler). 
City University Business School: CUBS has an "audit unit" consisting of A. Chambers, G. 
Selim, and G. Vintner. The unit is primarily concerned with internal auditing; however, there is 
also interest and recent publications in the fields of the audit of management information systems 
(A. Chambers and G. Selim) and public sector efficiency audit techniques (G. Vintner). Research 
and publications in the field of auditor's "going concern qualifications" (R. Taffler). Postgraduate 
research work includes the topics of systems audit and operational audit. 
Durham: Research in collaboration with Spicer and Pegler on the application of Bayesian 
methods in audit sampling (L. Skerratt); also research into the role of analytical review. 
East Anglia: Completed ICAEW project on the impact of microprocessors on small and 
medium sized practices (K. Bhaskar and B. Williams). Interest in a number of ideas concerned with 
auditing EDP systems, e.g., the audit of data base accounting systems. 
Edinburgh: Completd Ph.D. "An Identification, Evaluation and Development of the The-
oretical Framework of U.K. Company Audit Practices" (R. Ferrier). Ph.D. in progress (J. Innes) 
entitled "External Management Auditing." Research on the effect of external management audit 
on bankers' lending decisions. Research report on "Materiality in Accounting and Auditing" 
completed for APC (T. Lee). 
Exeter: Project completed on "Value for Money" auditing (J. Glynn). 
Glasgow: Survey on auditor responsibility with regard to the detection of fraud and 
irregularities completed on behalf of the APC (D. Flint). Research interest and publications in the 
fields of "value for money" audit, public sector auditing, peer review, auditing standards, audit 
committees, auditing theory and the significance of the "true and fair view," and social and ethical 
issues in auditing (D. Flint). Research interest and publications in the fields of auditing current cost 
accounts, audit committees, international auditing standards, and audit reporting (J. Shaw). 
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Heriot Watt: Completed project entitled "Audit Quality and Value for Money: Perceptions of 
Company Financial Management" (N. Lothian, 1983). 
Kent: Ph.D. completed entitled "Accountability and Audit in the Saudi Arabian Government" 
(B. Quota, 1977). Completed empirical research project investigating current practices in private 
sector management audits and consideration of future developments (P. Boys). 
Lancaster: Completed ROA project relating to international auditing standards (E. Stamp, in 
collaboration with M. Moonitz [Berkeley]). Recent paper on U.K. auditing research and publication 
on the levels of assurance issue (A. Steele). "Accountants' Professional Negligence" (J. Pockson) 
Macmillan, 1982. 
Liverpool Polytechnic: Research into "Public Sector: Systems Audit" (K. Wade; Wade has 
recently taken an appointment with the CIPFA). 
Liverpool: Interest and publication in the field of the market for audit services (R. Morris). 
Manchester: Research into the structure of the U.K. auditing profession (S. Turley and P. 
Moizer). Research (sponsored by the ICMA) on the quality of audits of small companies (S. 
Turley). Research on the use of procedures for establishing the extent of reliance to be placed on 
the work of other auditors (S. Turley, P. Moizer, and D. Walker [seconded from PMM & Co.]). 
M.Sc. research into materiality for audit purposes (K. Robson). 
Middlesex Polytechnic: Coauthorship of a recent paper analyzing audit fees on an 
international basis (P. Walton). 
Oxford Centre for Management Studies: Research interest and publications in the field of 
computer auditing (M. Earl and A. McCosh). 
Oxford Polytechnic: Research interest and publications in the field of computer auditing, 
particularly as applicable to local government (G. Holmberg). 
Sheffield: Research interest in the field of computer auditing (E. Lowe). 
Southampton: Research interest and publications in the field of auditing small companies (M. 
Page; Page is currently on secondment to the ICAEW). 
Strathclyde: Conference May 1984 entitled "Accountants' Professional Liability" (organized 
by C. Nobes and E . Minnis). 
Further information may be obtained either through: 
David Gwilliam 
The Department of Accounting, 
The University College of Wales, Aberystwyth SY23 3DB, Wales, U.K. 
or directly from the individuals and institutions concerned. 
Appendix 2 
Recent Auditing Articles in U.K. Research Journals 
Accounting & Business Research 
Issue Authors 
Winter 1970 Peter Bird 
Autumn 1971 David Flint 
Winter 
Winter 
Spring 
Winter 
Autumn 
Spring 
Summer 
1976 
1976 
1973 
1975 
1973 
1976 
1977 
(Israel) 
J. Santocki 
Ralph Estes & 
Marvin Reimer 
(U.S.) 
(Australia) 
Bruce Picking 
David Hatherly 
C. Nottingham 
M . Knoll 
G.W. Beck 
Title 
The Scope of Company Audit. 
The Role of the Auditor in Modern Society: 
An Exploratory Essay. 
The Role of the Auditor in 
Modern Society. 
Auditing Standards. 
Linking Internal Control and Substantive 
Tests: A Note. 
Conceptual Framework for Computer Audits. 
Auditor's Report—Society's 
Expectations and Realities. 
Meaning and Scope of Management Audit. 
A Study of the Effect of 
Qualified Auditors' Opinions 
on Bankers' Lending Decisions. 
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Accounting & Business Research (continued) 
Issue Authors 
Spring 1978 G.D. Pound 
(Australia) 
Spring 1979 David Hatherly 
Spring 1979 Ralph Estes & 
Marvin Reimer 
(U.S.) 
Autumn 1979 C. Wayne Alderman 
(U.S.) 
Summer 1980 G.D. Pound & 
J.K. Courtis 
(Australia) 
Summer 1981 Michael Firth 
Summer 1981 Frank Milne & 
Ron Weber 
(Australia) 
Winter 1981 Edward Blocher 
(U.S.) 
Winter 1981 John Y. Lee 
(U.S.) 
Winter 1981 Martin E . Taylor 
& Robert L. Baker 
(U.S.) 
Spring 1982 David Hatherly 
Autumn 1982 Alan G. Davison 
(Australia) 
Winter 1982 J.W. Martin & 
Gary J. Previts 
(U.S.) 
Autumn 1983 C.E. Arlington 
W.A. Hillison & 
P.F. Williams 
(U.S.) 
Winter 1983 Keith Houghton 
(Australia) 
Accounting, Organizations and Society 
1976- No. 4 
1977- No. 1 
1977-No. 1 
1977-No. 2 
1977-No. 3 
C. Medawar 
W.C. Uecker 
(U.S.) 
K.A. Wilcox & 
C. H. Smith 
(U.S.) 
J.G. Rhode 
J.E. Sorensen & 
E . E . Lowler III 
(U.S.) 
D. Lavin 
(U.S.) 
Title 
A Review of EDP Auditing. 
Segmentation and the Audit Process. 
An Experimental Study of the Differential 
Effect of Standard and Qualified Auditors' 
Opinions on Investors' Price Decisions. 
An Empirical Analysis of the Impact 
of Uncertainty Qualifications on the Market 
Risk Components. 
The Auditor's Liability: A Myth. 
Auditor-Client Relationships and Their Impact 
on Bankers' Perceived Lending Decisions. 
Regulation and the Auditing Profession in the 
U.S.A.: The Metcalf Sub-committee's 
Recommendations Re-examined. 
Assessment of Prior Distributions: 
The Effect on Required Sample Size in 
Bayesian Audit Sampling. 
A New Approach to the Levels of 
Assurance Issue in Auditing. 
An Analysis of the External 
Audit Fee. 
Accounting and Auditing Standards: 
Why They Are Inconsistent. 
Auditors' Liability to Third Parties for 
Negligence. 
The Risk Preference Profiles of Practising 
CPAs: Some Tentative Results. 
The Psychology of Expectation Gaps: 
Why is There So Much Dispute About 
Auditor Responsibility? 
Audit Reports: Their Impact on the Loan 
Decision Process and Outcome. An 
Experiment. 
The Social Audit: A Political View. 
An Enquiry into the Need for Currently 
Feasible Extensions of the Attest Function in 
Corporate Annual Reports. 
Role Discrepancies and the Auditor-
Client Relationship. 
Sources of Professional Turnover 
in Public Accounting Firms Revealed 
by the Exit Interview. 
Some Effects of the Perceived 
Independence of the Auditor. 
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Appendix 3 
U.K. Institutions referred to by abbreviations 
ASC The Accounting Standards Committee of the CCAB (formerly the Accounting 
Standards Steering Committee [ASSC]). Responsible for the development of ac-
counting standards ("Statements of Standard Accounting Practice" [SSAPs]) in 
Great Britain and Ireland. 
APC The Auditing Practices Committee of the CCAB. Responsible for the development of 
auditing standards in Great Britain and Ireland. 
CBI The Confederation of British Industry. An association representing employers. 
CCAB The Consultative Committee of Accountancy Bodies. Represents the professional 
accountancy bodies in Great Britain and Ireland, including the ICAEW. 
CIPFA The Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy. The professional body 
whose members are mainly employed in the public sector. 
ESRC The Economic and Social Research Council (formerly the Social Science Research 
Council [SSRC]). One of the government funded research councils which supports 
academic research on specific projects in the social sciences (including accounting). 
The government's "block grants" to individual universities are intended to finance 
teaching and the general research base. 
ICAEW The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales. The largest of the 
professional bodies whose members are authorized to carry out audits under the 
U.K. Companies Acts. 
ICMA The Institute of Cost and Management Accountants. The professional body whose 
members are employed mainly in industry. 
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Discussant's Response to 
Current Developments in United Kingdom 
Auditing Research 
John H . Fitzgibbon III 
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. 
Gwilliam's paper is interesting for two reasons. First, it provides a good 
account of the current status of auditing research in the U.K. and the reasons 
why U.K. research has been more limited than U.S. research. Second, the 
paper provides a basis for analyzing how future changes in the U.K. environ­
ment might affect the level and nature of research performed. 
The paper is divided into four sections: 
• A summary of research that has been done, 
• A discussion of why past research has been so limited, 
• A discussion of what U.S. research might be applicable in the U.K., 
and 
• A discussion of what research areas might be most beneficial for 
U.K. researchers to pursue. 
The primary focus of my discussion will be to expand on some of Gwilliam's 
comments and to provide my own views on the relative importance of some of 
the matters mentioned in the paper. 
Why Has There Been So Little U.K. Auditing Research? 
In some respects, the U.K. auditing environment is similar to the U.S. 
environment approximately 15 years ago. There apparently is very little 
external pressure on the profession to improve auditing techniques, and, 
therefore, very little money and effort is being expended on auditing research. 
Gwilliam's paper provides a comprehensive description of the characteris­
tics of the U.K. and the U.S. auditing research environments. For conven­
ience, I will group these characteristics into three categories—the academic, 
the auditing firm, and the general business environments. 
Academic Environment 
Gwilliam points out that the U.K. academic environment is not as conducive 
to auditing research as the U.S. environment. There are fewer accounting 
faculty, they are not as research oriented, and they are not as well trained in 
research techniques as their U.S. counterparts. Gwilliam also states that 
auditing research is not considered to be a prestigious activity and that funding 
for research is not generally available. All of these factors are disincentives to 
conducting contemporary auditing research, particularly in "high-tech" areas 
such as expert systems and decision aids. 
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It struck me as ironic that one of the reasons contributing to the low level of 
research in the U.K. is that many U.K. academics are former auditors who 
have become disenchanted with auditing. I would have expected that aca­
demics who are former auditors would be more interested in auditing research 
than other academics because of their awareness of the problems and issues 
facing auditors. 
Auditing Firm Environment 
Gwilliam points out that major U.K. auditing firms do not fund academic 
research to the same degree that their U.S. counterparts do. Major U.S. 
auditing firms provide a great deal of support for auditing research by funding 
specific projects, contributing to university accounting programs, providing 
support for doctoral students, and sponsoring research conferences. In the 
U.K., auditing firms provide very little such support. 
Gwilliam's paper asserts that U.S firms receive recruiting and public 
relations benefits from supporting academic auditing research and that funding 
might be provided for this reason. When Peat Marwick introduced its Research 
Opportunities in Auditing Program in 1976, its objective was to stimulate 
interest in auditing research and, thereby, to improve the profession. This is 
still the objective of the program, and significant progress has been made 
toward its achievement. Any recruiting or public relations benefits that Peat 
Marwick has received are fortunate side effects of sponsoring the ROA 
program. Therefore, while I agree that firms receive public relations benefits 
from sponsoring research, I do not think that these benefits are a primary 
motivating factor in deciding to provide funding. 
In the past, the U.K. and the U.S. used different approaches to profes­
sional training. In the U.S., university graduates with majors in accounting 
were hired. In the U.K. , the typical recruit had a liberal arts degree and 
received his accounting and auditing training after he was hired. The paper 
points out that since auditing research is not usually conducted at the 
universities where U.K. firms recruit, U.K. firms would not have been 
motivated by recruiting benefits to fund academic auditing research. I agree 
with Gwilliam's point. I also think it would be interesting to investigate the 
reasons for and the ramifications of the two training methods. 
As a part of his discussion of why U.S. accounting firms fund academic 
research more than U.K. firms, Gwilliam discusses the possibility that it might 
be less expensive for U.S. firms to pay academics to perform research than to 
do it themselves. I suspect that this is true, but I do not think that it is a major 
factor in funding decisions. Research grants are not usually restricted by the 
donors, the results of the research are the property of the researchers, and 
projects funded are selected based primarily on their academic merit. The 
possibility of an immediate research benefit to the funding firm is usually not a 
consideration. The lack of donor control indicated by these factors makes the 
estimation of any direct economic benefits very difficult. Because of the 
difficulty of measuring the benefits to the funding firm, I do not think that the 
relative cost of the two alternatives is a significant determining factor in the 
decision to fund academic research. 
Another reason cited for the relatively low level of research in the U.K. is 
the fact that researchers do not have access to audit working papers. It is true 
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that audit working papers contain a great deal of researchable data. However, 
the lack of working paper access does not explain the relatively low level of 
U.K. research because U.S. researchers have only limited access to audit 
working papers. Confidentiality of client data is one of the cornerstones of the 
auditing profession, and it must not be compromised. Therefore, academic 
access to working papers must continue to be limited. Occasionally, a firm 
releases data collected in connection with an internal research project for 
further analysis by the academic community, but such data are summarized or 
client-specific information is deleted so that confidential client data are not 
disclosed. 
An alternative to using working paper data for research is to have auditors 
provide judgments for cases based on hypothetical audit situations. In this 
manner, researchers can find out what auditors do in the field without 
reviewing working papers. Careful experimental design can help to ensure 
adequate external and internal validity, and this method has the benefit of 
providing information about how several auditors would react in similar 
circumstances. This stability of circumstances would be impossible to duplicate 
using client data from a number of different audit engagements. Research in the 
U.S. is often carried out in this manner, and U.K. researchers could also 
benefit from using this method. 
Two factors that Gwilliam does not mention are the relative size of U.K. 
and U.S. firms and the fact that the major international auditing firms practice in 
both countries. The major U.K. firms are smaller than the major U.S. firms. 
The major U.S. firms generally have larger staff operations than their U.K. 
counterparts and can make a larger commitment to developing their audit 
technology, becoming familiar with academic research activities, and funding 
academic research projects. Also, since "The Big Eight" are principal firms in 
both countries, the U.K. practices of these firms can benefit directly from U.S. 
research by adopting the technology of their U.S. practices. Both of these 
factors would limit the incentive for U.K. firms to engage in or fund auditing 
research. 
Business Environment 
The business environment in the U.K. is similar to that in the U.S. in many 
ways. The two countries share a common language and similar accounting 
practices, and both have well developed industrial bases and financial markets. 
However, the practice of auditing in the U.K. is somewhat different. In the 
U.K., a lower risk of litigation against auditors exists, there is less competition 
among auditing firms, and the government is not concerned with auditing 
matters. 
Gwilliam indicates that these factors may contribute to a lower level of 
concern in the U.K. about the efficiency and effectiveness of auditing 
techniques. While this may be true, I think that U.K. firms are interested in 
improving their auditing techniques. Even in the U.K. business environment, 
firms that are more efficient or more effective than their competitors will obtain 
competitive benefits in the long run. 
160 
U.K. Research: Needs and Future Directions 
A logical approach to conducting future auditing research in the U.K. is to 
review what has already been done elsewhere, use what is directly applicable, 
adapt what needs to be tailored to specific U.K. circumstances, and fill in any 
gaps between existing research and U.K. needs. Gwilliam suggests that this 
approach be used. 
One of the examples given of the direct adoption of U.S. research is the use 
of SEADOC by Peat Marwick's U.K. practice. SEADOC-Peat Marwick's 
method of documenting internal accounting controls—was developed primarily 
by its U.S. practice. However, Peat Marwick practices around the world were 
involved in its development to ensure that it would be useful in their 
environments. All audit decision aids used by Peat Marwick are developed 
under the review of Peat Marwick's Accounting and Auditing Committee, 
which includes representatives from major practices around the world. There­
fore, at least in the case of Peat Marwick, all products of U.S. research which 
are applied outside of the U.S. are carefully screened to ensure that they are 
applicable. 
Gwilliam identifies four areas as being of specific U.K. interest: audits of 
small businesses, forecasts, audits of public sector entities, and reports on 
inflation-adjusted balances. These areas were selected because the U.K. 
accounting profession presently places greater emphasis on them than the U.S. 
profession does. However, these areas are also of increasing importance to the 
U.S. profession. If U.K. researchers do perform research in these areas, the 
U.S. profession might reap some of the benefits of their efforts. 
Conclusion 
I hope that Gwilliam's paper will also be published in the U.K. and that 
U.K. researchers and auditors will read it carefully. Researchers should use it 
as a basis for determining which areas of research they should pursue. Auditors 
should use the paper to assess their present research positions and to assess 
whether, in the changing U.K. environment, they should increase their 
commitment to auditing research. Gwilliam points out that auditing research in 
the U.K. appears to be growing. His paper should provide a basis for guiding 
this growth and for stimulating further growth in the future. 
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7 
Let's Change GAAS!!! ??? *&#" @ 
Robert Mednick* 
Arthur Andersen & Co. 
Alan J. Winters* 
Louisiana State University 
How strange that when we hurl a man into the future, we take few pains to protect him from 
the shock of change. 
Alvin Toffler 
Future Shock 
This paper is about change, and change is almost always resisted and often 
controversial. We believe that this is as it should be. Proposed changes should 
not be blindly accepted nor casually dismissed. Rather, they should be exposed 
for careful evaluation, critical debate, and, we hope, constructive criticism. 
Consistent with that belief, we propose that the ten generally accepted auditing 
standards (GAAS)* be changed to prepare the auditor for the future and to 
provide some protection from the shock of the changes that future will bring. 
We think that this future has already struck auditing practice and is sending 
tremors through its bedrock—GAAS. Our proposal explains why change is 
necessary, what the change should be, and how it might be implemented. 
Why Change GAAS? 
Proposing to change GAAS (as the title punctuation suggests) is likely to 
trigger varying reactions ranging from heated criticism to enthusiastic endorse­
ment. Just where one falls on this continuum is determined by how strongly 
one agrees with the following views: (1) GAAS continue to provide an ample 
foundation for guidance on today's audit-related services, (2) audit services not 
contemplated by GAAS are improper and should be prohibited, and (3) GAAS 
are sacrosanct, i.e., standards by their nature are (or should be) immutable. 
Those at one extreme of the continuum find changing the ten generally 
accepted auditing standards repugnant and adhere tenaciously to one or more 
* The authors are members of the Auditing Standards Board's Levels of Assurance Task Force. 
Although some of the views the authors express in this paper were inevitably influenced by their 
involvement with the task force, these views do not necessarily represent those of the task force, 
Auditing Standards Board, or AICPA. 
* Throughout the paper our use of the term "GAAS" is intended to refer only to the ten generally 
accepted auditing standards. If the term is used in one of its broader connotations such as the ten 
standards and the SASs, or the ten standards, SASs, and customs of auditing practice, it will be 
specifically noted in the paper. 
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of these precepts. Others along the continuum may be skeptical and likely to 
hold one or more of these views but not as resolutely. Still further along the 
continuum are the curious who are more open-minded and inquisitive about the 
need to change GAAS, although they also may find any or all of these three 
notions tenable. At the other extreme of the continuum are enthusiasts for 
changing GAAS, of which we are two, who have views diametrically opposed to 
the three above. In fact, it is our rejection of these three views that makes us 
discontented with existing GAAS and prompts us to propose a change. 
GAAS Are Not Ample 
Our primary reason for advocating a change in GAAS is that those 
standards no longer provide a sufficient foundation for guidance on today's 
scope of audit services*. The current scope of audit services extends beyond 
the bounds of the standards. 
The proposition that the scope of audit services has outgrown GAAS is 
easy to substantiate. GAAS were formally adopted by the profession 36 years 
ago** as a public declaration of its conception of the auditor's responsibility for 
a single professional service—audits of historical financial statements. Re­
striction of GAAS to this single audit service is evident from the fact that the 
evidential matter standard and three of the four reporting standards refer 
specifically to financial statements. Even the context of the 43-page special 
report that first introduced the standards to the profession relates entirely to 
audits of historical financial statements.1 
In addition, the only audit service provided by the profession at the time the 
standards were developed and introduced was an audit of historical financial 
statements. These circumstances give historical legitimacy to the singular 
object of GAAS and make it illogical to conclude that GAAS were intended, or 
could be interpreted, to apply to any service other than audits of historical 
financial statements. 
Of course, GAAS have not shackled the expansion of audit services. 
Assurance is now being expressed on a variety of representations other than 
historical financial statements. This expansion also has taken a second course. 
Forms and levels of assurance other than that provided for in GAAS are being 
expressed. Examples of each of these expansions are abundant. CPAs audit 
internal control systems, specific elements of a financial statement, financial 
forecasts, computer software, Nielsen ratings, and various types of contests; 
all of which are representations different than historical financial statements. 
CPAs also provide assurance other than a positive opinion on such representa­
tions as historical financial statements, compliance with contractual or regula­
tory requirements, and internal accounting control. 
The restricted governing power of GAAS coupled with this expansion of 
audit services present four problems for the profession: (1) audit services exist 
* The term "audit services" is used to denote services that involve the basic elements of an 
audit—a CPA is engaged to examine and express assurance on the credibility of an assertion by one 
party for use by another party. Thus the expansion referred to excludes the growth of such 
services as tax and management consulting. 
** The first nine of the 10 standards were officially adopted by the AICPA's membership in 1948. 
The tenth standard (fourth reporting standard) was adopted one year later. 
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for which there are no general standards, (2) supposedly authoritative guidance 
(statements on auditing standards) has been established to implement some of 
these extrinsic audit services on the basis of inapplicable general standards, (3) 
inconsistencies exist among the presumedly authoritative statements on 
auditing standards for those other audit services, and (4) no standards exist for 
establishing guidance for future audit services. The gravity of these problems 
warrants further elaboration. 
Problem 1. GAAS were developed to provide standards for the audit of 
only one specific type of representation—historical financial statements. They 
were not fashioned in a manner that would restrict the types of other 
representations a CPA could audit. Thus, current audit services have evolved 
beyond the bounds of GAAS. Many of these services have no standards to 
govern their conduct (e.g., reporting on computer software). If the profession 
is to have a foundation from which to develop guidance for these services, new 
standards will be necessary. 
Problem 2. While some of these new audit services have no authoritative 
implementation standards concerning them, the remainder are subject to SASs 
of questionable authority. The Auditing Standards Board has issued a number 
of SASs pertaining to audit services for representations other than historical 
financial statements or for forms of assurance other than a positive opinion. For 
example, statements on auditing standards currently recognize and provide 
guidance for nearly 20 different limited assurance engagements with another 
engagement proposed in an SAS exposure draft.2 These SASs are ostensibly 
interpretations of GAAS but, in fact, concern audit services not contemplated 
by those standards and as a result extend GAAS. 
Some examples of SASs that have broadened GAAS are: SAS 14 concern­
ing special reports on elements of financial statements, agreed-upon pro­
cedures, and compliance with regulatory requirements; SAS 27 concerning 
required supplementary information; SAS 30 concerning internal accounting 
control; SAS 38 concerning comfort letters; SAS 42 concerning condensed 
statements and selected data; and SAS 44 concerning internal control of 
service organizations. 
If pronouncements regarding audit services for other than historical 
financial statements are to have legitimate authority, they must be based on a 
set of standards that encompasses those services. Since GAAS do not apply to 
those engagements, a new set of standards is necessary. 
Problem 3. In addition to being of questionable authority, the SASs 
pertaining to these other audit services also contain inconsistencies, ambigu­
ities, and fragmented professional requirements that contradict one another. 
These problems have occurred because GAAS were not intended to encom­
pass these types of audit services and, therefore, do not embody all of the 
concepts necessary for developing such guidance. Even though the Auditing 
Standards Board and its predecessors tried to implicitly interpret how GAAS 
should apply to these services, the standards they were interpreting were not 
designed to apply to those situations. Because GAAS lack the necessary 
conceptual foundation for such services, they have hindered the development 
of logical, clear, consistent guidance for them and have promoted discrepancies 
among SASs. If these discrepancies are to be reconciled, new standards will be 
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necessary to provide an adequate conceptual basis for guidance on these other 
audit services. 
Problem 4. Since GAAS are limited to audits of historical financial 
statements, they are impotent as authoritative guidance for future expansions 
of the audit function. If new audit services relating to representations other 
than historical financial statements are deemed appropriate, new standards will 
be necessary to provide guidance and ensure quality. If restrictions are desired 
on the types of representations on which auditors can express assurance, new 
standards will have to provide the basis for those restrictions. 
Audit Services Should Not Be Confined By GAAS 
An argument sometimes mounted against changing GAAS is that the 
profession should not provide any audit services other than those the standards 
currently contemplate—examination of historical financial statements. If audits 
were restricted to only that service encompassed by GAAS, no change in the 
standards would be necessary. 
Theoretically, this argument makes the profession forever hostage to 
GAAS by restricting the audit services CPAs can provide solely to positive 
opinions on historical financial statements. The restriction, however, ignores 
the emergence of auditing as a distinct discipline with legitimate applications 
beyond historical financial statements and flies in the face of existing practice 
and demonstrated public demand for new audit services. The argument's most 
damning flaw, however, is that its presumes that GAAS effectively put 
restrictions on expansion of the audit function. Yet, as explained in the previous 
section, neither GAAS nor any other professional standards limit the types of 
audit services that can be performed by public accountants. Thus, proponents 
of this argument would actually find it necessary to change GAAS to establish 
their desired restriction. 
Obviously, the profession has already sanctioned audit services beyond 
positive opinions on historical financial statements. The SASs referred to in the 
previous section illustrate how, by fiat, the Auditing Standards Board has 
expanded the audit function beyond that single service. Furthermore, in the 
absence of standards for determining appropriate expansions of the audit 
function, CPAs have been free to provide, and have provided, whatever audit 
services they deem consistent with their professional creed. Thus, the 
decision has already been made, both at the profession level and by many of its 
individual members, that audit services should be extended—possibly signifi­
cantly—beyond examination of historical financial statements. 
We concur with that decision. Auditing historical financial statements has 
become the CPA's birthright and the emergence of auditing as a discipline 
separate from accounting is the inherited legacy of that birthright. We believe 
that auditing has many legitimate applications beyond historical financial 
statements and that broader standards are necessary to assure the controlled 
development of these new audit services and to provide guidance for them. 
GAAS are powerless to provide that direction and guidance. 
GAAS Are Not Sacrosanct. 
Another argument that is sometimes raised in opposition to any proposed 
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change in GAAS is that standards are too fundamental to be changed. The 
essence of the argument is that, once established, standards become the 
profession's constitution and that any tampering with that constitution erodes 
the profession's credibility, implies that the previous standards were faulty, 
and marks a change in the fundamental nature of the audit function. 
No set of standards is immutable. Constitutions should be and have been 
amended when the need is demonstrated and justified—so should GAAS. A 
profession's standards and its services must be commensurate with each 
other. In fact, it is the incongruity in these two areas that erodes credibility by 
creating potential pitfalls in the performance of professional services. Stand­
ards either must be broad enough to provide for the legitimate evolution of 
professional services or evolve along with them. Our standards have remained 
static while our audit services have mutated. 
Changing GAAS would not imply that GAAS were faulty. Indeed, GAAS 
admirably serve their intended purpose, and, if the audit function were to be 
restricted to positive opinions on historical financial statements, we would not 
propose any change in the standards. GAAS must be changed because they fail 
to accommodate the legitimate expansion of audit services; not because they 
are internally flawed. 
Finally, new standards would not have to alter the fundamental nature of 
auditing. They would simply align with (and perhaps reconcile) contemporary 
practice and provide for the logical, controlled progression of auditing's role in 
society. In fact, without new standards, auditing's future development will be 
subject to caprice and improvisation, almost certainly altering its fundamental 
nature in an undesirable manner. 
What Should the Change Be? 
Change can occur in a multitude of forms and degrees. While we advocate 
the change in GAAS, we believe that GAAS provide a valid model for new 
standards. Therefore, the changes we recommend are fundamentally revisions 
and adaptations of GAAS to provide a framework comprehensive enough to 
direct, accommodate, and endure the evolution of auditing into areas other than 
positive opinions on historical financial statements. 
We believe that sufficiently comprehensive standards must provide basic 
guidance to the profession concerning the following questions. 
1. Under what circumstances can an auditor provide assurance on an 
assertion? 
2. What form(s) of assurance can and should an auditor provide? 
3. How many levels of assurance can and should an auditor provide? 
4. Is there a minimum scope of involvement below which no assurance 
should be permitted? 
5. What scope of involvement is necessary to enable an auditor to provide 
a given level of assurance? 
6. What should be the structure and wording of an auditor's report in 
specific assurance engagements? 
7. What, if any, different requirements should exist for engagements 
designed to provide assurance to the general public versus those solely 
for the benefit of specified parties who participate in establishing the 
terms of the engagement? 
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The proposed attest standards (PAS) that follow are organized in the same 
broad categories as GAAS. Some of the PAS are discussed only briefly because 
they do not differ significantly from their GAAS counterpart. Therefore, we 
believe, any objection to them would also pertain to GAAS. 
Those PAS that do introduce potential controversy unique to their nature 
are accorded more extensive discussion. The terms "attest" and "attester" 
are used with some trepidation. We are aware that the terms imbue the 
auditor's role with an aura of exactitude that the profession does not claim. We 
use the term primarily as a means of distinguishing the auditor's role under 
GAAS from his expanded role as a provider of various forms and levels of 
assurance on various types of representations; not to impose a responsibility 
for increased accuracy on the auditor. The Appendix contains a listing of PAS 
and compares them with GAAS. 
General Standards 
(1) The Engagement Shall Be Performed by a Person or Persons Having 
Adequate Technical Training and Proficiency as an Attester. 
This is the existing first general standard modified to be appropriate for 
different representations and levels of assurance. It recognizes attestation as a 
separate discipline with a common body of knowledge. This standard protects 
the client and user of the representation by requiring that the attester be 
capable of providing the contracted service. It effectively requires that the 
attester meet the uniform education, experience, and examination require­
ments of the profession. 
(2) The Engagement Shall Be Performed by an Attester or Attesters Command-
ing Competence in the Subject Matter of the Assertion on Which Assurance Is To 
Be Provided. 
This is a new general standard. It is necessary because, as the marketplace 
extends and broadens the attest function into new areas, attesters will become 
involved with representations that are outside today's most widely recognized 
area of a public accountant's technical competence—accounting. 
This standard would not necessarily require the attester to personally 
acquire expert competence in the subject matter reported on. It requires that 
the attester "command" that competence. Interpretive statements of this 
standard could discuss the use of specialists in a manner similar to SAS 11 and 
SAS 48 (revision of SAS 3 recently approved by the Auditing Standards Board). 
The latter provides that an auditor with final responsibility for the engagement 
must be sufficiently competent in EDP matters to (a) communicate the 
objectives of the computer audit specialist's work and (b) review the results of 
his work to assure that the objectives have been met. 
The Auditing Standards Board (or another AICPA authorized body) also 
could issue, from time to time, interpretive statements to indicate those 
particular subjects which it believes attesters are in general competent (or 
incompetent) to independently evaluate. This standard and the one that follows 
are necessary to set general boundaries for the attest function. Without them, 
such boundaries will be established solely by such external factors as the 
marketplace, statutory or regulatory constraints, and general public policy. 
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(3) The Attester Shall Accept an Attest Engagement Only If He or She Has 
Reason To Believe the Following Two Conditions Exist: 
• The assertions must be capable of evaluation against established and 
recognized criteria or, in their absence, against reasonable criteria that 
are stated in the presentation of the assertions in a sufficiently clear and 
comprehensive manner for a reader to be able to understand them and 
determine if they are relevant for his or her purposes. 
• The assertions must be capable of reasonably consistent estimation or 
measurement; that is, competent people using the same or similar 
measurement or disclosure criteria should obtain materially similar 
estimates or measurements. 
This is a new general standard. It is necessary to ensure that attest 
engagements are performed only when they can be effective and useful. It 
requires attesters to have a reasonable basis for believing that they are capable 
of providing meaningful assurance on the assertions before accepting an attest 
engagement. 
As the marketplace increasingly demands the expansion of the attest 
function into new areas, situations will arise in which attesters are asked to 
become associated with assertions on which they may not be capable of 
providing assurance. This standard is desirable because it will force attesters 
to focus on the question of their ability to provide meaningful assurance before 
an engagement commences, thereby protecting the client, users, and the 
public. For the same reason, it will help assuage potential fears of regulators 
about imprudent expansions of the attest function. 
The first condition in this standard requires the attester to have criteria 
against which to evaluate assertions. However, in new attest areas, there may 
be no established or recognized criteria for this purpose. Consequently, this 
standard permits the attester to attest to assertions using stated criteria that 
are clear and comprehensive enough to permit readers to understand them and 
assess their relevance for their own purposes. Failing to permit this would 
result in a standard so rigid that all experimentation in new attest areas would 
effectively be prohibited. Indeed, such common existing services as compila­
tion and review of financial forecasts and projections would have been 
prohibited. 
The second condition in this standard ensures that the assertion is capable 
of reasonably consistent estimation or measurement. It also sets boundaries on 
the types of assertions subject to the attest function. 
This condition prohibits an attester from providing assurance on represen­
tations that are so subjective that the attester's assurance would add no 
credibility to the representation and thus be meaningless to an informed user. 
(4) In All Matters Relating to the Attest Engagement, an Independence in 
Mental Attitude Shall Be Maintained by the Attester or Attesters. 
This is the existing second general standard with the words "assignment" 
changed to "attest engagement," "is to" changed to "shall," and "auditor or 
auditors" changed to "attester or attesters." It does not contain any 
substantive differences from its GAAS counterpart. 
(5) Due Professional Care Shall Be Exercised in the Performance of the 
Engagement and the Preparation of the Report. 
This is the existing third general standard with the words "is to" and 
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"examination" changed to "shall" and "engagement." This standard recog­
nizes the profession's obligations to users and does not substantively differ 
from its GAAS counterpart. 
Standards of Field Work 
(1) The Work Shall Be Adequately Planned and Assistants, If Any, Shall Be 
Properly Supervised. 
This is the existing first standard of field work with the word "shall" used 
in place of "is to" and "are to." Some would argue that this standard is 
unnecessary because it is subsumed by the proposed second field work 
standard and is, therefore, redundant. Those individuals also believe that this 
standard is primarily related to efficiency and that, because the market forces 
attesters to adequately plan their engagements to be as efficient as their 
competition, this standard is unnecessary for purposes of protecting the users 
of attest reports. 
We believe, however, that a significant aspect of this standard relates to 
the effectiveness of the attestation procedures. Requiring consideration of the 
adequacy of procedures only near the end of an engagement (as the second 
proposed field work standard requires) is not as useful in assuring the 
effectiveness of the attest procedures as this standard. 
(2) Sufficient Evidence Shall Be Obtained To Provide a Basis for the Assurance 
That Is To Be Communicated in the Attest Report or To Comply with the 
Arrangements Made with Specified Users. 
This is the existing third standard of field work modified to be appropriate 
for different levels of assurance and various types of assertions. It also covers 
engagements tailored to meet the needs of specified users who have partici­
pated (directly or through a designated representative) in the establishment of 
the nature and scope of the engagement. 
We believe this standard encompasses the study and evaluation of internal 
control because this study is an element of accumulating sufficient evidence. 
Thus, we do not deem it necessary to have a separate field work standard 
concerning internal control. 
Because this standard requires sufficient evidence, it raises the overriding 
and complex question of what the scope of the attester's work should be on a 
given attest engagement. Furthermore, this question is even more significant 
today than in the past in view of the expansion of the attest function to new 
types of assertions and different levels of assurance. Consequently, we will 
discuss this standard in somewhat more depth than the previous ones. 
The nature and extent of the procedures that may be applied on any 
particular attest engagement is relatively broad. In establishing a proper mix to 
appropriately restrict attestation risk,* the following generalizations about the 
validity of evidential matter are cited in the existing auditing literature: 
• Evidential matter obtained from independent sources outside an 
entity provides greater assurance of reliability for the purposes of an 
attest engagement than evidential matter secured solely within an 
entity. 
* Attestation risk is the risk that the attester may unknowingly fail to appropriately modify his or 
her attest report on assertions that are materially misstated. It consists of (1) the risk (consisting 
of inherent and control risk) that the assertion contains errors that could be material, and (2) the 
risk (detection risk) that the attester will not detect such errors. 
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• Assertions developed under effective internal controls are more 
reliable than those developed in the absence of internal controls. 
• The independent attester's direct personal knowledge, obtained 
through physical examination, observation, computation, and inspec­
tion, is more persuasive than information obtained indirectly. 
Thus, in the hierarchy of available attest procedures, those that involve 
search and verification (e.g., inspection, confirmation, observation, etc.), 
particularly when using independent sources outside the entity, are generally 
considered to be more reliable in reducing attestation risk than those involving 
mere inquiries and comparisons of internal data (e.g., discussions with 
individuals responsible for the assertion and analytical review). On the other 
hand, the latter are generally less expensive to apply in practice. 
The foremost objective in any attest engagement is to accumulate sufficient 
evidence to limit attestation risk to a level that is, in the attester's professional 
judgment, appropriate for the assurance to be provided. In positive opinion 
engagements, such as audits of historical financial statements, this is accom­
plished by applying the so-called risk model approach. This approach provides a 
framework for risk assessment to aid the auditor in planning procedures to 
reduce audit risk to an acceptably low level and allows the auditor the flexibility 
of determining the mix of audit procedures that most effectively and efficiently 
reduces audit risk to that level. 
We concur that the risk model concept is appropriate for both positive 
opinion and limited assurance engagements. However, we think more research 
and experience in applying the risk model are necessary to determine if it can 
be applied in limited assurance engagements the same way it is applied in 
positive assurance engagements. 
In positive opinion engagements, the risk model is applied on a case-by-
case basis to specific attest engagements. The attester assesses inherent and 
control risk (or makes assumptions about them) and designs substantive 
procedures to limit attest risk to an acceptable level. We have concerns that a 
case-by-case application of the risk model may not work as well in limited 
assurance engagements. 
Our concerns about the risk model are not based on any internal conceptual 
flaws in the model. The problem lies elsewhere. In our view, the prerequisite 
for applying the risk model—an acceptable level of attestation risk—may not be 
susceptible to sufficiently precise definition and communication in limited 
assurance engagements to allow it to be applied in the same manner as it is 
used in positive opinion engagements. 
To properly apply the risk model, the attester must know in advance the 
appropriate level of assurance to be achieved in an attest engagement. By its 
nature, the risk model requires that the assurance goal be specified independ­
ently of the procedures to be performed to achieve that assurance. 
By way of an explanatory analogy, one could say that the risk model is 
similar to a compass. A compass is a useful navigational tool only when the 
navigator has some fairly specific notion of the destination he is supposed to 
reach. The risk model is a useful attest tool only when the attester has some 
fairly specific notion of the assurance level he is supposed to reach. The 
compass cannot decide the destination for the navigator; it can only help guide 
him to that destination once it is specified. Similarly, the risk model cannot 
171 
decide what the level of assurance should be for the attester; it can only help 
guide him to that assurance once it is specified. 
The appropriate assurance objective for any given category of limited 
assurance engagements is a policy decision to be made at the profession level 
by a standard-setting body such as the Auditing Standards Board. Such 
decisions must be made at the profession level to ensure reasonable uniformity 
in reported assurance among attesters for the same category of limited 
assurance engagements. 
If the standard-setting body is to define the assurance goal in limited 
assurance engagements in terms usable in the risk model (i.e., independently 
of procedures), it must do so in either quantitative or qualitative terms. 
Currently, the profession is both unable and unwilling to quantify levels of 
assurance because (1) existing attest methods lack the precision to produce 
reliable quantification and (2) it is perceived that an unacceptable increase in the 
attester's exposure to business risk may result from quantification. 
Short of quantification, the level of assurance must be defined in qualitative 
terms; for example, "moderate." However, these qualitative terms may 
provide too vague an assurance target for attesters (e.g., does moderate mean 
20 percent assurance, 70 percent assurance, between 30 to 50 percent, or 
some other range?). Using such terms may fail to provide attesters and users 
with enough guidance to interpret in a sufficiently clear manner just what level 
of assurance the profession intends the attester to achieve. Without a more 
refined definition of assurance, the risk model is powerless to prescribe the 
necessary risk reduction, and the attester is left without adequate guidance for 
determining the appropriate scope of work. 
In existing limited assurance engagements, the profession has tried to 
overcome the inability to adequately define a targeted level of assurance that is 
independent of the risk model by authoritatively establishing one or more 
required levels of procedures. This prescribed procedures approach does not 
require an independent definition of assurance to be functional. Presumedly, 
the intended level of assurance is defined by the procedures prescribed. Since 
the scope of work for any given level of assurance is authoritatively defined, 
the resulting level of assurance is considered to be defined as well. 
Advocates of the procedures approach maintain that both attesters and 
users are better able to interpret the assurance intended, that attesters have 
guidance regarding the scope of work necessary to achieve the appropriate 
level of assurance, and that a clear line is drawn between positive opinion and 
limited assurance engagements. 
In effect, the prescribed procedures approach is an application of the risk 
model approach at the standard-setting level. The standard-setting body 
establishes relatively uniform procedures that define the appropriate attesta­
tion risk for a specific type of limited assurance engagement instead of 
individual attesters applying the risk model on a case-by-case basis. In effect, 
the standard setting body applies the risk model for attesters as a group.* 
* Some would argue that the essence of the risk model approach is the flexibility it gives the 
attester in designing procedures and that application of the risk model at the standard setting level 
eliminates that flexibility thereby destroying the usefulness of the model. Others believe, however, 
that the essence of the risk model is its ability to focus the attester's judgment on risk and the 
effectiveness of the model is not destroyed if that judgment is exercised at the standard setting 
level rather than by the individual attester. 
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Returning to the compass analogy, the prescribed procedures approach is 
similar to a navigational standard-setting body specifying the course to be 
followed by all navigators for a particular trip. The individual navigators need 
not know the precise destination in advance; they need only follow the 
prescribed course to arrive at the destination. Indeed, some advocates of this 
approach would maintain that the standard-setting body need not even know 
the precise destination in prescribing the course. They can specify a course, 
assess what destination the course leads to, and evaluae whether that 
destination is approximately where they desire all navigators to reach. 
We also have concerns about the prescribed procedures approach. Our 
major concern is that the approach either ignores or assumes constant the 
inherent and control risks in specific attest engagements. It implicitly assumes 
that the application of relatively uniform categories of procedures, such as 
inquiry and analytical review, will yield relatively uniform assurance levels in a 
given category of limited assurance engagements. 
In specific limited assurance engagements, just as in specific positive 
assurance engagements, there are differences in inherent and control risk. If 
prescribed procedures are applied without considering these risks, the as­
surance levels achieved are likely to vary, perhaps widely. 
In the final analysis, our concerns about both the risk model and the 
prescribed procedures approach are rooted in the ability of either of them to 
yield reasonably uniform assurance levels across a specific category of attest 
engagements. We believe that reasonably uniform assurance levels are 
essential to the acceptance and use of limited assurance reports. The 
profession sorely needs a better understanding of the relative variation in 
assurance levels under both approaches. Perhaps research and practical 
experience will provide that understanding in the near future. 
Of course, in connection with those engagements performed solely for the 
benefit of specified users, the attester should be required to perform only 
those procedures which have been designed, or agreed to, by such users. For 
this purpose, specified users include those individuals and entities who have 
participated in the establishment of the nature and scope of the attest 
engagement either directly or through a designated representative. As a 
result, such engagements can be tailored completely to the users need, and the 
proposed attest standard would require the attester to merely comply with the 
arrangements made with the specified users. 
Standards of Reporting 
(1) The Report Shall Identify the Assertions Being Reported on and State the 
Character of the Attest Engagement and Its Conformity with These Standards 
and with the Arrangements Made with Specified Users, If Any. 
This standard is derived from the portion of the existing fourth reporting 
standard that requires an auditor to indicate the character of the examination. 
The standard has been modified to be generally applicable to different levels of 
assurance on various representations and to recognize engagements agreed 
upon by specific parties. The requirement to indicate the character of the 
examination could be satisfied by either referring in the report to a specific 
interpretive standard that describes the scope of the attest engagement or by 
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delineating the scope of the engagement in the report itself. In the case of 
engagements with specific parties, the attester would explicitly describe the 
scope of work as agreed upon with the parties. 
(2) The Report Shall State the Attester's Conclusion, in the Form of Either a 
Positive Opinion or Negative Assurance, as to Whether the Assertions Are 
Presented in Conformity with Established and Recognized Criteria or, in Their 
Absence, Stated Reasonable Criteria for Reports Distributed to the Public, the 
Conclusion Shall Provide the Highest Level of Assurance Permissible by 
Authoritative Interpretive Standards Consistent with the Work Performed and the 
Evidence Obtained. 
This standard is derived from the first and fourth existing reporting 
standards, modified to be generally applicable to different levels of assurance 
on various types of representations. It permits only two forms of attest 
assurance—positive opinions or negative assurance. 
Obviously, there are other forms of assurance that we rejected. These 
forms can be illustrated by reference to Figure 1. 
Figure 1 graphically illustrates that the more corroborative evidence obtained 
from the scope of an attest engagement, the greater the assurance that can be 
expressed. Thus, one form for describing the specific level of assurance being 
provided would be to indicate quantitatively where a particular engagement 
falls on the diagonal line. For instance, a report might state that the attester 
was Y percent confident that an assertion was within X percent of the dollars 
represented (or some other unit of measure). We do not believe, however, 
that the profession has achieved (nor that it may ever achieve) sufficient 
sophistication in attest methods to permit reliable quantification of assurance 
levels in public reports at this time. 
Another possible form of assurance would differentiate qualitatively the 
levels of assurance achieved in limited assurance engagements by varying the 
strength of the words used in the attester's report. We believe, however, that 
this alternative runs contrary to the profession's experience which seems to 
indicate that it is unrealistic and inappropriate to expect users to distinguish 
between different attest reports prepared by different attesters on the basis of 
different descriptions of work performed and assurance provided. Conse­
quently, we favor the use of only the positive and negative form of assurance 
communicated in standard report language and reject attempts to communicate 
subtle differences in levels of assurance by the use of different (and often hard 
to define) qualitative terms. 
Figure 1 
Level 
of 
Assurance 
C o r r o b o r a t i v e Evidence Obtained 
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The specific wording of the report would be left to authoritative interpre­
tive pronouncements. We believe, however, that the logical starting point 
would be the development of a standard attest report that communicates the 
highest level of assurance an attester would be permitted to provide on 
whatever assertion he is reporting—the so-called "positive opinion."* After 
that development, the standard report wording for negative assurance would 
follow. 
Unfortunately, although the form of reporting is one of the most sensitive 
aspects of any attest engagement, the profession has probably done most 
poorly in attempting to define consistent standards for limited assurance 
engagements in this area. For instance, in some cases reports currently state 
"nothing has come to our attention" (typical negative assurance language); 
other reports indicate "we have no adjustments to propose" (sometimes 
called positive limited assurance); and in still other engagements, no report is 
given unless there is an exception to report (implicit negative assurance). In 
addition to these forms of limited assurance, there is at least one engagement 
in which the report states that specified data "is fairly stated in all material 
respects" in relation to a bigger unit—the complete financial statements 
(supplementary information in audit-submitted documents). 
Again, we believe that only one form of assurance below a positive opinion 
should be permitted. This form should be negative assurance because it can be 
easily adapted to any kind of assertion (financial or otherwise) and is least 
subject to misunderstanding by report readers. 
Although this standard restricts the forms of assurance, it does not 
explicitly place a limit on the number of different levels of assurance that could 
be expressed. Even if only one form of limited assurance is permitted— 
negative assurance—the actual level of assurance it provides will vary depend­
ing on the scope of the engagement (which can theoretically vary from 1 to 99 
percent of the assurance provided by a positive opinion). 
This situation raises two additional considerations. The first is how many 
different levels of negative assurance should be permitted for limited assurance 
engagements. The second is whether there is some minimum level of 
procedures which should always be performed (a floor) for an attester's 
assurance to be professional and meaningful to users. 
Regarding the first consideration, we believe that, where public reports are 
involved, the number of appropriate levels of assurance should generally be 
decided by the standard-setting body through interpretive statements. Al­
though it is our opinion that currently the profession has not developed the 
attest methods and communication devices to provide more than one level of 
negative assurance in such circumstances, future developments in these areas 
may one day make it feasible to provide more than one level of negative 
assurance. Our proposed standards provide for that possibility. 
Restricted reports issued solely to specified users pose a different 
situation. Since such individuals will have directly participated in establishing 
* Theoretically, the positive opinion is not the highest level of assurance that could be achieved. It 
is based on a concept of reasonableness rather than precise accuracy. A positive opinion, if 
illustrated on Figure 1, would be a horizontal line somewhere fairly close to the top of the existing 
diagonal. 
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the nature and scope of the engagement, the level of negative assurance 
provided can and should be tailored to their particular needs. 
As long as only one level of negative assurance is permitted in public 
reports, the second consideration will not arise. That is, the authoritatively 
defined level of assurance (through the risk model, prescribed procedures, or 
some other approach) also will establish the minimum scope of attest work for a 
public report. However, should future developments in attest methods make it 
reasonable for more than one level of negative assurance to be expressed, we 
would advocate a minimum scope of attest procedures below which no 
assurance would be expressed.* 
This standard also requires the attester's conclusion in public reports to be 
commensurate with the work performed; that is, the attester is required to 
express the highest level of assurance permitted by the standards that is 
consistent with the extent of the work performed. This provision discourages 
users from inferring more assurance than that specified in the attester's 
report. This has been a problem in the past when users have asserted that a 
report can be given greater weight because they know more work has been 
done than the assurance in the report implies. 
(3) The Report Shall State All of the Attester's Substantive Reservations About 
the Engagement and Assertions. 
This standard is also derived from the existing fourth reporting standard, 
modified to be appropriate for different levels of assurance on various types of 
representations. It applies equally to public-use and restricted-use reports. 
The words "reservations about the engagement" refer to any problem that 
the attester had in complying with the PAS or any interpretive statements or 
with procedures agreed to by specific parties. The reference to "reservations 
about assertions" pertains to any reservations about the conformity of the 
presentation with established and recognized criteria (or stated criteria) 
including required informative disclosures.* 
(4) The Report Shall Contain a Statement of Limitations on the Use of the Attest 
Report If It Is Intended Solely for Users Who Have Participated in the 
Establishment of the Nature and Scope of the Engagement. 
This is an additional standard created in recognition of the fact that the 
attest function can encompass engagements to apply procedures agreed upon 
by the asserter and user (directly or through a designated representative) for 
their mutual benefit. Reports on such engagements should clearly indicate that 
they are intended solely for the benefit of the specified parties and may not be 
useful to anyone else. 
* The appropriate minimum should be established by interpretive pronouncement since specific 
types of engagements are likely to require different attest approaches. 
Another issue related to this standard that should be dealt with by interpretive statements is 
whether it is permissible to express separate conclusions on individual assertions within a 
presentation of assertions or whether it is permissible to provide any assurance on an individual 
assertion when the attester has either disclaimed an opinion or issued an adverse opinion on the 
group of assertions taken as a whole. 
* It should be noted that the existing second and third reporting standards are not contained in 
PAS. Both standards (consistency and informative disclosure) are deemed to be encompassed by 
the proposed third reporting standard that requires the attester to state a conclusion on conformity 
with established and recognized criteria. 
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How Should the Change Be Implemented? 
We believe there are four approaches that could be taken to adopt the 
proposed attest standards. While we discard two of these approaches as 
unacceptable, we believe further study and consideration must be given to the 
remaining two before the most appropriate means of adoption can be deter­
mined. The four alternatives are: 
• Adopt PAS as a replacement of GAAS at the same level of authority 
following due process. 
• Adopt PAS as authoritiative standards for all attest engagements, 
including audits of historical financial statements, following due 
process but without withdrawing GAAS—in effect, at a higher level 
than GAAS. 
• Adopt PAS as new standards for attest engagements not covered by 
GAAS at the same level of authority as GAAS following due process. 
• Adopt PAS as informal guidance to the Auditing Standards Board 
without withdrawing GAAS. 
The key differences between the four alternatives are (1) whether PAS will 
replace or supplement GAAS, (2) whether PAS are intended to achieve 
authoritativeness through due process procedures, and (3) whether PAS will 
function at the same or at a higher level than GAAS. 
We reject the third and fourth alternatives. The latter is rejected because it 
would treat PAS as, at best, second-class recommendations which could be 
effectively ignored not only by current and future boards but also by attesters 
when it becomes desirable. 
The third approach is unacceptable because, while PAS would be authorita­
tive, this approach would draw a highly visible yet artificial distinction between 
audits of historical financial statements and other attest engagements and, 
thus, would be inconsistent with the basic skills and experience necessary to 
perform all attest engagements. We believe that there is a common level of 
skill, training, and experience necessary to perform any attest engagement 
and, therefore, that PAS should apply to all such engagements. 
While we believe that one of the first two alternatives should be adopted, 
we are undecided as to which approach would be best. The first approach 
would bring all attest engagements under the same set of standards, where we 
believe they logically belong. In addition, it would eliminate the potential 
confusion that might otherwise result from retaining GAAS but establish a 
single, self-contained definition of the CPA-attester's role in society. 
We also believe, however, that the second approach has merit because an 
elimination of GAAS could dilute the importance of audits of historical financial 
statements and, more importantly, create potentially serious problems in those 
jurisdictions that have through statute or regulation granted CPAs a monopoly 
in that type of attest service. Changing from GAAS to PAS could create 
legislative problems potentially more serious than having two sets of stand­
ards. 
Call For Action 
The time for change is ripe—perhaps overripe. Without it, the AICPA will 
find it increasingly difficult to be responsive to the needs of practitioners, and 
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the profession could lose credibility by failing to establish timely standards to 
assure the quality of practice in new areas of service. 
Inevitably, there will be some who pale at the thought of changing the 
Decalogue; such a change is always difficult. However, GAAS are outdated. 
The role of the attester in society has outgrown them, leaving large and 
undesirable voids in professional standards. And this growth in attest services 
will continue whether or not the AICPA and ASB acknowledge and accommo­
date it within professional and ethical standards. 
The reality is that the marketplace continues to demand new attest 
services to meet the new and growing needs of users. This is a healthy and 
progressive environment for a profession. 
The proposed attest standards are designed merely to assure that this 
expansion of services takes place in an orderly, controlled manner and within 
professional guidelines that ensure consistency and quality in the delivery of 
professional services. We need these standards now. 
End Notes 
1. "Tentative Statement of Auditing Standards—Their Generally Accepted Significance and 
Scope," Special Report by the Committee on Auditing Procedure, AIA, 1947. 
2. For a detailed analysis of these standards see "An Analysis of Professional Standards for 
Limited Assurance Engagements," Alan J. Winters (an unpublished paper prepared for the 
Auditing Standards Board). 
Appendix 
Comparison of Proposed Attest Standards and 
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards 
Proposed Attest Standards 
General Standards 
1. The engagement shall be performed by a 
person or persons having adequate technical 
training and proficiency as an attester. 
2. The engagement shall be performed by an 
attester or attesters commanding compe-
tence in the subject matter of the assertion 
on which assurance is to be provided. 
3. The attester shall accept an attest engage-
ment only if he or she has reason to believe 
the following two conditions exist: 
•The assertions must be capable of evalua-
tion against established and recognized 
criteria or, in their absence, against rea-
sonable criteria that are stated in the pres-
entation of the assertions in a sufficiently 
clear and comprehensive manner for a 
reader to be able to understand them and 
determine if they are relevant for his or her 
purposes. 
• The assertions must be capable of rea-
sonably consistent estimation or meas-
urement; that is, competent people using 
the same or similar measurement or dis-
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards 
General Standards 
1. The examination is to be performed by a 
person or persons having adequate technical 
training and proficiency as an auditor. 
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Proposed Attest Standards 
closure criteria should obtain materially 
similar estimates or measurements. 
4. In all matters relating to the attest engage-
ment, an independence in mental attitude 
shall be maintained by the attester or attes-
ters. 
5. Due professional care shall be exercised in 
the performance of the engagement and the 
preparation of the report. 
Standards of Field Work 
1. The work shall be adequately planned and 
assistants, if any, shall be properly super-
vised. 
2. Sufficient evidence shall be obtained to pro-
vide a basis for the assurance that is to be 
communicated in the attest report or to 
comply with the arrangements made with 
specified users. 
Standards of Reporting 
1. The report shall identify the assertions be-
ing reported on and state the character of 
his attest engagement and its conformity 
with these standards and with the arrange-
ments made with specified users, if any. 
2. The report shall state the attester's conclu-
sion, in the form of either a positive opinion 
or negative assurance, as to whether the 
assertions are presented in conformity with 
established and recognized criteria or, in 
their absence, stated reasonable criteria. 
For reports distributed to the public, the 
conclusion shall provide the highest level of 
assurance permissible by authoritative in-
terpretive standards consistent with the 
work performed and the evidence obtained. 
3. The report shall state all of the attester's 
substantive reservations about the engage-
ment and assertions. 
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards 
2. In all matters relating to the assignment, an 
independence in mental attitude is to be 
maintained by the auditor or auditors. 
3. Due professional care is to be exercised in 
the performance of the examination and the 
preparation of the report. 
Standards of Field Work 
1. The work is to be adequately planned and 
assistants, if any, are to be adequately 
supervised. 
2. There is to be a proper study and evaluation 
of the existing internal control as a basis for 
reliance thereon and for the determination 
of the extent of the tests to which auditing 
procedures are to be restricted. 
3. Sufficient competent evidential matter is to 
be obtained through inspection, observa-
tion, inquiries, and confirmations to afford a 
reasonable basis for an opinion regarding the 
financial statements under examination. 
Standards of Reporing 
1. The report shall state whether the financial 
statements are presented in accordance 
with generally accepted accounting princi-
ples. 
2. The report shall state whether such princi-
ples have been consistently observed in the 
current period in relation to the preceding 
period. 
3. Informative disclosures in the financial 
statements are to be regarded as reasonably 
adequate unless otherwise stated in the 
report. 
4. The report shall either contain an express of 
opinion regarding the financial statements, 
taken as a whole, or an assertion to the 
effect that an opinion cannot be expressed. 
When an overall opinion cannot be ex-
pressed, the reasons therefor should be 
stated. In all cases where an auditor's name 
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Proposed Attest Standards Generally Accepted Auditing Standards 
4. The report shall contain a statement of 
limitations on the use of the attest report if it 
is intended solely for users who have partici-
pated in the establishment of the nature and 
scope of the engagement. 
is associated with financial statements, the 
report should contain a clear-cut indication 
of the character of the auditor's examina-
tion, if any, and the degree of responsibility 
he is taking. 
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Discussant's Response to 
Let's Change GAAS!!! ??? *&# @ 
William L. Felix, Jr. 
University of Arizona 
Periodic reevaluation and reexamination of all aspects of our professional 
environment constitute an excellent idea. The authors of this paper are to be 
complimented on their efforts to take ill-formed feelings of dissatisfaction with 
current Generally Accepted Auditing Standards, identify a need for change, and 
develop a response that should provide all of us here today a chance to think 
and to argue about the changes to Generally Accepted Auditing Standards are 
currently appropriate. I do agree, in general, with their argument that 
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards need reevaluation and probably need 
change. 
General Observations 
I also have two rather strong reservations on the content of their paper 
which I will try to support with some of my more detailed comments later on. 
There is considerable unevenness in the presentation in this paper, and many 
of its views and positions are, at best, weakly supported. It is very distracting 
to try to agree with a paper and the arguments in it when many of these 
arguments are poorly supported. In addition, for a paper that is proposing basic 
modifications to the conceptual criteria for professional auditing, there is very 
little theory. In particular, I would like to have seen a careful identification of 
the appropriate level and content of overall standards; that is, a thorough 
discussion of the level of concept at which GAAS should exist. In addition, a 
systematic argument from this concept or theoretical framework as to what the 
specific standards ought to comprise is needed. 
For example, there is no definition of the term "attestation." A well-
thought-out definition that leads one to some of the constructs underlying this 
service to society would seem essential. I usually think of "attestation" in 
terms of third party assurance on the "quality" of reasonably objective 
economic information. I would argue that "quality" criteria that would provide 
a framework against which auditors could evaluate their performance should, 
as the authors point out in a place or two, be established at a high level. 
Detailed content specifying specific actions or lack of action should be avoided 
and deferred to later interpretations of the basic criteria promulgated by the 
appropriate senior committee of the AICPA. The definition given above would 
suggest that the overall criteria ought to include a description of acceptable 
third parties, general criteria for the process of forming a level of assurance, 
reporting criteria, and possibly, although debatably, other criteria. After 
developing such a setting, the paper could then move on to proposing specific 
standards and to comparing them with existing GAAS in a logically coherent 
fashion. 
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As an aside, I found the authors a bit harsh in their implicit evaluation of the 
Auditing Standards Board. They seemed to suggest that, in setting standards 
for historical financial statements, the Auditing Standards Board is very faithful 
in followig GAAS. On the contrary, when setting standards for services other 
than audits of historical financial statements, the Auditing Standards Board is 
pictured as charging off in all directions with very little discipline or careful 
thought. I think neither extreme is accurate. One could hardly consider the 
Auditing Standards Board as faithfully following GAAS when, in fact, they are 
modifying GAAS in particular SASs. For example, a change in the second field 
work standard is included in SAS 43. On the other hand, in setting standards 
for internal control reports in SAS 30, one could argue that the Auditing 
Standards Board was reasonably consistent, at least with the spirit of GAAS in 
establishing both field work and reporting guidance for this type of service. 
Some Detailed Comments 
The introduction to this paper seems intended to create a splash. But it is 
not clear to me that the changes proposed in this paper are really so dramatic. 
The proposed standards seem quite consistent with what I would view as the 
spirit of the original GAAS, and, in fact, later on in the paper, the authors 
explicitly state that they are going to follow the framework of GAAS. Also, in 
their zeal to present a strong case for their proposed modifications, the authors 
seem to overdo their arguments. For example, note the logic in the opening 
pages. The proposition here is that GAAS "no longer provide sufficient 
foundation for guidance. . . . " In support for this proposition, the authors 
indicate that GAAS are old (36-years old), that they are designed for audits of 
historical financial statements, that they are restricted to these financial 
statements because they are specifically mentioned in the standards, that 
practice at the time involved only audits of historical financial statements, and 
that since GAAS were not intended for other service, it is illogical to conclude 
that they were intended or could be interpreted as applying to other services. 
These arguments do not support the premise. They do nothing to demonstrate 
that GAAS are, in any explicit sense, insufficient or inappropriate, other than 
that they make specific reference to one narrow type of service. The resulting 
standards that the authors develop may be reached by another argument. For 
example, consider the view that the current standards are "in spirit" a 
reasonable start. As mentioned above, the authors could use that framework 
and a "qualitative criteria" objective to reach the proposed standards. 
A bit further on in the paper, the authors point out four problems: 1) that 
audit services exist for which there are no general quality criteria or standards, 
2) that statements on auditing standards have been established "on the basis of 
inapplicable general standards," 3) that statements of auditing standards for 
new services are inconsistent, and 4) that there is no guidance for future 
possible services. Let's discuss each of these in sequence. 
Concerning problem 1, the authors point out that GAAS do not restrict new 
services and that, as a result, new services beyond the boundaries of current 
GAAS have been offered purportedly without any authoritative guidance. 
Implicitly, they say, therefore, that new standards are necessary. Something is 
left out. Two logical links that occur to a reader are as follows. The authors are 
assuming 1) that no services should be offered without explicit or implicit 
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coverage in GAAS and 2) that no services should be offered beyond the 
boundaries of such established GAAS. Neither of these premises is supported. 
In discussing problem 2, where they believe that SASs have been 
established on the basis of inapplicable general standards, they point out that 
new services exist that have no basis in statements in auditing standards and 
that other SASs supporting new services are of "questionable authority." 
There seems to be underlying disposition, although not specifically stated and 
argued, that all SASs must be derived from GAAS rather directly as a matter of 
coherence and legality. This connection is mentioned in rule 202 but is not 
especially clear elsewhere in our professional literature. While it may be 
desirable, it would be of considerable interest to have the authors establish this 
point. Also, it is not clear why SASs for other services that are in some sense 
consistent with the underlying concepts in GAAS are of questionable authority. 
In any case, based on these rather ill-supported arguments, the authors 
conclude that new standards are necessary to legitimize Statements on 
Auditing Standards. 
In discussing problem 3, where they argue that the SASs are inconsistent 
where not based on GAAS, they refer to inconsistencies, ambiguities, and 
fragmented professional requirements without illustration and then suggest 
that new standards would eliminate the problem. While I might agree that new 
standards may help, a part of the problem to which they refer may be due to 
other factors. For example, the abilities of the current board and auditing 
division staff or the effects of the political process on standard setting may be 
partial causes. In any case, the arguments for this problem are not convincing. 
There are no specific problems described, nor are the reasons that new PAS 
would eliminate (or reduce) the problem given. 
In discussion problem 4—the need for guidance for future possible 
services—they point out that, since GAAS is limited to audits of historical 
financial statements, they are "impotent" as authoritative guidance for future 
services. Based on this assertion, they state that new standards are neces­
sary. There is, again, no argument or evidence given to support their view, 
other than their assertion. Also, in this section, they point out that, if 
restrictions are desired on new services, new standards should establish such 
restrictions. There is no theory or argument given for the idea that future 
services should be restricted. 
Arguments for Proposed Changes 
In this section of the paper, the authors begin by pointing out that existing 
GAAS provide a valid model. Does this assertion suggest that there are 
concepts underlying GAAS that continue to be useful? I believe such to be the 
case. In fact, the argument here suggests that the previous positions are 
overdone. I would also like to take issue with the point that sufficient 
comprehensive standards must provide basic guidance. I am not sure what the 
authors mean by basic guidance, but I prefer the term "quality criteria," since 
it is my view that guidance carries with it the connotation of specific rules and 
procedures for practitioners that are best left to Statements on Auditing 
Standards or other rule-making derived from the general standards being 
proposed. 
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In reviewing the authors' list of items that specifically should be covered by 
auditing standards, I am not clear whether or not the authors meant this list to 
be comprehensive, but it is not, since personal standards and most of the field 
work standards are omitted. The use of a list of imperatives suggests the need 
for a complete list leading to the proposed standards. 
At this point in the paper, the authors raise the issue of whether or not we 
should call ourselves attesters or auditors. I have a bias towards retaining the 
term "auditor." It seems to me that the term is understood broadly by the 
general public and that there is no evidence that the general public restricts this 
term to audits of historical financial statements. Also, the term "auditor" is 
identified in statute and by the public, as a group who are expert at providing 
assurance. 
Comments on Specific Standards 
Let's look, first, at the proposed second general standard on competence. I 
found the term, "commanding competence," interesting. It seems to me that 
society's expectation should control here. That is, some degree of competence 
is likely to be required of and perceived by the public as residing with the 
auditor or attester, regardless of any standards we establish. This leaves me 
agreeing with the overall objective of the standard, but it is not clear how the 
objective should be achieved. Will the word "commanding competence" be 
understood? And is this standard really necessary, or might guidance better be 
given in SASs? 
The third general standard also seems okay in concept, but it is also too 
detailed. I would leave for Statements on Auditing Standards the issues of 
clarity and consistency in estimation. Such issues are subject to changing social 
expectations and are better left to changeable interpretations of the basic 
standards. 
The second field work standard includes discussion that goes far beyond 
that necessary to support the standard. The authors seem to have spent quite 
a bit of time agonizing over the appropriateness of the audit risk model included 
in SAS 47. I am not sure of the purpose of this discussion, but it is interesting 
to note that the concept of the risk model is logically consistent with the 
concept of assurance that is basic to the attest function. I was also somewhat 
disturbed by the discussion of a need for reasonably uniform assurance levels 
and the subsequent call for research. This discussion needs focus. It is very 
likely that auditors currently provide different levels assurance in audited 
financial statements. Is this bad, or is it even avoidable? I do not think so. Our 
problem is a lack of agreement on the definition and use of the term assurance. 
A better development of the idea of when and where assurance can vary and 
how the variation should be reported would seem more precise for this section. 
Reporting standards 3 and 4 discussed toward the paper's end seem 
awfully detailed. Are they really needed? They sound like specific guidance 
rather than criteria for auditors in the long run. 
An Overview 
This paper is clearly well designed to provide us with the substance for a 
good discussion. The proposed standards, themselves, seem to be a good 
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effort but may include too much detail. The paper supporting these standards 
has too much of a flavor of a sales pitch and would have been much more 
effective if framed in concept and theory. In addition, the legal and political 
dimensions of the proposed changes are not made clearly in the paper and need 
much more discussion. 
185 
8 
Self-Regulation: How It Works 
R. K. Mautz* 
University of Michigan 
Member, Public Oversight Board 
So that the academics in the audience may have some understanding of the 
impact of the peer review process when it was rather suddenly self-imposed on 
the accounting profession, I suggest you stretch your imaginations and 
consider the following analogy to the peer review process as if it were a reality. 
An Analogy to the Peer Review Program 
Every three years, your department must engage an accounting depart­
ment from another school, or an AAA appointed team, to review your 
department's quality control system. In preparation for that review, you must 
first file a quality control document that includes: 
1. Factual information about the size of your department, students, and 
faculty. 
2. A statement of the goals of your department and how these 
reconcile with and are supported by the goals of the college and 
university. 
3. Your department's policies and practices with respect to: 
a. Recruiting faculty and students. 
b. Faculty promotions, pay, and allocations of other re­
sources. 
c. Content of course outlines. 
d. Selection of textbooks, including provisions for avoiding 
any conflicts of interest. 
e. Grading practices and provisions for faculty evaluation. 
f. Nature, extent, cost, and relevance of research activities 
of faculty members. 
g. Allocation of committee activities and extent of academic 
community service. 
h. Nature and extent of, and rewards for, professional 
service. 
i. Nature and extent of faculty consulting, its relationship to 
department goals, and controls exercised to prevent 
excessive consulting. 
The purpose of the independent review of your department by your peers 
is to determine whether these policies and practices provide reasonable 
* These remarks represent my personal views and are not offered as necessarily representive of 
any official position of the Public Oversight Board. 
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assurance of quality performance by your department from the standpoint of 
the students and others who rely upon it. The review will also determine the 
extent to which members of your faculty actually comply with those policies 
and procedures and with any regulations imposed by your college, university, 
regents, or other authorities. 
In performing the review, the review team will visit classes, review syllabi, 
meet with faculty members and students, examine any policy manuals or 
handbooks used within your department or university, read examinations and 
test the grading thereof, read faculty-authored publications, and take such 
other steps as it considers necessary to form an opinion on the adequacy and 
effectiveness of your quality control system. 
The review team's conclusions will be expressed in a formal opinion 
supplemented by a letter of comment noting ways in which your system of 
quality control might be improved. This report and letter of comments will be 
placed in a public file open to your dean, students, their parents, alumni, and 
anyone else interested. 
You will pay for the review at standard consulting rates and from your own 
departmental budget. You may or may not have an opportunity to make similar 
reviews of other departments. No reciprocal reviews are permitted. 
This is at least a rough analogy to the peer review program adopted by the 
AICPA—with what some members thought was excesssive haste. The 
leadership of the profession both believed in what they were imposing upon 
their own and other firms and also felt that they had no viable alternative. The 
practitioners who had little or nothing to do with the big decisions but whose 
lives and pocketbooks were directly affected by those decisions did not 
welcome the results with great enthusiasm. 
The Nature of Professional Regulation 
Discussing professional regulation with you involves two difficulties. First, 
it is still developing so that there is no way to bring you the final word, if there 
ever will be one. Second, our time is limited and the subject is complex. Hence, 
I can give you no more than a summary treatment of the subject. 
You may find it helpful to think of professional regulation in terms of one 
goal, two approaches, and three levels. 
Stated in simple terms, the goal is to protect the public against audit and 
accounting failures. 
The two approaches are punishment and education. Some believe strongly 
that the greatest incentive to quality work is the sure knowledge that failure to 
comply with standards is prompt and appropriate punishment. Almost every­
one believes that there are at least some cases in which punishment is 
appropriate and that punishing the wrongdoer does, indeed, have some 
deterrent effect on those who otherwise might be tempted to indulge in the 
same improper practice. 
Others believe that education is the best possibility for improvement of 
professional performance. They hold that as many practitioners as possible 
should be educated to the existence of standards and how to meet them in the 
belief that most practitioners, indeed most people, desire to perform well. As 
you might surmise, a combination of these two approaches provides the best 
hope of adequate performance. 
188 
These two approaches are closely related to the three levels of regulation. 
Taking a broad view of professional regulation, one finds it applied by three 
authorities. Public regulation is applied by governmental bodies or agencies, is 
directed at punishing those who fall below minimum acceptable behavior, and 
has the full authority and power of the state for enforcement purposes. Most 
governmental regulation is concerned with conformity with legally established 
rules and regulations or with alleged breach of contract. In this country and 
many others, the government provides rules of discovery, subpoena, judicial 
review, appeal, and other measures intended to assure equitable treatment for 
both parties to any dispute. Punishment or damages that shift resources from 
one party to another may result. 
Peer regulation is performed through professional organizations which do 
not have either the power or authority of government. Their primary activity is 
to establish professional standards—such as generally accepted auditing stand­
ards, generally accepted accounting principles, standards of quality control, and 
rules of ethics—and to encourage members to accept and comply with them. 
The most that voluntary organizations can do in the way of punishment or 
enforcement is to censure or expel nonconforming members. Those who do 
not wish to comply either do not join the organization or drop out in protest 
against requirements they believe to be improper. Thus, peer regulation is a 
voluntary matter. 
Private regulation occurs within firms, to some extent within every firm, 
and, therefore, is the most pervasive form of regulation. The motivation is 
based on professional pride and enlightened self-interest. If a firm is to remain 
competitive, it cannot tolerate incompetent, careless, or untrustworthy em­
ployees. Furthermore, these are the kinds of employees most likely to make 
the mistakes that lead to litigation, a very undesirable event. 
Management of a firm does not have the authority or power of government, 
but it is far more powerful than a professional organization. The power to 
terminate employment is a strong one just as is the power to reward excellent 
performance both financially and with promotions into new opportunities. 
These options make private regulation extremely important in the overall 
regulatory process. 
Neither of the two approaches and no one of the three levels of regulation is 
sufficient by itself. If a profession is to be well regulated, public, professional, 
and private regulation must all be employed, most desirably with some degree 
of coordination and cooperation. Each of them has the potential for, and usually 
employs, both punishment and education to some extent, but public regulation 
tends to stress punishment whereas peer and private regulation emphasize 
education. 
The AICPA's Self-Regulatory Program 
Until 1977, the AICPA had been an organization offering personal member­
ships only. No provision of any kind was made for membership or activity by 
firms. Under pressure from Congress, in that year the AICPA made a rather 
remarkable change in its organization. It established a division for firms 
consisting of two sections, a Private Companies Practice Section and an SEC 
Practice Section. Any firm could join either or both of these sections. 
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Each section is governed by an executive committee appointed by the 
AICPA chairman with the approval of the AICPA Board of Directors. My 
discussion is concerned only with the SEC Practice Section. 
Serving under the executive committee are a peer review committee and a 
special investigations committee which are responsible for much of the work of 
the section. A Public Oversight Board (POB) of five members has been 
established to represent the public interest and to monitor the work of the 
section. It has no line authority, serving only in an oversight and advisory role. 
It does have considerable influence. 
The original POB was chaired by Mr. John McCloy, a man of very broad 
experience and great public service. Included in the membership were Arthur 
Woods and John Harper, retired chief executive officers of Sears and Alcoa, 
respectively, and Ray Garrett and William Carey, both former SEC chairmen. 
Both Mr. Garrett and Mr. Carey have since died, and Mr. McCloy resigned 
very recently. Al Sommers, formerly a member of the SEC, has been added to 
the Board's membership, and I was added earlier as the first and so far the only 
accountant on the Board. It has been a very interesting assignment. 
The Peer Review Process 
Under the supervision of the executive committee, the peer review 
committee and the special investigations committee direct most of the work of 
the section. Peer review is the heart of the self-regulatory program. It consists 
of a quality compliance review of each member firm every three years to be 
performed by peers; that is, by partners and managers from other firms. 
A quality compliance review is based on a set of standards that cover all 
aspects of a firm's accounting and auditing services. Nine elements of quality 
control have been identified. These are: 
• Independence 
• Assigning personnel to engagements 
• Consultation 
• Supervision 
• Hiring 
• Professional development 
• Advancement 
• Acceptance and continuation of clients 
• Inspection 
The section's Peer Review Manual explains the nature and scope of each of 
these elements. The establishment of this set of quality control standards 
represents a considerable achievement. A significant part of their development 
had been accomplished by the Institute's Committee on Auditing Procedure 
before 1977 and was available for the section to develop further when the need 
arose. They now provide to member firms an indication of what is expected of 
them in the way of quality assurance and the standards against which they will 
be measured during a compliance review. 
The compliance (peer) review team may come from another firm (engaged 
by the firm to be reviewed), or it may be a team selected by the peer review 
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committee for the purpose. The firm to be reviewed makes that choice. The 
review team is headed by a team captain who directs the work and writes the 
final report. 
In preparation for a compliance review, a firm prepares a quality control 
document which describes its policies and procedures for all the nine elements 
of quality control described previously. This document is supplied to the review 
team which reviews it for adequacy and compliance with professional standards 
and, during the course of the review, considers the appropriateness of the 
described policies and procedures for the firm under review. 
In performing the review, the review team reads the firm's policy and 
procedure manuals, studies its guides and check-lists, examines the technical 
library for adequacy, selects and examines work papers from audit engage­
ments, and interviews selected people from the professional staff. The Peer 
Review Manual provides guides regarding the number of accounting and audit 
engagement hours that should be tested by the review team and the number of 
offices to be visited in a multi-office practice. 
At the conclusion of the review, the team captain discusses with his team 
members the type of report to be issued. It may be unqualified; unqualified with 
a letter of comments about ways in which the quality control policies and 
procedures of the firm can be improved; modified and accompanied by a letter 
of comments; or adverse. 
At the conclusion of every compliance review, including compliance 
reviews of each office covered in a multi-office engagement, the review team 
captain and possibly his team members meet with the management of the 
reviewed firm or office to discuss their findings and conclusions, including the 
nature of the report. When a modified report or even a report with significant 
recommendations in the letter of comments is planned, the discussion in such 
an exit conference can become heated indeed. Professional pride on the part of 
the reviewed firm is such that an adverse report, a modified report, or even 
strong comments are not well received. At the same time, the reviewers also 
take some pride in their ability to improve any system they find. Whatever 
report is finally issued, together with any letter of comments, goes into a public 
file at the AICPA offices available to anyone interested in seeing it. 
The peer review committee will accept unqualified reports without a letter 
of comments for direct filing in the public file unless it has some reason to 
question the propriety of the report. Any report accompanied by a letter of 
comments will receive the committee's attention. Its question is whether the 
comments suggest the necessity of a modified or adverse report rather than an 
unqualified or modified report, respectively. In some cases, the peer review 
committee will detail one or more of its members to discuss with the team 
captain and any others involved any reservations which it may have. It may 
even send the review team back for more work, if it feels this is necessary, or 
schedule an additional or accelerated peer review to assure that recommended 
quality control improvements are actually implemented. Once the peer review 
committee is satisfied, a majority vote then accepts the report for public file 
purposes. 
In addition to the review by the peer review committee, the staff of the 
Public Oversight Board also reviews the quality compliance review work 
papers, attends the exit conference, or reads the report and letter of 
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comments. Finally, on a sampling basis and with the identity of the audit 
engagement work papers masked, representatives of the SEC Office of the 
Chief Accountant also review the peer review work papers and report. 
The Work of the Special Investigations Committee 
As mentioned, the peer review process works on a triennial rotation basis 
and on a sampling basis for each firm. Thus, there is no way a compliance 
review can assure freedom from error. In addition, compliance review is 
concerned with the reviewed firm's system of quality control policies and 
procedures. When litigation against a member firm concerning the propriety of 
its accounting or auditing findings is initiated, there immediately exists an 
implication that the quality control system is not adequate. Of course, 
allegations in litigation proceedings are no more than allegations until actually 
tested by the legal process. Nevertheless, the possibility that they might be 
found valid raises questions about the system of quality control. 
The special investigations committee was established to inquire into such 
possibilities. Each member firm must report all litigation involving audits of 
SEC clients within 30 days. The special investigations committee then can call 
for whatever information it considers necessary to discover whether the firm's 
quality control situation is adequate or not. It typically begins by reading the 
allegations and reviewing the financial statements to which they relate. It may 
also obtain the latest peer review report and letter of comments, consult with 
members of the review team and reviewed firm, and take whatever other steps 
are necessary to determine whether the allegations indicate a significant 
weakness in the firm's quality control. 
Allegations charged in litigation may be: 
• Frivolous. 
• Made in error relative to the role and responsibility of the independ­
ent accountant. 
• Valid but the result of personnel failure rather than failure of the 
quality control system. 
• Valid and the result of a weakness in the quality control system: 
Which the firm has already corrected. 
Which still needs to be strengthened. 
In almost half the cases that are reported, the committee finds the charges 
to be frivolous or based on error. These cases are promptly closed. When it 
finds what appear to be valid allegations with the likelihood that personnel 
failure is at fault, the committee leaves the matter to public regulation which is 
much better equipped to determine responsibility and fix punishment, if any is 
called for. If the allegations appear valid and imply a significant system 
weakness, the committee will call for a special review under its direct control. 
Such a review may be directed at specific offices of the firm, at the work of 
specific individuals, or at the services performed by the firm in a given industry 
or industries as seems necessary. The approach followed is one of seeking to 
find weaknesses that may exist so they can be remedied and the public 
protected. 
If the firm management has already looked into the possibilities and taken 
the necessary action, the committee desires assurance that this has really 
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happened and then will take no further action other than to add a report to that 
effect to the public file. If nothing has been done, it will insist that the member 
firm take appropriate action. 
When notification of litigation is first received, a staff summary is prepared 
and supplied to all (nine) members of the committee. The chairman will appoint 
one or more members as a task force to direct the staff in obtaining whatever 
additional information is needed. Until the task force members are themselves 
satisfied that the case should be closed and can influence the rest of the 
committee to agree, the case will remain open. The committee's desire, of 
course, is to reach the most effective conclusion as soon as possible, an 
effective conclusion being one that provides adequate protection to the public 
without undue cost to the member firm. 
The Executive Committee 
The executive committee supervises the peer review committee and the 
special investigations committee, providing general guidance as necessary. It 
also has final authority for the imposition of sanctions. These are provided for in 
general terms within the rules and membership requirements of the section 
which are necessarily limited in scope and authority. The self-regulatory 
program in no way replaces or substitutes for either public or private 
regulation. Firms or individuals found guilty of breaking the law or of breach of 
contract will be punished by our public regulatory process. Those found guilty 
of negligence, irresponsibility, or other inadequacies are likely to be dealt with 
by their employers in a manner that seems appropriate to them in the 
circumstances. Sanctions most likely to be imposed by the executive commit­
tee would be for failure to comply with membership requirements, including 
refusal to cooperate with either the peer review or the special investigations 
committee. The executive committee also has the authority to determine 
whether sanctions should be publicized. 
Sanctions mentioned in the Peer Review Manual include: 
• Corrective measures by the firm, including consideration by the firm 
of appropriate actions with respect to individual firm personnel. 
• Additional requirements for continuing professional education. 
• Accelerated or special peer reviews. 
• Monetary fines. 
Role of the Public Oversight Board 
In its guardianship of the public interest, the POB serves in an oversight 
capacity only. It has no line authority. Members of the staff and of the Board 
attend meetings of other components of the self-regulatory process, always 
have the privilege of entering into the discussion, sometimes meet with specific 
components or their leadership for discussion purposes, and do not hesitate to 
comment either critically or constructively as necessary. Responsiveness to 
Board comments has been gratifying. 
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Conclusion 
This paper provides no more than a quick introduction to the AICPA's 
program, but there are three thoughts I hope you will take with you. First, 
over time self-regulation should have a significant effect on the quality of audit 
service provided by independent accounting firms. It is a remarkably effective 
educational device. Second, self-regulation replaces nothing; it is an addition, 
not a substitution. Public and private regulation are still in place and effective. 
All three aspects of regulation are necessary to get the job done well. Third, as 
devised and as functioning, the present program is a remarkable addition to the 
regulatory mechanism previously in existence, so far as we can determine, 
unmatched in any other profession. 
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